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ABSTRACT
In industrialized countries there has been a long debate about the extent of market failure in 
health care. Recently similar concerns have arisen in developing countries as international 
organizations have advocated a greater role for the private sector. In many developing 
countries the private health care sector is already substantial, yet limited information is 
available about the behaviour of private providers. Empirical evidence is essential to the 
formulation of policies about and regulation of the private sector. This study explores the 
nature of hospital competition in Bangkok and in particular the impact which (i) problems of 
asymmetric information (ii) product differentiation and (iii) consumer behaviour have upon 
hospital competition.
The nature of hospital competition is analysed directly through examining the impact of 
market concentration on prices, profitability, intensity and quality of care provided, and 
indirectly through a consideration of the underlying market conditions and institutions and 
their impact on competition. Direct evidence is sought through the analysis of a hospital 
database covering approximately forty hospitals in the Greater Bangkok area. The indirect 
evidence is based on a survey of consumer knowledge and behaviour in the Bangkok health 
care market, supported by interviews and document review.
A substantial degree of both horizontal and vertical product differentiation is observed 
amongst hospitals in Bangkok. Consumers are relatively well-informed about differences 
between hospitals, willing to seek further information and quite sophisticated in their decision­
making, however only limited price sensitivity is apparent. Non-price competition is dominant; 
hospitals facing higher competition have higher profitability and higher prices. Some evidence 
of both quality competition and supplier induced demand is found, but the study is 
inconclusive as to the extent of these.
The findings support concerns in Thailand about the problems associated with a poorly 
regulated private health care sector and highlight the difficulties in regulating a very complex 
market such as that for hospital care.
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'Classical supply and demand analysis may help us to understand the 
social institutions o f very simple and primitive medical economies. But 
it is singularly unhelpful when applied to the immensely complicated 
play o f forces operating in the field of modern scientific medicine. 
Theoretical short-cuts are no substitute for the slow and painful study 
of reality.9
Titmuss 1963
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.0 WHY EXAMINE HEALTH CARE MARKETS?
The seeds of this thesis were sown during an investigation into the relative efficiency of public 
and private sector health care providers with a particular focus on developing countries. Despite 
the dearth of sound empirical studies from developing countries on this topic, the overwhelming 
impression was that there was no regular and predictable difference in efficiency between the two 
sectors. For example, in the US there are studies demonstrating that the unit cost at for-profit 
hospitals is higher than that at non-profit ones (Gaumer 1986), that the reverse is true (Bays 
1979), and that there is no significant difference (Register et al 1985). There are undoubtedly 
difficulties in comparing efficiency in the health care sector, the most obvious being the need to 
capture subtle variations in case-mix, severity and quality of care, but the apparently contradictoiy 
results described above are not necessarily due to flawed studies. Although textbook economics 
would suggest that for-profit organizations are likely to operate more efficiently than other 
organizations due to their profit motive, this result is dependent upon a standard and smoothly 
functioning market place. If the market does not operate in a standard manner, for example 
prices are paid by a third party insurer and often constitute a simple mark-up on production costs, 
then the rational profit maximizer may not minimize costs. This was indeed the explanation used 
by Gaumer (op cit) to explain his study findings. The behaviour of health care providers is so 
dependent upon market and regulatoiy structures that any attempt to analyse the behaviour of 
providers without reference to their environment is bound to fail. This is of course true of other 
goods as well, but the complexity and diversity of health care markets makes the maxim even 
more important.
During the past decade a reappraisal of the appropriate role of the state has taken place, across 
a wide range of sectors and countries. Our original investigation of the comparative efficiency of 
public and private health care providers had been stimulated by a policy shift during the mid to 
late nineteen-eighties in international organizations such as the World Bank and bilateral donors 
such as USAID. These organizations had advocated an increased role for the private sector in 
health care (World Bank 1987, World Bank 1993). The new policy line emerging was not
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obviously the product of a considered and rational examination of developing country problems. 
There was clearly a strong ideological component to the proposed reforms, however the most 
commonly stated rationale for the new set of policies was that the increased use of market 
mechanisms in health care would improve efficiency. It was suggested that private organizations 
were generally more efficient than public ones (World Bank 1987). An important role for 
government in the provision of certain preventive and public health services such as 
immunization, water supply and treatment of tuberculosis was acknowledged as the existence of 
both externalities and merit good characteristics in such services would lead to their under­
provision if left to the private sector. But curative health care services, it was argued, are much 
like any other good and as such should be financed and provided privately (Birdsall 1989, Griffin 
1989).
In developing countries themselves there is often widespread acknowledgement of inefficiencies 
within the public health care system (Mills 1995). However probably the principal appeal of 
privatization policies to developing country policy makers is that they will relieve the pressure 
on already overstretched and often under-funded Ministry of Health budgets.
There is only limited empirical evidence to support the claims being made about private health 
care providers in developing countries, indeed until recently very little research on the private 
health care sector had been undertaken. A handful of research studies have investigated the size 
and growth of the sector (eg. Bhat 1991, McIntyre and Valentine 1995, Parker 1980), the 
characteristics of users of private providers (Mulou et al 1991), the relative efficiency of public 
and private sector providers (Alailima and Mohideen 1984) and the quality of care offered by 
private providers (Aljunid 1995, Uplekar 1989a and b). Household surveys have commonly been 
used to estimate the demand for health care services including that for private sector care (Akin 
et al 1986, Heller 1982). There has been virtually no work on the nature of the health care 
market environment in developing countries and how this interacts with provider behaviour.
Furthermore appropriate conceptual and methodological tools for examining health care markets 
have hardly been developed. In industrial economics the traditional starting point for investigating 
markets is an analysis of market structure and how market structure affects the behaviour and 
profitability of firms (Shy 1995, Waterson 1984). In health care even the definition of a market
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is not straightforward; is it appropriate to speak of a market for inpatient services, or a market for 
surgical services, or a market for appendectomies? Measures of market concentration will vary 
according to whether a narrow specialty service or a broader grouping of services is considered 
(Robinson et al 1991). The geographical definition of market areas is also unclear; a market may 
be defined in terms of actual patterns of utilization or some notional measure of accessibility such 
as distance to the hospital. This too will affect measures of concentration.
Health care systems in most Western European countries are financed from the public purse or 
through compulsory health insurance schemes. Thus although provision of care may be shared 
between the public and private sector (as is the case in France and Germany for example), the 
emphasis until recently has been on collaboration and coordination rather than creating the 
competitive pressures of the market place. Even recent health care reforms within Europe still 
carefully circumscribe the role of market mechanisms (Culyer et al 1990, Saltman and von Otter 
1992). Consequently in Europe there has been only limited development of the necessary 
conceptual and methodological tools to analyse the functioning of health care markets. Compared 
to Europe the US health care sector is certainly less dominated by government finance and has 
a considerably larger role for private providers. Correspondingly there is a much larger body of 
research work analysing competition in health care markets. However it would be incorrect to 
portray the American health care market as a free, unregulated one; government intervenes 
considerably in the market through, for example, certificate of need legislation, licensing laws, 
anti-trust regulation and perhaps most significantly, the purchase of care for approximately 72 
million people through the Medicare and Medicaid Schemes (Joskow 1980, Havighurst 1986, 
Newsweek 1995).
Analysis of health care markets in developing countries is further complicated by poor data 
quality and availability. Research studies in the US have commonly drawn upon substantial 
existing databases and it would not be feasible to replicate the methods used in such studies in 
the developing world, where data is both of poor quality and in short supply. Most developing 
country governments have readily available only the most basic data on private sector health care 
providers, such as location and bed numbers, and often this is out of date or unreliable (WHO
1991). Furthermore private providers are often extremely reluctant to collaborate with researchers 
or allow access to their records.
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One of the most important benefits which has come from the recent international focus upon the 
private health care sector is an acknowledgement of the significance of the existing private sector 
in developing countries. Until the late eighties much of government policy seemed not to consider 
the role of the private sector. For example the policies endorsed by ministers of health in the 1978 
Alma Ata declaration effectively ignored the private sector; Health for All by the year 2000 was 
to be achieved primarily by reorienting government resources (WHO 1978). Yet in many lower 
and middle income countries the private health care sector is substantial. In India for example it 
is estimated that more than three-quarters of health care contacts are in the private sector (Bhat
1991). On the continent of Asia (excluding India and China) approximately 60% of total health 
expenditure is private, in Sub-Saharan Africa the corresponding figure is 44% and in Latin 
America and the Carribbean 40% (World Bank 1993). In rural areas private providers of modem 
medicine are often few and far between, but in urban areas they are commonly plentiful and their 
numbers recently have increased rapidly, particularly in countries where there is an over-supply 
of doctors (Bhat 1991, Gamer and Thaver 1993). In cities such as Bangkok, Bombay and Jakarta 
large numbers of private providers, both at the primary and hospital levels, compete amongst 
themselves and (possibly) with the public sector.
This thesis attempts to shed light on how markets such as these operate. In particular our focus 
is on the extent and form of competition prevailing in such markets and how two key variables, 
the degree of imperfect information on the part of the purchaser of health care, and variations 
between providers in the quality and nature of care delivered, affect competition.
It is intended that the results emerging from this study contribute to the ongoing debate about the 
appropriate role of government in health care in developing countries. However there are less 
grand but equally critical policy concerns to be addressed by the research. Given the large scale 
of the private health care sector in many developing countries, few governments would find it 
either feasible or desirable to nationalize it in the foreseeable future. Wide scale privatization of 
government services is just as unlikely. In the mixed economy of developing country health care, 
research is required to establish which measures governments can adopt to ensure that resources 
for health (both public and private) are used as efficiently as possible. For example, it may be 
useful to know the basis on which prospective patients choose a health care provider and how 
sensitive they are to factors such as quality and price. If people act in a consumerist manner and
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seek information to guide their decision then, through the dissemination of appropriate 
information, government may reduce search costs and enable the market for health care to 
function more smoothly. Similarly a greater understanding of how health care providers compete 
would allow governments to focus their regulatory efforts upon areas where competition may lead 
to inappropriate standards, whether this be levels of high-technology equipment or heavy reliance 
upon nurse aids.
It has already been indicated that the broad topic of this thesis has been the subject of 
considerable debate and discussion in both national and international arena. In order to place the 
subsequent chapters in proper historical context the following section briefly outlines the 
development of the public/private mix debate and the form which it has taken in developing 
countries.
1.1 THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE MIX DEBATE
The debate about the appropriate roles of public and private sectors in health care has been 
polarized with participants forcefully expounding the virtues of the private sector and the great 
shortcomings of the public sector, or vice versa. In many European countries, particularly those 
of northern Europe, there emerged in the post-war period a consensus that access to health care 
should be determined by need rather than ability to pay (Abel-Smith 1990, Saltman and Von Otter
1992). In response to this, many European societies attempted to improve access and coverage 
by expanding the role of the public sector in health care through the establishment or expansion 
of a national health service or national health insurance schemes. However debate about the role 
of government re-emerged during the 1960s, with critics of socialized medicine arguing that health 
care was much like any other good and therefore could be provided through the market (eg. Lees 
1961, Friedman 1962). Anti-marketeers responded that health care was so different from other 
consumer goods that market provision was inappropriate (eg. Titmuss 1963, Arrow 1963).
As many developing countries became independent during the 1960s and 1970s they commonly 
adopted at independence the type of health care system prevailing in the countries of their former 
colonial rulers. In much of Anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa government financed and provided 
health care systems were established whilst Francophone countries attempted to expand die
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coverage of compulsory health insurance schemes (Bennett and Ngalande-Banda 1994). The right 
to free health care for all was often established as a basic tenet of the new government (Zwi and 
Mills 1995). Many populist socialist states, such as Zambia and Tanzania, passed regulations 
curbing the role of the private sector (Kalumba and Freund 1989, WHO 1991) and in Marxist- 
Leninist states such as Mozambique the whole health sector was nationalized (Walt 1983). In 
South and South-east Asia the private sector was more likely to remain unchecked, but there were 
strong efforts to provide publicly funded health care, and occasionally the role of the private 
sector was limited as in some socialist states in India (Jesani and Anantharam 1989). Broadly 
speaking, during the post-colonial period, the public sector in developing countries became viewed 
as the primary player in health care.
In the industrialized west, disillusionment with the supremacy of statist ideas became more acute 
during the mid-seventies with the onset of recession. The long-standing liberal tradition dating 
back to Adam Smith, was resurrected and promoted with new vigour. The New Right attributed 
many of the economic and social problems in industrialized countries to an excessively dominant 
role for the state vis a vis the individual. A free market, it was argued, would both create more 
appropriate incentives for an efficient economy and was an absolute good in its own right, as it 
protected individual liberty (Nozick 1974). During die 1980s and 1990s these arguments were 
followed through in policy implementation initially through the privatization of nationalized 
industries, but increasingly in less obvious sectors such as health care (Peele 1989).
Recent policy reforms in the Germany, Holland, Sweden and the UK have all introduced a greater 
element of the market into the formerly state dominated health service (Culyer et al 1990, OECD 
1992, Saltman and von Otter 1992, Saltman 1995). None of the industrialized countries have 
deserted the principle of state finance, but all of the countries mentioned above have attempted 
to introduce an element of competition in the provision of care in order to improve efficiency. 
This has been attempted by developing or strengthening the role of purchasing agencies (as in the 
Germany, Holland and the UK) or alternatively by making funds follow patients (as in Sweden).
Since the rise of the New Right in the US and the UK during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
developing countries have come under increased external pressure to reform their pro-statist
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policies through privatization of state owned enterprises and economic liberalization (Adam et al
1992). More recently external pressure has often taken the form of aid conditionality (Mosley 
1988). External pressure has commonly been complemented by a realisation that the state-led 
import substituting policies of the Independence period have failed to deliver the anticipated 
economic development and have sometimes led to bloated and corrupt bureaucracies (World Bank 
1981, Dia 1992). New models of development were required. Shrinking budgetary resources, due 
to the decline in commodity prices and subsequent recession in many developing country 
economies, put further pressure upon governments to reconsider how public monies are spent; 
whether more services could be privately funded and provided, and whether public services could 
be delivered more efficiently.
The broad global trend towards privatization was finally reflected in developing country health 
sectors around the mid-eighties. One of the clearest articulations of the policy is contained in the 
World Bank's document 'Health Sector Financing: An Agenda for Reform' (1987). In this paper 
four main policies (user fees, insurance, privatization and decentralization) were promoted as ways 
of improving efficiency and equity in health care, as well as increasing the level of resources 
available to the health care sector. The ideas contained in this document have been intensely 
debated since and have been extremely influential. In terms of privatization it has become clear 
how little empirical data there are upon which to base policy decisions (Cross and Levine 1991, 
WHO 1991). Moreover the policies adopted by the World Bank seemed to be increasingly out-of- 
touch with accumulated wisdom in both the US and Europe.
The debate which followed the publication of 'An Agenda for Reform' succeeded in refining, and 
in some respects moderating, the original policy line. Increasingly a consensus is emerging which 
recognizes the importance of government finance for at least highly cost-effective services, 
particularly those with a high degree of externalities or with a public good nature. However 
statements emanating from the World Bank and USAID still suppose a substantial number of 
benefits associated with an increased role for the private health care sector in developing 
countries. For example the 1993 World Development Report on health envisaged a substantial role 
for the private health care market. It recommended that government focus upon the provision of
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a 'basic package* of essential health services1, whilst all other services be left to the private sector. 
Current controversy in the developing world bears considerable resemblance to the debates of the 
1960s (and beyond) in the industrialized world; how different is curative personal health care from 
other goods and how serious are the implications of these differences for the functioning of health 
care markets? To some degree the answers to these questions are culturally and contextually 
specific and thus need to be found through empirical investigation.
1.2 PURPOSE, SCOPE, APPROACH AND CONTENTS
1.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of the thesis is partly to contribute to the ongoing debate about the appropriate role 
of markets in health care, but less ambitiously, also to make concrete recommendations about the 
scope for government (or other agents) to improve the functioning of health care markets.
For further development in the analysis of health care markets in developing countries, better 
methods are required, both at the conceptual level and in terms of data collection and processing. 
A further purpose of the thesis is to construct and test a conceptual framework and to help 
develop tools for health care market analysis in developing countries.
1.2.2 Scope
Bangkok, Thailand was selected as the focus of this research. This was for two main reasons. 
Firstly Thailand, and Bangkok in particular, has an extensive private health care sector and the 
Thai government is now facing problems of rapid private sector growth, cost containment and 
inappropriate use of technologies making the concerns of this study very policy relevant 
(Nittayaramphong and Tangcharoensathien 1994). Moreover the problems posed by private health 
care in Bangkok are not peculiar to Thailand, many other cities in the region, such as Jakarta, 
Bombay, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and increasingly the cities of Southern China face a similar 
situation (Yesudian 1994, Yuen 1992). Secondly a close collaborative relationship exists between 
the Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Ministry of 
Public Health, Thailand which meant that the research could potentially shape policy in what is
!In low income countries the basic package at 'a minimum' would offer family planning, basic 
maternity and child health services, tuberculosis and STD control (World Bank 1993).
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a rather sensitive policy area2. Moreover working with the Ministry of Health the researcher was 
able to access records not in the public domain, and was given a high degree of logistical 
support.
The size and scope of the health care market in Bangkok makes it essential to restrict the study 
to just one aspect of the health care market: the study focuses upon the market for hospital 
services. Although it is common for hospital contacts to account for only a small proportion of 
provider-patient contacts, this is not necessarily the case in Bangkok. The importance of hospital 
contacts is considerably greater in Thailand than in the West. In Thailand patients are able to 
access directly without referral, any level of hospital they wish for ambulatory or inpatient care. 
The situation is similar throughout much of South-east and East Asia. For example in Taiwan it 
was noted that:
'Providers in clinics seldom offer any suggestion for further higher level treatment for
patients. Patients usually consult friends for a higher level provider or just 'shop around*.
Even if the illness is a minor one which could be treated in a cheaper clinic, patients like
to go to hospital for treatment.' (Su 1995)
Moreover the hospital level forms an important focus for research as the cost of the care is high 
(Bamum and Kutzin 1993) and in Thailand there has been recent rapid growth in the private 
hospital sector making it the focus of concern for policy makers. Finally the availability and 
quality of routine data on private hospitals tends to be considerably better than for the private 
primary care sector.
1.2.3 Approach
In the tradition of economic theory the general approach adopted is to consider if and how 
markets for hospital care in developing countries differ from standard models of perfectly 
competitive markets and hence the implications for the behaviour and performance of hospital 
firms. Although little has been written about hospital markets in developing countries, there is a 
substantial literature in economic theory and health economics in the US about how markets 
which are pervaded by asymmetric information and product diversity function. These theories are 
used as the basis from which to develop a developing country specific model. However in order
2 At the time of the study the author was a staff member at the Health Policy Unit.
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to adapt industrialized country models for use in developing countries a review of the specific 
institutional forms of health care markets in developing countries and the role of consumers in 
these markets is made.
Although there is no shortage of theoretical models to draw on, gathering good empirical data is 
a major problem. Private hospitals in Bangkok are extremely reluctant to allow access to 
researchers, even for relatively unobtrusive data collection, such as interviewing outpatients on 
the private hospital site. This problem has shaped the study to a considerable degree; the approach 
has avoided collecting any data from hospitals which would be perceived as sensitive in nature 
and has instead depended mainly upon compiling data from existing administrative records and 
investigating the demand side of the market.
1.2.4 Contents
Chapter 2 reviews the literature from industrialized countries on how markets for health care may 
operate. It is argued that imperfect knowledge on behalf of the consumer, product diversity and 
a reluctance of patients to act in a consumerist manner are the key features in industrialized 
country health care markets.
In Chapter 3 the evidence concerning the nature of health care markets in developing countries, 
and in particular Bangkok, is reviewed. Chapter 4 aims to synthesize the theoretical discussion 
of Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence of Chapter 3 so as to develop a conceptual model of 
health care competition in developing countries.
In Chapter 5 the methods used in the study are outlined. Two discrete but interrelated approaches 
are described. In the first, a market wide approach is used to examine the characteristics and 
behaviour of hospital firms. The results of this component are presented in Chapter 6. The second 
component considers the role of consumers in the market and in particular focuses on questions 
concerning the extent of consumer knowledge and types of consumer behaviour. The results of 
this component of the study are presented in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 evidence relating to the form 
of hospital competition in Bangkok is analysed.
Chapter 9 discusses the findings from the three previous chapters in more depth and the final
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chapter considers the policy implications of the study both for Thailand and developing countries 
more generally.
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CHAPTER 2
APPROACHES TO IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION IN HEALTH: AN INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD
PERSPECTIVE
2.0 INTRODUCTION
Although analysis of developing country health care markets has been limited, there is no 
shortage of literature which may contribute to a conceptual analysis of such markets. The two 
most obvious bodies of work are (i) economic theory and (ii) studies of health care markets 
in the industrialized world, and particularly in the US.
The usual starting point for any analysis of competition in markets is industrial economics. 
However as section 2.1 demonstrates there are reasons why standard models of industrial 
organization and competition may not offer satisfactory explanations of health care markets. 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that one of the key characteristics of health care markets is the 
acute asymmetry of information between the patient and the health care provider. There is 
now a substantial literature in economic theory addressing how markets operate when 
asymmetric information is present and section 2.2 attempts to give a flavour of the relevant 
material. Integral to the problem of asymmetric information is that of product diversity; die 
more complex and differentiated health care services become, the greater the problems of 
asymmetric information are likely to be. The discussion of product differentiation in section
2.3 suggests that product diversity on its own may create market power, but when combined 
with imperfect information, market failure is even more acute.
There have now been numerous empirical studies examining the degree to which various types 
of health care markets in the US conform to the standard model of price competition. Three 
main alternative models of health sector competition exist which, to varying degrees, draw 
upon the economic literature on asymmetric information and the application of this to 
industry. These models and approaches to their empirical testing are explored in section 2.4 
and 2.5.
Finally in recent years a number of empirical studies in the health sector have turned the focus 
away from market level analysis to individual actors. Standard economic theory assumes 
consumers to be both sovereign and substantively rational. That is consumers know what is
in their own interest better than anyone else, and are able to decide, given the prevailing 
conditions and constraints, how best to achieve their own interests. In health care, asymmetric 
information is problematic to this assumption, but there is an even more fundamental issue 
regarding whether patients wish to act like consumers at all. It has frequently been asserted 
that the principle of consumer sovereignty is inappropriate in the health sector context; 
patients wish to place their trust in health care providers and thus the exchange is unlike 
regular market transactions (Press 1978). Such studies and their implications are discussed in 
section 2.6.
This chapter does not seek to provide a definitive blueprint of how health care markets are 
likely to operate. Such a blueprint is unlikely to exist; market functioning will vary according 
to differing institutional arrangements, cultural differences and even the service under 
consideration. Instead the aim of the chapter is to identify the key dimensions which need to 
be considered when analysing health care markets and to provide possible alternative models 
for their operation. The final section draws out the implications for hospital competition in 
developing countries from the preceding discussion.
2.1 STANDARD ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION
Standard models of competition envisage a chain linking the structure of an industry 
(particularly market concentration) to the conduct of firms within that industry and hence to 
performance1 (Bain 1968, Waterson 1984). Associated with different market structures are 
different forms of competition. At one extreme there is the perfectly competitive market, 
where there are many buyers and sellers,and firms do not have any market power but are 
forced to accept the competitive market price for their product,leaving them only with a 
decision about the optimal quantity to produce. In such an environment they will make 
'normal'2 profits. This model of perfect competition is essentially one of price competition, it 
suggests that firms will not be able to raise their price (even minutely) above the competitive 
price without losing all customers. At the opposite pole a monopolist is the single seller in an 
industry who faces a fixed downward sloping aggregate demand curve. Faced with this 
demand curve the monopolist will choose to produce at a profit-maximising price and quantity.
1 This is commonly known as the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.
2 Firms in perfectly competitive markets are also sometimes said to make zero profits, 
however measured in the standard accounting form profits will not be zero as there is an expected 
return to the entrepreneur who has taken die risk.
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Between these two extremes are a range of other market forms where firms have some degree 
of market power. The form of competition in such markets is not as fixed as for the two 
extreme market structures but depends on a range of differing assumptions about firm and 
consumer behaviour. A distinction is commonly made between oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition; although both are forms of imperfect competition, in oligopoly a relatively small 
number of firms are interdependent. Thus in developing its own market strategy each firm 
must conjecture about the behaviour of other firms. In the case of monopolistic competition 
there are many sellers and buyers and thus this interdependence between firms does not exist, 
however for reasons to be discussed in section 2.3 each of these sellers has some degree of 
market power.
The strict conditions for perfect competition appear elusive in the real world, nonetheless 
analysis based on perfect competition is widespread and often successful. It has been argued 
that the perfectly competitive model is a useful abstraction from reality and the results of the 
model are sufficiently robust for it to have wide reaching applications (Friedman 1953). In 
explaining health care markets, perfect competition must clearly not be ruled out. The 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm has also criticized; it is a rather deterministic 
approach which makes scant recognition of die strategic behaviour for firms which may 
influence market structure (Waterson 1984). Commonly observed behaviour such as 
advertising, research and development, explicitly attempt to change the market environment 
within which a firm operates. Advances in game theory in the 1970s enabled economic 
theorists to develop more sophisticated approaches whereby behaviour of the firm with respect 
to pricing, R and D etc influence the form of the final equilibrium, and crucially, such models 
were able to incorporate better, strategic behaviour in the face of asymmetric information..
The model of perfect competition has also been criticised for being founded in price 
competition, yet remaining silent on the issue of how prices are actually set (Roberts 1990). 
This point highlights the fact that standard models of competition are concerned solely with 
how firms respond to outward stimuli and do not analyse how internal organization affects this 
response. Particularly when owners are separate from managers, decisions may be the result 
of a quite complex set of interactions (Cyert and March 1963). This would appear to be a 
particularly relevant insight in the case of hospitals where owners, managers, physicians and 
nurses may all shape the objectives and behaviour of the firm (McGuire 1985). The profit- 
maximising motive of firms has also been commonly questioned and more complex objective 
functions suggested (Baumol 1971).
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2.2 ECONOMIC MODELS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Debate about the appropriateness of health care markets has centred around problems which 
arise when a seller knows more than the purchaser. This asymmetry of information has two 
main implications for the market. Firstly if patients tend to be less informed than providers 
then they may find it difficult to judge the quality of care offered and hence whether it is 
offered at a fair price. This type of informational asymmetry is similar to the problem 
analysed by Akerlof (1970) in his seminal article The Market for Lemons'. Secondly, for 
certain conditions, patients attending a physician may lack information about both the nature 
of their ailment and the most appropriate form of treatment to take. Thus they may have to 
delegate the decision about what course of treatment to take to the physician. Principal-agent 
theory in economic theory is concerned with just such situations.
Akerlof (1970) considered the implications for a market of consumers being imperfectly 
informed about product quality. It was suggested that all goods would change hands at the 
price associated with average quality. Higher quality sellers would therefore exit from the 
market thus reducing average quality and price. This process would be iterated until the 
market had disintegrated. However in reality, the complete breakdown of markets with 
asymmetric information is prevented through a variety of mechanisms, two of the most 
important and relevant of which are signalling and minimum quality standards.
High quality sellers will attempt to signal to potential purchasers the quality of their product 
so that they are able to charge more than the average price. Naturally there is an incentive for 
lower quality sellers to try to imitate such a signal, hence it is suggested that the signals 
emitted will only be credible if they are associated with an activity which is lower cost for 
higher quality sellers to undertake (Spence 1973). The classic example of signalling occurs 
in labour markets where higher quality potential employees may attempt to distinguish 
themselves from other sellers of labour by gaining qualifications. The cost to more able 
persons of gaining qualifications is modeled to be less than the cost to the less able. The 
concept has also been applied to insurance where low risk individuals signal their lower 
degree of risk by selecting insurance packages with less complete coverage (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz 1976). Although signalling may prevent complete market failure it is not necessarily 
costless. Spence (1976) distinguishes between 'contingent contracts' and 'exogenously costly 
signals'. The example of the selection of an insurance package is a good example of a 
contingent contract; the signal efficiently conveys information and there is no welfare loss. 
On the other hand an exogenously costly signal has a social cost associated with the signalling
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action. Education purely to gain qualifications so as to signal the quality of the individual (in 
contrast to education to enhance productivity) is a good example of this.
Price can be used as a signal of product quality. This may occur if consumers can gain, either 
through direct observation or previous purchase, some indication of quality. At a certain price 
consumers expect to find a certain quality, if a firm chooses to provide less quality than 
expected at a certain price then they may lose customers. At equilibrium all price signals are 
such that each firm's profit maximizing quality is that signalled by its price (Wolinsky 1986). 
Furthermore the mark-up over marginal cost will vary directly with the degree of imperfect 
information amongst consumers.
Another mechanism through which the problems of asymmetric information between seller 
and buyer about quality may be alleviated, is minimum quality standards. Leland (1979) 
shows formally that under certain conditions such minimum quality standards will resolve 
problems of asymmetric information, although they may lead to other problems such as 
monopoly side effects for the sellers.
Whilst health care providers may engage in signalling activity, patients may undertake 
consumer search, seeking out information about the price and quality of different goods on 
the market. The basic search rule suggests that consumers will carry out search activities up 
to the point where the expected marginal benefit of the search is equal to the marginal cost 
of carrying out the search (Stigler 1961). The way in which search activity is modelled 
varies: consumers may visit a number of retailers sequentially seeking the lowest price, or ask 
friends randomly, or purchase a guide to prices. The appropriate way in which to model 
search behaviour depends partly on the nature of the good/service under consideration. For 
example, for some goods the potential purchaser may be able to make a reasonable assessment 
of quality prior to purchase, these are known as search goods. For others, such as second hand 
cars the good must be purchased before the quality can be properly appraised, these are 
known as experience goods (Nelson 1970). Sometimes consumers may pass by word of mouth 
information about a good, thus the quality or price of a good in one period may affect 
consumption patterns in the next. Such goods are often called reputation goods. The search 
literature covers both asymmetric information about quality and about price.
The centrality of the agency relationship between health care providers and patient in health 
economics has been widely recognized and will not be discussed at length here. Principal-
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agent theoiy has been applied to a variety of economic activities; essentially any where an 
agent acts on behalf of a principal, including employees in a firm, managers acting on behalf 
of shareholders, and sharecropping arrangements. The fundamental problem in the principal 
agent literature is how the principal can design a contract which will motivate the agent to act 
in the principal’s best interest given differing utility functions of principal and agent and 
differing information sets (Stiglitz 1990). A number of factors will affect the design of the 
contract and the success of the relationship, including the form of the two utility functions, 
the amount and type of information the principal possesses about the agent's actions, die 
period over which the relationship will be maintained for, the punishments available for 
breaking the contract and the ease with which violations of the contract can be verified.
In health care it is often assumed that the utility functions of principal and agent are rather 
closer than the standard economic literature implies (McGuire et al 1988) and that due to 
strong professional ethics the health care provider will act in the best interests of the patient. 
However it is clear that this is contingent upon a number of conditions. Standard principal- 
agent theory sheds light on these conditions. The form of the contract, or payment mechanism, 
is important. Fee-for-service payment often being said to create greater incentives for over­
servicing. Health care systems where patients tend to stick with one regular health care 
provider, rather than switching providers may also encourage more appropriate behaviour. The 
available sanctions for misbehaviour would also appear to be important.
Although the principal-agent literature focuses upon a single relationship, in health care there 
are generally multiple interacting relationships at play which need to be taken into account. 
The physician may be the patient's agent but frequently is also an agent for the government 
or a health insurance organization, at least in the sense of providing services which a third 
party payer funds. Moreover in a hospital setting doctors are agents of managers and managers 
in turn may be agents of shareholders. The way in which doctors (and managers) are paid will 
thus also affect how good an agent the physician is for the patient.
2.3 ECONOMIC MODELS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
2.3.1 Theoretical models
In health care markets throughout the world substantial diversity is observed in the health care 
services offered. Not only is there a range of different types of providers (hospitals, small 
clinics, traditional healers, physiotherapists etc), but even within a certain type of provider 
group the quality and type of care offered may vary enormously. Product differentiation may
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segment the market, limiting the degree of competition prevailing. In addition product 
diversity is a core part of asymmetric information problems.
Two types of product differentiation (horizontal and vertical) are often distinguished. In 
horizontal product differentiation the differences between products or services are rooted in 
consumers' fundamental differences in taste. The simplest examples of horizontal product 
differentiation are where there is only one characteristic under consideration, such as the 
sweetness of a dessert. Some individuals may prefer extremely sweet desserts where others 
prefer them to be less sweet. In contrast vertical product differentiation occurs when the goods 
on the market have the same set of (desirable) characteristics but some simply have more of 
die characteristics than others. Consumers would unanimously agree on a preference ranking 
of the products, but as they have differing preferences over income and intensity of feeling 
for the product they will consume products of different quality (Waterson 1989).
The simplest approach to horizontal product differentiation is based upon the spatial model 
of competition developed by Hotelling. It considers a good with just one characteristic, such 
as the sweetness of a dessert. Consumers tastes are spread evenly over the whole range of 
degrees of sweetness (see figure 2.1) and firms may produce at any point along the space. 
Paralleling the spatial model it is assumed that consumers face an additional cost (x) in 
consuming a product which does not exactly match their own tastes, (x) is related to the 
distance between their own personal taste for sweetness and the sweetness of the product 
which they consume. Thus if three firms were producing desserts at points A, B and C on the 
sweetness scale and charging the same price (p), then a consumer at point (Y) would choose 
to consume B as the price to the consumer (p+xdj) is less than that of product A (p+xd2) and 
product C. Sunk costs in production would imply that firms are not able to move easily along 
the scale. This may be a reasonable assumption for certain types of health care, particularly 
the more capital intensive forms. Under these circumstances firms will locate evenly across 
the scale so as to share out the market between them (Eaton and Lipsey 1978). If a new firm 
wishes to enter the market then it is forced to locate between two established firms (say at D). 
It is possible that at such a point it will be unable to capture sufficient of the market to break 
even. Sunk costs act as a barrier to entry and firms in the market may make positive profits.
The Hotelling type model only deals with one (or two polar) characteristics, but goods 
frequently have more characteristics. Lancaster (1966 and 1971) argued that traditional 
demand theory failed to capture any of the important information about the nature of the good
Figure 2.1
Product differentiation using the spatial competition model
p+xd2
C Not sweetSweet A Y B D
Figure 2.2
Product differentiation using Lancaster's characteristics model 
Characteristic Y IC
Characteristic X
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in demand thus economic theory had difficulty in analysing phenomenon such as product 
innovation and product diversification. In the characteristics approach which he developed, 
consumption is seen as a technology; a certain good or service is valued by the consumer for 
the inherent characteristics in it. Consumption of the good allows the consumer to process the 
characteristics and thus enhance his or her utility. The consumer attempts to maximize utility 
over the characteristics space, subject to the budget constraint. According to the consumption 
technology there are two possible ways of doing this. If it is possible to mix goods, as it is 
with breakfast cereals for example, then consumers will purchase the two goods which are 
closest to their own preferences and mix them. This is illustrated for two characteristics in fig 
2.2. Each of the rays (A-C) represent a good with a different combination of characteristics 
X and Y3. Given the consumer's budget constraint s/he can purchase Oa of A, Ob of B etc. 
If, on the other hand there are indivisibilities, consumers will select the good which most 
closely matches their own preferences. In this circumstance small changes in price or 
specifications of the goods may lead consumers to switch goods.
Sen in his writings on nutrition and welfare has used the characteristics approach, suggesting: 
"There is the notion of a good (in this case rice); that of the characteristic of a good 
(eg giving calories and nutrition); that of a functioning of a person (in this case living 
without calorie deficiency); that of utility (in this case, the pleasure or desire- 
fulfilment from the functioning in question, or from some other functioning related 
to the characteristics of rice)." (Sen 1984)
The technology of health care consumption can be broken into a similar process. The 
consumption of the different characteristics of health care impact upon the functioning or 
capabilities of a person, which we perceive to be the absence of disease or injury or impaired 
capacity. Finally this capability endows the individual with utility, or the well being derived 
from the individual's health.
Different characteristics of health care can be distinguished such as the clinical curative 
aspects of health care, information provision and reassurance, caring and comfort. For 
outpatient services consumers may consume a mix of services so as to maximize their utility. 
For example Kleinman (1980) in Taiwan commonly observed patients seeking care from both 
allopathic and traditional Chinese doctors for the same condition. For inpatient care however
3 Potentially a large number of characteristics could be considered in an analysis such as this, 
figure 6.2 is constrained by the two-dimensional nature of the page.
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it would seem less likely that patients can mix services.
In the health care sector it is likely that elements of horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation occur together. For example there may be vertical product differentiation within 
the private hospital care sector; some private hospitals may offer higher quality clinical care, 
more comfortable surroundings and better nursing care than other private hospitals. But it is 
commonly suggested that public hospitals offer a different mix of characteristics to private 
ones; public hospitals may offer higher standards of curative care but lower standards of 
comfort. Ireland (1987) attempts to combine models of vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation. The key to the model is whether horizontal product differentiation or vertical 
product differentiation is dominant. If vertical product differentiation is dominant then 
everyone will select the inherently higher quality good even if the bundle of characteristics 
in the good does not closely match everyone's preferences. Conversely if horizontal product 
differentiation is dominant then everyone will select the good which best matches their 
preferences despite the fact that it may be of an inherently lower quality. In general horizontal 
dominance is likely to lead to lower levels of competition and higher revenues than vertical 
dominance.
In both horizontally and vertically differentiated markets, if there are sunk costs associated 
with the production of a good or service of a certain mix of characteristics or standard of 
quality, then entry barriers arise and firms may segment the market and maintain a certain 
degree of market power. This scenario is essentially that of oligopolistic competition. As the 
number of firms becomes larger and there are closer substitutes for each good then the market 
begins to approximate perfect competition. Wolinsky (1986) demonstrates how if product 
differentiation is combined with imperfect information on the part of the consumer then a 
monopolistically competitive situation will arise. In Wolinsky's model consumers face positive 
search costs. As the number of firms in the market becomes larger then almost perfect 
substitutes become available, however it is sub-optimal for the consumer to examine too many 
of the available substitutes and hence each firm retains a degree of market power. The smaller 
the search costs, the better informed consumers will be and the more closely the model 
approximates perfect competition.
2.3.2 Empirical Applications
Empirical work on product differentiation and the characteristics approach has not kept pace 
with theoretical developments (Ireland 1987, Waterson 1989). Rosen attempted to
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operationalize Lancaster's idea by introducing the notion of an hedonic price function (Rosen 
1974). In Lancaster's model consumers place valuations on characteristics rather than goods. 
Thus by regressing the market price of a good on the characteristics of a good it is possible 
to identify 'shadow prices' for the individual characteristics embedded in a good.
In practice at least two key questions arise; firstly what are the relevant characteristics and 
secondly what is the form of the relationship between prices and characteristics (Griliches 
1971)? The set of relevant characteristics embedded in certain goods may be unproblematic, 
for example, the relevant characteristics for a car may be power, fuel consumption, size, 
comfort reliability etc. But for more complex goods and services, such as health care, the 
relevant set of characteristics is less obvious. A semi-logarithmic form is commonly used for 
the hedonic regression equations, but there is no clear theoretical basis for any particular form. 
Furthermore potential multicollinearity between independent variables means that the shadow 
prices derived may be imprecise and unstable. Nonetheless the hedonic price approach has 
been widely used in (i) the estimation of shadow environmental prices through the use of 
house prices (ii) adjustment of price indices to take account of change in quality of products 
over time and (iii) estimation of quality adjusted prices in order to investigate company 
performance.
Hedonic price analyses have been particularly widely used for durable goods such as cars (eg. 
Cowling and Cubbing 1971), but they have been less commonly applied to non-durables. 
Thompson (1988) attributes this to the more limited information which tends to be available 
about the characteristics of non-durable goods. However recent applications of the tool have 
considered newspapers (Thompson 1988) and breakfast cereals (Stanley and Tschirhart 1991).
In the health sector there would appear to be further problems in applying hedonic price 
theory. Lancaster states that in order for the theory to be applicable :-
'the characteristics possessed by a good or a combination of goods are the same for 
all consumers and, given units of measurement, are in the same quantities, so that the 
personal element in consumer choice arises in the choice between collections of 
characteristics only, not in the allocation of characteristics to the good' (Lancaster
1971)
If this is not the case then the shadow prices derived are likely to reflect not only consumers' 
implicit valuations of the characteristics but also their differing beliefs about the characteristics 
possessed by differing goods. In health care it would seem unlikely that consumers are
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perfectly informed about the characteristics of different providers, for all the reasons discussed 
above. Bowbrick (1992) suggests that not just in health care, but in many markets the 
conditions described above are unlikely to hold. Indeed marketing theory explicitly assumes 
that it is possible to create in consumers' minds a set of characteristics subjectively associated 
with a product which may bear little relationship to the objective characteristics of the 
product. Given the extremely high degree of product diversity in modem markets, it would 
in most industries seem unrealistic to expect consumers to be perfectly informed about the 
characteristics possessed by different products.
Finally the characteristics approach implicitly assumes that consumers have clear preferences 
over the characteristics embedded in a product. It is questionable whether this is always the 
case, particularly with a service such as health care. There may be considerable psychic costs 
to patients in making decisions between different providers and patients may prefer to not act 
in a rational and sovereign manner, but rather to simply place their faith in a particular 
provider.
On a conceptual level the characteristics approach would appear to provide a suitable tool for 
analysing product differentiation and imperfect information in health care markets. However 
there are clearly considerable problems in applying the concept empirically. Estimates of 
hedonic prices need to be treated with caution.
2.4 MODELS OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS 
US interest in competition in the health care sector developed during the 1970s as health 
economists attempted to address the question of how best to contain rapidly spiralling health 
care costs. Two alternative schools of thought developed. Enthoven (1978) and others argued 
that market forces could be used to contain hospital cost inflation as the demand constraint 
was binding. In opposition it was suggested that in health care, market solutions were 
inappropriate due to acute problems of imperfect information and government intervention was 
the only answer (Evans 1974, Reinhardt 1985). This debate has generated a substantial amount 
of empirical work and a number of models describing competition in health care. There is 
generally an implicit, though not always clearly stated, link between these models and the 
micro-economic theories of imperfect information described above. The health sector specific 
models of competition all assume that an element of imperfect information on the part of the 
consumer leads to imperfect competition. The strengths of the models however is that they
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develop stronger behavioural hypotheses about how hospitals compete and thus are worthwhile 
reviewing from this perspective.
Three main types of model are reviewed:-
i. The Induced demand model posits that health care providers are only partially constrained 
by the consumer demand function because of the agency relationship in health care. Thus in 
the face of increased competition in the market place, instead of accepting lower profitability, 
providers attempt to shift the demand curve outwards. This is done through increasing the 
intensity of service provision. In some respects this model assumes health care providers have 
greater market power than even monopolists who, it should be recalled, faced a fixed demand 
curve. However profit maximization is rarely suggested. The Target Income Hypothesis' 
suggests that health care providers wish to maintain a certain level of income. Under increased 
competition providers will shift the demand curve to the extent needed to re-attain target 
income levels (Evans 1974). During the 1980s and 1990s health economists have become 
increasingly sceptical that physicians have anything like the degree of discretion implied by 
the Target Income Hypothesis. Zweifel (1981) suggests that the medical ethics of the health 
care providers act as a constraint. In order for health care providers to induce consumers to 
buy more services they must provide them with information which is rather less accurate, 
however there is a psychic cost to doing this which deters excessive deceit.
The induced demand model does not deny a role for the informed consumer to discipline the 
market, however psychic constraints upon the health care provider make it unlikely that 
consumers will ever need to do so.
ii. The Quality Competition model attempts to explain why in the US more competitive 
health care markets appear to have higher costs. It is argued that because of insurance cover 
consumers are not very price sensitive, therefore in order to increase market share hospitals 
invest in quality. This tendency is exacerbated by the need to attract specialists (who are 
presumed to appreciate access to high-technology equipment) and who in turn attract patients. 
The non-profit motivation of many US hospitals contributes to the credibility of this strategy.
The presence of imperfect information affects the model in a critical way. Generally it is 
assumed that both consumers and institutional buyers are not concerned with the available 
level of technical equipment and facilities per se, but have difficulties in assessing the
procedural aspects of quality of care, and therefore focus on structural aspects, such as 
buildings and equipment. Thus the hospital could be seen to be using technical equipment as 
a signal to the market. However for such a signal to be a credible one, it must be lower cost 
for high quality hospitals to acquire such equipment. This may be the case if only high quality 
personnel know how to operate such equipment, and higher quality hospitals have better 
quality staff. For a hospital to be able to signal effectively to the market that it has a higher 
level of quality of care, its signal must stand out against the background noise. There is thus 
a real danger that hospitals invest more and more in signalling, with little effect (Robinson 
1988). This would be a classic example of Spence's exogenously costly signal.
iii. The Increasing Monopoly Model is essentially a search model that views health care as 
a 'reputation good' meaning that
' (a) sellers products are differentiated and (b) consumers' search amongst sellers is 
conducted primarily by asking relatives, friends and associates for recommendations.' 
(Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981)
It is hypothesized that if the number of health care providers in a market area increases then 
consumers will find it harder to collect information about a particular provider. Therefore 
consumers will become less sensitive to price and the equilibrium charge will rise.
Pauly and Satterthwaite (op cit) suggest that this model best fits the primary care setting 
where a relatively straightforward and constant relationship exists between the characteristics 
of the provider and the services offered. For hospital services, inpatients may be admitted to 
different wards and be treated by different consultants for different conditions. Thus reputation 
in terms of services may be less reliable at the hospital than at the primary level. However 
a consumer may still seek information from acquaintances about hospital characteristics.
These three models have all been used to explain the same 'stylized fact', that is that less 
concentrated markets, where competition would be expected to be higher, often exhibit higher 
costs. Although they are 'alternative' explanatory models, there is no logical reason why they 
should be mutually exclusive.
Although these models provide a much clearer explanation of how imperfect information 
affects health care markets, they have a common weakness. The models conceive of the 
provider unit as a singular cohesive unit. In reality the internal organizational structures of 
health care providers, and hospitals in particular, are complex. Frequently the strategic long
term management functions are quite distinct from the physicians who have day to day 
authority over resource use (McGuire 1985). This affects the supplier induced demand model 
in particular. The incentive for physicians operating in hospital settings to induce demand 
depends entirely upon how they are paid.
A related point concerns the assumed motivation of provider units. The supplier induced 
demand model in particular, assumes that the primary motivation of providers is profit. The 
quality competition model allows the possibility that hospitals pursue quality and/or reputation 
as well as or instead of profit. The appropriateness of the profit-seeking assumption clearly 
depends to some degree on the range of providers in the health care market. In the US, for- 
profit hospitals only account for about 10% of the total number of acute hospital beds 
(Schlesinger et al 1987), and thus the assumption seems questionable. Amongst non-profit 
providers a very wide range of motivations have been postulated including cost recovery, 
output maximization, output and quality maximization, utility maximization and cash flow 
maximization (Davis 1972). It is unlikely that these objectives could all be pursued through 
quality competition alone. As discussed earlier, even for for-profit firms, profit maximization 
may not be the sole objective.
With these caveats in mind the following section describes the empirical application of these 
models.
2.5 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF MODELS OF HEALTH CARE COMPETITION 
Empirical testing should determine which of the models is the dominant one. Unfortunately 
the predictions of the models are not always clearly differentiated (see Table 2.1). For 
example, if in response to a decrease in market concentration, prices are seen to rise this 
would directly refute the traditional model, but may not shed light on alternative models. It 
may be that because of higher search costs consumers are less price sensitive and providers 
have been able to increase fees. Alternatively physicians may have responded by increasing 
service intensity, which may also have the net effect of raising total fee charged. Furthermore 
it is possible that more intense competition has led to investment in quality which may in turn 
generate higher nominal prices (though not necessarily higher quality adjusted prices). If all 
four key variables (price, provider income, quality and service intensity) are examined it may 
be possible to gain a clearer (though not necessarily conclusive) idea of the form of 
competition prevailing. As it is quite possible that more than one form of competition is
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prevailing in the market at the same point in time, such opacity is not surprising.
Table 2.1
The effect predicted bv different models of a decrease in market concentration
Model
Variable
Traditional
model
Induced
demand
Quality
Competition
Increasing
Monopoly
Fees/price - +
Provider income - +
Quality +
Service intensity +
CEV: - decrease in variable
+ increase in variable
blank space indicates no impact or unclear impact 
SOURCE: Adapted from Reinhardt 1978.
Much of the empirical testing of the induced demand model has examined whether a higher 
density of physicians leads to higher service intensity. Both Fuchs (1978) and Cromwell and 
Mitchell (1986) found greater surgeon density to be associated with increased surgical 
intervention per capita. However such direct inferences ignore that (i) more specialist services 
are likely to be located in urban areas where there is a higher physician density (ii) in such 
urban areas the time costs to patients of seeking care may be lower and thus there may be 
greater demand from patients (Feldman and Sloan 1988). Rice and Labelle (1989) question 
whether the correct test of the theory is an examination of the interrelationship between 
physician density and quantity of services provided. They suggest that physicians will only 
induce demand if increased competition (ie. higher density) results in lower prices. The 
continuing debate about more or less appropriate ways of testing for supplier induced demand 
means that the empirical evidence remains mixed and inconclusive.
The presence of quality competition in health care markets has mainly been explored through 
examining how levels of (i) excess bed capacity (ii) staffing levels and (iii) medical facilities 
maintained by hospitals vary according to measures of local competition. It has been 
suggested that excess bed capacity attracts physicians as they are unlikely to encounter 
problems in admitting patients. Empirical research has suggested that all three of these
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measures tend to be higher in markets where there is lower concentration, that is that quality 
competition is a prevalent phenomenon (Robinson 1988). The models described above shed 
little light on the behavioural determinants of quality competition. In a rather more 
sophisticated analysis, Chirikos (1992) models hospital managers as aiming to maximize 
quantity (measured by market share) and quality (measured by expenditure to raise input 
intensity and/or deepen capital stock). The results suggest that quality spending is higher in 
more competitive markets and that in turn quality spending tends to increase market share.
Empirically the level of consumer information is consistently found to be a significant variable 
affecting competitive intensity. For example Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) regress price on 
a vector of variables including proxies for the 'ease of gathering information'4 and find these 
proxies to be very significant. However, attempts to compare the increasing monopoly model 
with other models cast doubt upon its validity. Cromwell and Mitchell (1986) test the impact 
of various influences on price and fmd that although provider density per capita is highly 
significant the number of providers per square mile is not. They take this to be an indication 
of the superiority of supplier induced demand explanations over those based on the increasing 
monopoly model. The validity of the increasing monopoly model clearly depends on quite 
how information transfer is modelled. Pauly and Satterthwaite are rather vague:
I f  the number of primary care physicians in a community is small - three for 
example, - then each physician has a detailed reputation throughout the community. 
Each consumer is likely to have friends who go to the three and can remember what 
the friends have reported about each. If, however, the number of physicians in the 
community is larger - thirty, for example - then each one's reputation is less defined.' 
(Pauly and Satterthwaite 1981)
There are however a number of models of search which break the link between a larger 
number of providers and higher search costs; consumers may search for a new provider by 
asking family or friends for a single recommendation, or faced with a large number of 
potential providers, consumers may focus search efforts using a simple rule of thumb, such 
as proximity or price. The lack of empirical evidence to support the behavioural foundations 
of the model are problematic
4 In the Pauly and Satterthwaite model the proxies are (i) the percentage of newly arrived 
households in the area and (ii) the number of single headed households. Both of these proxies are 
postulated to be associated with greater difficulties in information collection. Freeh and Woolley 
(1992) add the percentage of households with telephones. Telephones are assumed to make search 
activities easier.
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and hence which proxies are used in empirical testing. In the original article information 
acquisition was modeled in a bizarre way; it was assumed that consumers would first select 
a health care provider and then ask around for information. In practice it would be at least as 
acceptable for consumers in search of a new provider to ask family and friends for 
recommendations. With such behaviour, once the number of providers is already large, there 
is no reason for search costs to increase with the number of providers. The lack of empirical 
evidence to support the behavioural foundations of the model are problematic.
Many of the more recent studies integrate two or more different models, often incorporating 
a role for traditional economic theory and its predictions relating to market concentration.
For example Freeh and Woolley (1993) suggest that price may not be the appropriate variable 
to use to distinguish between the traditional model and the increasing monopoly model. If 
increased concentration leads to lower quality then even under the traditional economic model, 
prices may fall. The key test of the traditional economic model is whether increased 
concentration leads to an increase in the price-cost margin. Their empirical results suggest that 
in more concentrated markets quality declines but there is little change in price. Overall this 
leads to higher price-cost margins consistent with the traditional model. Freeh and Woolley's 
analysis does not provide any evidence to support the increasing monopoly model (ie. prices 
do not appear to go down in more concentrated markets) but the information variables 
included in the model are strong and significant. The authors conclude:
'Consumer information is important in explaining hospital prices, and less important 
in hospital quality. Consumers are not passive; they do play a role in hospital choice.' 
(Freeh and Woolley 1993)
Noether (1988) also observes that if price and quality competition occur simultaneously then 
the effects may offset each other. Lower concentration may push prices up through quality 
competition and lower them through standard price competition. Price-cost margins must be 
examined for a conclusive result. Noether's empirical work suggest that both price and quality 
competition intensify in less concentrated markets, but the magnitude of the impact of 
concentration is small.
McCarthy (1985) further supports the relevance of traditional economic theories in the primary 
care market. Price, waiting time and physician density all negatively affect demand (as 
measured by the number of hospital visits). McCarthy suggests that this shows that the market
does act as a constraint upon physician behaviour. However the approach used does not rule 
out the possibility of demand inducement within a visit ie. through greater service intensity.
Van Doorslaer's (1987) adapts the induced demand model to allow for a stronger role for 
consumer information. Although this model does not fully integrate the increasing monopoly 
model it takes on board some of the assumptions that the increasing monopoly model is based 
upon ie. health care is a reputation good and seeking information on health care providers is 
a costly process. Van Doorslaer suggests that consumers have a known (subjective) probability 
distribution for the impact of medical care on health status. It is assumed that this probability 
distribution is normal with a positive variance. Consumers may attempt to get a more 
accurate estimate of the probability distribution through a variety of means, including personal 
observation and experience, observation and the experience of others, and purchased expert 
medical care. These extra sources of information will be purchased to the point where their 
expected marginal utility outweighs their marginal cost and will be integrated into the 
individual's a priori probability distribution function. The more informed the consumer, from 
these various sources, the harder it is for physicians to induce demand. Empirical testing 
suggests that better informed individuals do indeed have significantly less physician initiated 
contacts, although they themselves are more likely to consult a physician. Coyte (1985) 
presents a similar model where consumers monitor physicians up to the point where the 
marginal benefit of doing so outweighs marginal cost. Physicians adapt their behaviour 
accordingly and will act opportunistically to the extent that consumer information allows this. 
Coyte's model is not empirically tested.
2.6 CONSUMERISM
To varying degrees the models described above assume that patients exert some discipline 
over the market through selecting providers who offer value for money. Thus it is assumed 
that patients act like consumers. If this were not the case, and for example patients were not 
sensitive to price or quality, then the implications would be substantial. Neither price nor 
quality competition would be likely to occur as patients simply selected the nearest or most 
physically accessible provider. Strong challenges have been made to the notion of consumer 
sovereignty in health care. It has been argued that patients appreciate having the responsibility 
of decision making removed from them and placed in the hands of a doctor (Press 1978) and 
that ofren when seeking health care people are physically weak and therefore simply unable 
to cany out normal consumerist behaviour (Campbell 1990). The extent of consumerist 
behaviour is clearly an empirical question the answer to which will vary according to cultural
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norms and the structure of the health care system being studied.
In Western Europe and the US there has been increasing interest in the role of consumerism 
in health care. Several of the recent health care reforms in these countries have explicitly 
given patients a role in driving competition between health care providers. In the UK patients 
choose between GPs whom, in turn, may (if they are budget holders) choose the source of 
hospital services for their registered patients. If patients seek out the GPs who offer the best 
services then there is an incentive for GPs to act efficiently. In Sweden consumer choice of 
provider has been institutionalized during the 1990s, although links between patient choice and 
provider unit budgets have not always been clear cut (Saltman and von Otter 1992). In the US 
some of the approaches to cost-containment were demand side oriented, using co-payment 
mechanisms to constrain utilization. Such reforms have prompted a number of recent studies 
investigating the extent to which consumers exert market discipline through their choice of 
provider. This research has taken place solely within industrialized countries, however it sheds 
light on the question of how and why people choose their health care provider and the 
interface between these micro-level decisions and the functioning of the market as a whole.
Many varied definitions of consumerism have been offered. Hibbard and Weeks (1987) 
identify three main elements of consumerist behaviour (i) knowledge, including both the 
current possession of knowledge about health care services and the willingness to seek further 
information to supplement this knowledge (ii) attitudes, particularly willingness to use 
independent judgement rather than simply submit to the direction of a doctor and (iii) 
behaviour, in particular cost and quality sensitivity. Lupton et al (1991) suggest a slightly 
different definition including bargaining power, freedom of choice, knowledge, motivation to 
choose and power to challenge medical authority. This definition emphasizes more the 
institutional environment required for consumerist behaviour to occur. Lupton et al also quote 
from an Australian health care consumer handbook which gives the following advice:
'Know what you want, shop around and if the service is unsatisfactory take your 
business elsewhere or seek redress.'
This advice brings in an important additional element of knowledge which is that consumers 
need to know what they seek in a health care provider, otherwise information will be of little 
relevance.
The empirical studies explore different aspects of consumerist behaviour. From the literature 
it is possible to identify the following foci>
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- Possession of 'broad' health knowledge about disease causation, illness symptoms,
appropriate treatments etc.;
- Possession of health system knowledge, for example concerning the characteristics
of different health care providers or about how the system as a whole functions;
- Information seeking behaviour;
- Price and quality sensitivity;
- Independence from medical advice in decision making;
- Characteristics sought in choosing a health care provider.
Studies have also attempted to determine which socio-demographic characteristics are likely 
to encourage people to act in a more consumerist manner. Many of the studies have 
researched decisions relating to primary care providers. This is because in the UK, the US and 
Australia where the studies have been situated, consumers have freedom of choice between 
primary physician but not necessarily between different hospitals.
Studies of broad health knowledge have hypothesized that without such knowledge it is 
difficult for a consumer to make a rational choice of health care provider. In addition, 
Newhouse et al (1981) suggest that health knowledge places consumers in a stronger 
negotiating position with providers during health care consultations.
Chamy et al (1990) used data from the Cardiff Health Survey to construct four knowledge 
scales (a health knowledge scale, an illness symptoms scale, a disease causation scale and an 
appropriate action scale), with the purposing of assessing whether greater health knowledge 
is likely to lead to more appropriate action in the event of illness. Individuals' broad health 
knowledge and knowledge of disease causation did not apparently lead them to make more 
appropriate decisions about what actions to take in the event of illness. However the illness 
symptoms scale was found to be associated with appropriate action. Newhouse et al (1981) 
constructed a ten item 'consumer sophistication' scale which included both broad health 
knowledge dimensions and more specific questions about the health care system. For example 
amongst the latter category respondents were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed 
with the following statement Tou may be able to tell how good a doctor is by finding out if 
he is certified by a special board.' On the basis of this Newhouse et al suggest that consumers 
are rather more knowledgeable about decisions made during the course of a consultation (eg. 
they have a suitable degree of scepticism about the necessity of operations) than about issues 
which would help them to choose a provider. However the comparability of the two scales
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is not established and the basis for this assertion appears weak.
In marketing and advertising literature a clear distinction is made between different phases of 
knowledge acquisition by the consumer (Bowbrick 1992). If people think that at some point 
in time they might need to purchase a particular product or service, then it is likely that they 
will possess some general level of knowledge about it. However before actually purchasing 
a good or service people are likely to engage in more intense information seeking behaviour 
to supplement the general knowledge which they already have. Thus it may be inappropriate 
on the basis of general studies of consumer knowledge (such as that by Newhouse et al 1981) 
to conclude that people are poorly informed. Studies examining the knowledge base on which 
particular health care seeking decisions are probably more valid.
Two UK studies have explored health care system knowledge by enquiring as to how 
specific health care utilization decisions were made. Higgins and Wiles (1992) surveyed a 
sample of patients who had elected to have private hospital treatment. Although the majority 
of respondents claimed that they had used private care to escape NHS waiting lists few knew 
how long the waiting lists were. In a survey of people newly registering with GPs Salisbury 
(1989) found that most said they had chosen the practice because it was the nearest to their 
home, however there was frequently a practice unknown to the respondent which was even 
closer.
Booth and Babchuk (1972) examine information seeking behaviour in selecting a provider. 
The researchers focused upon the over forty-fives and in particular those who had recently 
sought care from a new provider5, and examined how this choice had been made. Mass media 
had played a very limited role in influencing choice as it tended to provide general health 
messages which were not sufficiently tailored to individuals' concerns. Instead personal 
contacts, particularly with relatives and friends played a major role in influencing choice of 
provider. Few respondents sought advice from doctors. The most influential advisors tended 
to be friends, of a similar age and background, and in particular those who had had first hand 
experience of the service being considered.
5 The definition of provider used in the Booth and Babchuk study is a broad one ranging from 
a new doctor to a new welfare services such as meals on wheels. For the latter type of service 
informational problems are probably not as acute as they are for clinical care and therefore seeking 
advice from friends rather than a professional may be a more obvious strategy.
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The importance of friends and relatives in providing information about providers is supported 
by UK studies. Nearly 50% of Salisbury's sample had first heard of the practice with which 
they registered through a neighbour or friend. In choosing whether or not to use a private 
hospital, general practitioners were rather more important, but friends and relatives still had 
a significant role, particularly where they had undergone a similar treatment (Higgins and 
Wiles 1992).
Price sensitivity is a central characteristic of consumerist behaviour and yet the empirical 
evidence on price sensitivity in health care seems remarkably mixed. Studies in both 
industrialized and developing countries have suggested that the poor are sensitive to the price 
of health care and will reduce their demand in response to higher relative prices (Gertler and 
Van der Gaag 1990, Litvack and Bodart 1993, Manning et al 1987, Waddington and 
Enyimayew 1989 and 1990). However analyses of decision making processes suggest that at 
least amongst the US population, price sensitivity in health care is not a general rule. Of a 
sample of 2000 US respondents (approximately half of whom were Medicare enrollees) only 
39% reported engaging in any one of the following activities (Hibbard and Weeks 1987):-
- using physician fees as an important criterion when selecting a physician
- choosing not to see a physician when ill because of costs
- not following doctor's order because of costs
- asking about fees in discussion with a doctor.
In a follow up study a sub-sample of the same population were provided with a physician fee 
directoiy listing fees for area providers. Although those with the directory appeared to be 
better informed on prices than the control group there was no detectable difference in their 
health care utilization patterns (Hibbard and Weeks 1989). In the UK 62% of the sample 
seeking private hospital care did not know how much the treatment would cost and 70% of 
the insured did not know whether a co-payment would be required (Higgins and Wiles 1992).
Rice et al (1992) investigated price sensitivity in the US through an evaluation of the 
Medicare 'Participating Physicians Program'. Under this programme, physicians were 
prohibited from charging the patient more than Medicare approved rates. A telephone survey 
found that of Medicare enrollees less than 10% of the sample had switched physician during 
the past year, and of those who had, only 5% had switched for economic reasons including 
a meagre 1% who had switched to a physician working under the program. Moreover the 
majority of respondents said that they would not consider switching to a physician working 
under the programme.
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Obviously in the US insured persons only bear a fraction of the full cost of care. The level 
of co-payment appears to be affordable for most, and under these circumstances individuals 
seem reluctant to consider the price of care when selecting a provider.
Few of the studies considered consumer independence from medical advice. Only Hibbard 
and Weeks (1987) address this and theirs is a rather simplistic measure. Only 34% of 
respondents said that they would not always strictly follow die advice which doctors gave 
them.
Finally considerable work on what consumers look for in a health care provider has been 
completed. Lupton et al (1991) asked a series of open ended questions including why people 
chose their GP, why they continued to use them and what makes a good or bad doctor. Calnan 
(1988) used in-depth interviews with twenty women to explore what they thought constituted 
good and bad doctors. Overwhelmingly the evidence from these surveys points to the 
importance of good interpersonal relationships. Medical competence and knowledge is 
awarded some importance, but comes second to a sympathetic manner, good listening ability 
and communication skills.
Overall, the evidence emerging from studies of consumer behaviour in health care suggest that 
the archetypal image of the active consumer exercising independent judgement and seeking 
out high quality low price care is an inaccurate picture, at least in the industrialized countries 
where these studies have been undertaken. The limited degree of consumerism exhibited by 
health care users suggests that unless other agents (such as third party payers) are influential, 
there is only limited stimulation of competitive forces in the market. The apparently low levels 
of information amongst consumers, and their lack of willingness to monitor providers may 
create scope for providers to be imperfect agents, unless their behaviour is bounded by other 
factors such as professional ethics.
2.7 SUMMARY
The central issue in the debate about the public private mix for health care is the degree to 
which health care markets stray from the perfectly competitive model. This chapter has 
attempted to clarify the mechanisms through which such markets may fail and to consider the 
resulting forms of competition. Key factors affecting the form and extent of market failure 
are:-
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the extent of asymmetric information: imperfect information on the part of the 
consumer gives rise to a number of critical problems. If consumers are imperfectly 
informed about the characteristics of providers and there is product differentiation 
between providers then consumers are unlikely to seek out the products or services 
in the market which most closely match their own preferences and offer good value 
for money. Alternatively consumers may be able to select a good provider, but then 
are poorly informed about the nature of the service they require. Several of the other 
elements discussed below derive their importance from this fundamental problem of 
asymmetric information.
the extent of product differentiation: if product differentiation is a dominant force 
in the market then barriers to entry may occur and firms within the market are likely 
to be able to make positive profits. Product differentiation combined with asymmetric 
information exacerbates difficulties consumers face in selecting a provider, 
the magnitude of search costs: if accurate information about providers in the market 
is freely available then imperfect information is not a problem. The higher the costs 
of seeking information, the more problematic asymmetric information is likely to be. 
the effectiveness of provider signals: in the face of imperfect information high 
quality providers are likely to try to signal the quality of care which they offer. 
Signalling mechanisms may be effective, but in the health care market this is unlikely 
to be the case. The more important signalling is seen to be by providers the more 
resources will be diverted into it.
the willingness of patients to act in a consumerist manner: a number of different 
dimensions of consumerism have been identified. It is not necessarily the case that 
consumers will act consistently across all these dimensions. For example consumers 
may be very sensitive to the quality of care and may seek out information on this, but 
at the same time they could be relatively insensitive to price, and incapable of making 
medical decisions independent of their physician.
The importance of these factors in health care markets is an empirical question which could 
be approached from two angles. Studies such as those described in sections 2.4 and 2.5 above 
have taken a market level approach looking at market concentration, availability of 
information and how this affects a range of variables such as price, quality and profitability. 
An alternative approach would be to look at the underlying factors, in particular consumer 
knowledge and behaviour and how this influences the market. There are likely to be close 
connections between individual behaviour and the behaviour of providers, for example hospital
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advertising will affect consumer knowledge, consumer price sensitivity will affect the way in 
which hospitals compete.
In examining the extent and nature of market failure it is necessary to be specific about the 
market under consideration. Market failure will vary across different types of health care 
services. Pauly (1978 and 1988) distinguishes between different types of medical care markets 
where (i) the market works reasonably well (ii) the market doesn't work well and (iii) where 
it might work well given an appropriate competitive framework. Services fall into one of these 
three categories according to the frequency of purchase and the knowledge the typical 
consumer has about both the value of the service and its appropriateness for different 
conditions. Thus for simple primary care such as childhood vaccinations or treatment of 
diarrhoea, the high frequency of purchase and the lesser extent of asymmetric information 
means that the market is likely to work substantially better than for chemotherapy for cancer.
Similarly the extent of market failure is likely to vary according to the health care system. 
Both provider and consumer conduct will vary according to the structure of the health care 
system (Evans 1981) and also prevailing cultural norms. All of the empirical studies discussed 
in this chapter have considered industrialized societies which may have quite different health 
care systems and cultures to that found in the developing world. In order to consider the 
relevance of the theories discussed in this chapter to Bangkok, a much clearer idea of the 
nature of health care markets in the developing world is required. In chapter 3 the focus shifts 
to the developing world.
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CHAPTER 3
URBAN HEALTH CARE MARKETS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
3.0 INTRODUCTION
The models of hospital competition discussed in Chapter 2 have been largely developed and 
tested in the US. The structure of the health care system, the ethos of health care workers and 
cultural attitudes towards health will vary betwen countries and will inevitably affect the way 
in which the market for hospital care operates. This chapter tries to give a flavour of the 
nature of health care markets in the developing world, particularly in urban areas, and how 
they differ from health care markets in industrialized countries. There are clearly considerable 
dangers in generalizing about the health care systems of many diverse nations, but certain 
similarities do exist in the institutional arrangements of many developing countries; where 
this is not true comments are tied to a particular country or group of countries. The second 
part of the chapter focuses upon the health care situation in Bangkok. Besides orienting the 
reader to the situation in Bangkok, we aim to show how typical or atypical Bangkok is of 
cities in other developing countries.
3.1 DEVELOPING COUNTRY HEALTH CARE MARKETS - AN OVERVIEW
Figure 3.1 outlines the typical organization of developing country health care systems. At first 
glance such systems appear to be structurally similar to those in the industrialized world, 
however considerable differences lie in the significance of various relationships and the 
importance of different agents.
There is a wide variety of health care providers in developing countries, in particular figure
3.1 separates out public and private providers, and primary and hospital levels. In the poorest 
countries (much of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) private providers are most common 
at the primary level, however in middle income countries (such as those of South-East Asia 
and Latin America) the private hospital sector tends to be larger and is often growing rapidly. 
In middle-income countries private hospitals have greater financial viability due to the 
population's higher ability to pay, more widespread insurance coverage and easier access to 
credit on the part of investors.
For public health care providers the main source of income is likely to be government revenue 
which is commonly paid by global budget to providers, however for private providers the 
main source of finance is generally out-of-pocket payments from patients. Although social
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Figure 3.1
Financial flows in a typical developing country health care system
Premiums
Private insurance
Reimbursement
Social/employer insurancePremiums
GovernmentTax revenues
Global budgetPublic clinics
Private clinicsFees
Population and 
enterprises
Patient
Public hospitalsFees
Private hospitals
major
financial
flows
minor
financial
flows
insurance, private insurance and employer based insurance schemes all exist in developing 
countries, their coverage is often limited and only a small proportion of out-of-pocket 
payments by patients are likely to be reimbursed by any of these forms of insurance.
On paper, referral mechanisms between public primary level and public secondary level 
providers normally exist, although they operate with varying degrees of efficiency. It is much 
less clear how private providers fit into referral systems (Aljunid 1995). Commonly there are 
no established referral systems between public and private providers or indeed within the 
private sector.
Regulatory responsibilities are normally carried out by several different agents including 
government bodies and private organizations such as professional bodies. Often the regulatory 
efforts of such bodies are focussed upon health care providers and fewer controls are exerted 
over the financing agencies.
The following sections review each of the main agents within the health care system 
(providers, financers, patients and regulators) in more detail.
3.1.1 Providers
Most city dwellers in developing countries, and some living in rural areas, have a wide 
choice of providers from which to seek health care including government clinics, government 
hospitals, private doctors, private pharmacies, traditional healers of many sorts, private 
hospitals owned by both non-profit organizations and owned by investors (Bhat 1991a, 
Berman et al 1987, Green 1987). These providers differ not only in their ownership and the 
level of the health care system at which they operate, but also in the quality of care provided 
and the type of medicine practiced. There is thus considerable horizontal product 
differentiation across providers. This diversity exists for a number of reasons. It is partly due 
to people's preferences. In many lower and middle income countries people demand both 
traditional and allopathic forms of medicine. In Taiwan for example both Chinese medicine 
and allopathic care are covered by social health insurance (Su 1995). Providers may specialize 
in one approach or may use a mixture of approaches. Some governments have actively 
encouraged the role of traditional providers within the health care system because of the 
shortage of trained allopathic personnel.
It is possible to conceptualize this in terms of Lancaster's characteristics model with different
providers offering a different mixture of characteristics. For example several authors have 
suggested that the main difference between public and private allopathic medical practitioners 
is that private care tends to be more convenient and comfortable, whereas public care may be 
stronger in terms of clinical quality (Culyer 1982, Naylor 1988). Both public and private 
Western style providers may be weak in terms of providing information and communicating 
with the patient, as well as in the caring role. In contrast traditional healers often perform an 
important role in terms of providing information and relieving stress, even if the clinical 
quality of care associated with this service is low (Kleinman 1980).
Vertical product differentiation between providers is also substantial. For example in Bombay 
it was said that:
The private facilities range from modem sophisticated hospitals serving the needs of
affluent classes to clinics operating in dilapidated rooms in slums run by semi-
qualified people.' (Yesudian 1994:74)
The contrast in the standard of care available is perhaps particularly acute in India, but a wide 
range of different standards of care is found in many other developing countries. These 
differences are perhaps rooted in the greater socio-economic inequities commonly present in 
developing countries (Kuznets 1955). One consequence of the wide variation in the standards 
of care provided is that some providers may offer exceedingly poor quality care. A recent 
committee of enquiry into private nursing homes in Bombay included the following amongst 
the list of problems identified:
- One seventh of the nursing homes are in sheds or lofts in slums;
- Less than one third have qualified nurses;
- Some do not disinfect the operating theatre more than once a week;
- None incinerate any infectious waste material, but instead drop it in municipal bins;
- Over a third of all wards and half of beds in them are dirty and most are poorly lit.
(Yesudian 1994)
Services provided in such facilities may do more harm than good to an individual's health 
status.
Problems of unacceptable standards of care are not confined to the bottom end of the market, 
a major concern at all levels of the market, but perhaps particularly in facilities serving 
wealthier clients is the use of unnecessary diagnostic tests, surgical interventions or 
pharmaceuticals. In Brazil for example far higher rates of Caesarian sections were found 
amongst private patients than uninsured ones (Barros et al 1986). McGreevey (1988)
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documents a variety of forms of demand inducement, all said to be prevalent in Brazil. 
Yesudian (1994) discusses 'cut practice* in Bombay where unnecessary referrals are made 
between doctors with the referring doctor receiving a portion of the fee charged by the doctor 
to whom the referral was made. Uplekar (1989a and b) examined prescription patterns 
amongst private doctors in Bombay for the treatment of tuberculosis and leprosy and 
concluded that in general the physicians prescribed a considerably larger number of drugs than 
was required.
The reasons for low standards of care in the private sector are likely to be complex, including 
the lack of continuous education for health care staff, weak regulation, poor support for 
investment in facilities etc. but financial incentives combined with the for-profit orientation 
of many health care providers in developing countries is probably a significant factor. It is 
difficult to obtain data about what percentage of facilities in private ownership have a for- 
profit orientation, but it seems that the picture varies substantially across regions. In Sub- 
Saharan Africa non-profit organizations, particularly mission facilities, often provide around 
40% of total health care contacts (Gilson et al 1994). In many Western European countries 
and the US the private sector is dominated by non-profit organizations. However in Asia 
private for-profit providers often make up the largest proportion of the private sector. In India, 
for example, in 1987 it was estimated that more than 80% of private hospitals were operated 
on a for-profit basis, between them these hospitals owned approximately 58% of private beds 
(Bhat 1991a) At the primary level many of these for-profit providers are small family run 
businesses. For larger hospitals, investor-owned companies are more significant. Furthermore 
in many Asian countries supposedly non-profit foundations are often run along very similar 
lines to for-profit ones.
The evidence relating hospital ownership to quality of care is ambiguous. There is little clear 
evidence that for-profit ownership adversely affects quality of care (Shortell et al 1988), but 
it appears that for-profit providers respond more to financial incentives (Gaumer 1986). Thus 
it is possible that faced with fee-for-service based remuneration, for-profit providers in 
developing countries may respond by either providing low quality care in order to reduce their 
own costs, or over-servicing the patient in order to increase revenues.
3.1.2 Financers
The fortunes of private providers are commonly closely linked to health insurance coverage 
(Ngalande-Banda and Simukonda 1994, Price 1989). Indeed one author commented that:
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involvement in health service provision is the potential for insurance coverage.' 
(Griffin 1989)
However it is also clear that the private health care sector often flourishes in conditions where 
there is extremely limited health insurance, or at least limited health insurance providing 
access to private providers. In Latin America many national health insurance schemes were 
established early this century (McGreevey 1990) and now cover a substantial proportion of 
the population. However they are frequently based upon a direct model of delivery, ie. the 
social security institute has its own facilities through which care is provided, and hence those 
who seek care privately commonly pay for it out of their own pocket. In Mexico although 
55% of the population are covered by health insurance approximately 37% of health care 
contacts were found to be in the private for-profit sector not covered by the social insurance 
scheme (Cruz and Zurita 1993). In much of Asia health insurance schemes are very poorly 
developed (Ron et al 1990) and yet extremely high utilization of private providers is evident, 
particularly at the primary level. For example India and Pakistan both have health insurance 
coverage of no more than 5% of the population but approximately 70% of health care contacts 
are estimated to be in the private sector (Bhat 1991a, Mohammed et al 1993). A study of 
private practitioners in Jamaica showed that 60% of their income came direct from patients 
on a fee-for-service basis, 25-30% was reimbursable by private health insurance schemes and 
the remainder was covered by special arrangements such as employer schemes (Cumper 
1990). It is probable that in many developing countries some informal risk pooling 
mechanisms operate, for example through lending within the extended family. In many low 
and middle income countries a minority of the work force are in formal sector employment 
and this, despite innovative schemes attempting to cover informal sector workers, often forms 
a natural limit to the coverage of social and employer based schemes.
Where sizeable third party payer organizations do exist they often have limited bureaucratic 
capacity. Bureaucratic inefficiencies are reflected in, for example, high administrative costs 
and late reimbursement of expenditure. In Western Europe administrative costs for social 
health insurance schemes are often around 5% of revenue, in Latin America they are reported 
to go up to about 28% and in Mali were said to amount to 50% (WHO 1993). An important 
implication of this is that even where insurance schemes with substantial population coverage 
exist in the developing world they are often unable to act in a way which encourages 
appropriate behaviour on the part of providers. Recent reforms in Western Europe and 
proposals for reform in the US emphasize the potentially powerful role of purchasers of health
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care in the market place (Enthoven 1988, Culyer et al 1990). Through negotiations with 
providers, medical review and medical audit, health insurance organizations can help to ensure 
an appropriate standard of care at a low cost for their clients. This may even have spill-over 
effects benefitting the uninsured part of the population. However adequate information systems 
and sufficient bureaucratic capacity are required to achieve this. All too often these are lacking 
in developing countries (Kutzin and Bamum 1992).
Stronger health insurance organizations and more widespread insurance coverage would not 
only be able to enforce discipline upon providers through mechanisms such as medical audit 
etc but may also help to set incentives for providers through the structuring of the payment 
mechanism. The great majority of uninsured patients pay private health care providers on a 
fee-for-service basis. Fee-for-service systems have an inherent tendency to encourage the over- 
provision of care, leading potentially to problems of cost-escalation and unnecessary servicing. 
In contrast insurance schemes both in industrialized countries and in the developing world are 
increasingly experimenting with prospective forms of payment designed to contain costs 
(WHO 1993).
3.1.3 Patients/consumers
Expansion of the private sector is commonly said to benefit only the rich. Several studies have 
explored the truth of this assertion. There is certainly considerable evidence that higher 
income groups tend to use private providers more than lower income groups. For example in 
rural Indonesia Berman et al (1987) found that the average number of contacts with a private 
practitioner were 0.18 per illness episode for the three lower income quartiles, but rose to 
0.477 for the highest income quartile. This is supported by Heller's findings in Malaysia 
where logistic regression analysis showed that higher income levels were associated with a 
greater probability of using private providers (Heller 1982). Akin et al (1986) claim similar 
results in the Phillippines, although only one proxy for income (number of rooms in the 
house) is actually significantly associated with greater use of private providers. However in 
contrast to these studies others suggest that there is little, if any, difference between lower 
and higher income groups in their use of the private sector. In a comparative study of San 
Salvador and Santo Domingo based on household survey data it was concluded that:
'Private sector providers are visited by the poor just as often as by the rich, and the 
cost per visit at private providers is similar between rich and poor.' (Bitran and 
Mclnnes 1993).
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A survey of patients at private clinics in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea found that 9% of 
patients were earning less that the minimum wage and classified a further 51% of the sample 
as coming from low income households (Mulou et al 1991). Studies from India show a slight 
income gradient, with higher income households marginally more likely to use private sector 
providers than lower income households. However the overall rate of private sector utilization 
is extremely high. For example a recent household survey in one area of India found that in 
the lowest income quintile care was sought in the private sector for 72.2% of illness episodes, 
in the highest income quintile this rose to 95.2% (Duggal and Amin 1989).
The empirical evidence cited above shows clearly that the situation varies from country to 
country and even within countries. However it would appear that even if higher income 
households are rather more likely to use private care than lower income households, it is not 
exclusively their preserve. Private sector utilization by lower income households is significant. 
One problem with many of these studies is that the private sector is treated as a homogenous 
group of providers. As previously discussed this is far from being the case. The considerable 
diversity of health care providers in developing countries is naturally mirrored by much 
diversity amongst the users of the private health care sector.
Although many studies have examined consumers' choice of provider, there is a striking 
scarcity of literature on how such choices are made. An international overview of studies on 
the use of health care services observed that
To date there have been few attempts to specify in any detail the various processes 
- stages and types of decisions - made in the seeking of medical care.' (McKinlay
1972)
Recently the situation has changed a little in the industrialized world where the increased 
interest in markets has began to stimulate studies of consumer behaviour (see Chapter 2). 
Despite the more widespread health care market activities in developing countries such studies 
are still uncommon. In developing countries anthropological studies have gone furthest in 
explaining how consumers in die market place choose between competing providers. It is 
impossible to review this vast literature here, but some key points are highlighted.
The anthropological literature suggests that in the eyes of many people in more traditional 
societies health is inextricably linked with mental and social well being. Thus there appears 
to be different levels at which ill health may be caused. Traditional societies are often equally 
concerned with finding out the root cause of illness as with alleviating symptoms (Zola 1973,
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Heggenhougen and Draper 1990). For example people may wish to seek answers to questions 
such as Why does this afflict me and not someone else?'. Resolving such issues is often seen 
as critical to achieving a full recovery. As a direct consequence of such beliefs anthropologists 
have found extensive use of different health care providers to treat one illness episode 
(Helman 1990). To a certain extent, a path of multiple resort is pursued in order to increase 
the probability that one of the therapies will work. However frequently patients feel that 
different types of therapy complement each other and that seeking care from a number of 
providers will result in a faster recovery or alternatively will ensure a complete recovery 
which one provider alone could not offer. For example, as the effectiveness of Western 
therapeutic techniques in alleviating symptoms becomes increasingly well known in many 
countries, it is a resort which is more and more commonly used. However this does not 
prevent patients from simultaneously seeking care from traditional providers to ensure that not 
just the symptoms are vanquished but the very root of the disease.
Research studies suggest that people's visits to health care providers are often triggered by 
some form of social disharmony such as not being able to participate in a social event, or a 
family disagreement over the problem, rather than the symptoms themselves. For example 
Zola's study of outpatients in the US found that the main triggers for seeking medical aid 
were the occurrence of an interpersonal crisis, and perceived interference of the illness with 
social or personal relations, or vocational or physical activity (Zola 1973). Ben-Sira (1990) 
suggests that "when coming to the physician, patients have two goals; the manifest goal of 
solution of their health problems, and the latent goal of alleviating their anxiety". Such studies 
of why people seek health care shed light on the characteristics which people seek in a health 
care provider. Although the curing function of health care providers is the one most 
commonly thought of (McKeown 1986) much of the demand for health care may be a demand 
for information. The nature of the information required may vary between cultures (What is 
wrong with me? Will I improve? Why has this illness happened to me and not someone else?) 
but the basic need is a strong one. In addition the health care provider may relieve the patient 
of responsibility for the illness, displacing responsibility to external factors and thus providing 
the patient with reassurance.
The reasons for seeking health care and the nature of the condition will influence the type of 
characteristics that a patient seeks in a health care provider. Patients may also affect the 
bundle of health care characteristics consumed by seeking care from more than one provider. 
Studies of health care utilization patterns in developing countries regularly show the use of
many sources of health care (Gilson 1992, Mwabu 1985). In particular the strong clinical 
powers of modem medicine may be combined with the healing powers of traditional care.
Much of the anthropological literature is concerned with the use of and beliefs about 
traditional medicine, far less appears to have been written about modem allopathic medicine 
in developing countries. In some countries such as India, China and parts of Africa traditional 
medicine is still of considerable significance. Elsewhere its hold has weakened in favour of 
modem Western medicine. However even in societies where traditional medicine is no longer 
of great significance the anthropological literature offers insights into attitudes towards health 
care. The willingness to utilize different health care providers for one illness episode or to 
shop around between different providers is of particular interest, as it directly contradicts the 
notion of patients being weak consumers eager to surrender responsibility for their health to 
a professional. A related point concerns the variety of characteristics which people seek in 
health care;, much of the anthropological literature describes peoples perception's of the 
different characteristics possessed by traditional practitioners and modem practitioners. 
However in societies where traditional medicine is no longer widely used it is possible that 
similar differences in perception exist with respect to public and private sector providers.
3.1.4 Regulators/Govemm ent
It is fairly widely accepted that certain market failures are likely to exist in the health care 
sector. What is more widely debated is the appropriate response to such problems (Lai 1995, 
Stiglitz 1989). Despite the continuing debate most countries, both developed and developing, 
have some regulatory oversight of the market. Often this regulatory function is carried out by 
government, particularly the Ministry of Health, and professional bodies such as the Medical 
Association. Though regulation may cover the prices, quantity and quality of care provided 
(Maynard 1982), the most common focus in developing countries is upon quality (Bennett et 
al 1994).
North (1990) argues that one of the greatest problems facing developing countries is weak 
institutions which fail to eliminate adequately problems of imperfect information. In Western 
market economies, which have followed a gradual industrialization process there was sufficient 
time to adapt to new technologies. However in much of the developing world, where 
technologies have been rapidly imported and diffused over a compressed period of time 
institutional development has been insufficient. This argument rings true with respect to 
regulatory institutions in the health care sector. Ministries of Health in developing countries
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usually have statutory regulatory powers, but they often do not have the ability or resources 
to exercise this power (Bartholet 1990, Mutungi 1992). Developing country governments are 
commonly weaker and less entrenched than industrialized country governments. There may 
be a tendency to government failure, particularly in the form of corruption and bribery in the 
licensing and inspection divisions of Ministries of Health (Klitgaard 1988). As in the 
industrialized world, professional organizations, such as Medical and Nursing Councils are 
responsible for regulating procedural aspects of quality of care. However on occasion these 
councils receive little or no funding, this was the case in Ghana until recently (pers comm G. 
Dakpallah). Some Medical Councils in India have been accused of manipulating facts and 
continuously postponing hearings of malpractice cases (Times of India 1992).
Where government and professional organizations are weak, consumer bodies may play an 
important role through placing pressure on these organizations to carry out their regulatory 
responsibilities in a more effective manner. However in many developing countries organized 
consumer groups do not exist. The transaction costs of forming such groups prevents them 
from developing and there is thus little external pressure upon government or professional 
councils (Dreze and Sen 1991).
3.2 THE MARKET FOR HEALTH CARE IN BANGKOK
In many respects Thailand is not a typical developing country. It has never been colonized. 
It is a middle income country with a GNP of approximately US$2,400 per capita (World Bank 
1996), yet its population remains predominantly rural. During the past 25 years the 
government has frequently been changed by coup d'etat, yet nearly all of these have been 
bloodless and the country, both economically and socially appears remarkably stable. Perhaps 
the main fact however which distinguishes Thailand from many other developing countries 
is the extraordinarily rapid economic growth which has occurred during the past fifteen years.
3.2.1 Economic growth and health care in Bangkok
As table 3.1 shows, rates of GNP growth during the 1980s averaged about 6%, and were 
particularly strong during the 1987-1990 period, averaging over 11% per annum (Robinson 
et al 1991). The engine of economic growth has been small scale industry and services. 
Despite the changing structure of production nearly two thirds of the workforce are still 
primarily engaged in agricultural activities. Industrialization had led to rapid urbanization, in 
1960 only 13% of the population lived in urban areas, by 1991 this had increased to 23%.
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Nevertheless the percentage of the population living in urban areas is still low compared to 
countries of a similar economic status.
Table 3.1
GDP Growth in Thailand 1980-1990
Year Real GDP Growth (% change)
1980 4.8
1985 3.5
1986 4.9
1987 9.5
1988 13.2
1989 12.0
19901 10.0
Source: Robinson et al 1991
Of the urban population the majority (nearly 60% or 5.9 million people) live in Bangkok 
(NSO 1993) making the city by far the largest in Thailand. At current growth rates it is 
estimated that it will be the 14th largest city in the world by the year 2000. Bangkok is a large 
sprawling city with developments along all the main transportation routes (see figure 3.2). The 
city has three centres; the old administrative centre around Sanam Luang where many 
government offices are still located, the business centre along Thanon Silom and Surawong, 
and the entertainment and tourism centre on Thanon Sukhumvit. The lack of a mass transit 
system has made travelling in Bangkok extremely difficult; traffic in the city is constantly 
congested and the average journey time to work is 91 minutes (second only to Rio de Janeiro) 
(Economist 1995). Residential areas are scattered throughout the city with low density and 
high density (slum) areas in close proximity (Pomchokchai 1985). The city is also ethnically 
veiy mixed, many of the Thais in Bangkok are actually first or second generation Chinese 
whose families came to Bangkok early this centuiy. In addition many migrant workers from
1 Preliminary data
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Figure 3.2
Population density and transportation routes in Bangkok
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Laos and the North East of Thailand spend at least part of the year in Bangkok working in 
the construction sector and service industries (Keyes 1989).
Besides acting as a catalyst to urbanization, economic growth in Thailand has impacted on the 
health sector in three principle ways:-
Growing inequity; economic growth has benefltted the better-off disproportionately. 
The Gini coefficient in Thailand increased from about 0.43 in 1975/76 to 0.48 in 
1988/89 (Robinson 1991). Increasing inequity in disposable incomes has generated a 
widening gap between the standards of health care expected by the rich and the poor. 
Estimates of occupation specific mortality rates suggest that they are over twice as 
high amongst agricultural workers as those in administrative or professional positions 
(Pannurunothai 1992).
Changing epidemiological profile; although infectious and parasitic diseases such as 
tuberculosis and malaria are still of importance in Thailand, they have been overtaken 
by injuries and poisonings, cardiovascular diseases and neoplasm as the leading cause 
of death (Pavabuta 1993).
Growth of demand; income elasticity of demand for health care has been estimated 
at 1.3 for Asia (Griffin 1991) and 1.62 for Thailand (Myers et al 1985). Rapid income 
growth, particularly in urban areas has led to increased health care expenditure. It has 
been estimated that in real terms private household expenditure on health care 
increased nearly fourfold between 1982 and 1992 (Hsiao 1993). This is particularly 
astounding as over the same period real government expenditure on health care more 
than doubled.
Each of the trends identified above has in some respects encouraged the development of the 
private health care sector. Growing inequity has led the relatively affluent to demand a 
quality of health care which the public health care sector cannot provide. The high income 
elasticity of demand for health care means that households are now willing to spend far more 
on health care than they have in the past. Most of this new ability to pay has been channelled 
towards private providers. Finally some authors have argued that care for non-communicable 
and lifestyle-related disease may be better provided through the market place (Birdsall 1989). 
Certainly such diseases may present less of a social concern than traditional public health 
problems.
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Few other nations, with the exception perhaps of Thailand's neighbours in South-East Asia 
have been lucky enough to experience private sector growth as a result of economic 
prosperity. Rather, growth of the private sector has commonly occurred as economies have 
contracted, government budgets dried up, and the quality of care in the public sector declined. 
In particular, factors such as drug shortages in the public sector have forced people to seek 
care from private providers.
3.2.2 Growth of the private health care sector
Historically Thailand has a rich tradition and diversity of health care providers; Okanurak and 
Chitprarop (1993) identify five main groups of folk healers in Thailand being (i) traditional 
healers (ii) injectionists (iii) magic doctors (iv) monk doctors and (v) Chinese doctors2. 
However in 1887 King Rama V, a reformer who was impressed by Western scientific 
progress, established the first hospital of Western medicine in Bangkok, Siriraj, which is still 
one of the country's premier teaching hospitals. The Chulalongkom University hospital 
followed shortly after. In Thailand, unlike countries where a colonial power was in place, 
these facilities were clearly designed for the use of the local population, however it is unclear 
the extent to which they were used by common people.
Western medicine in Thailand was principally provided by government and not-for-profit 
private hospitals, although there were a few private for-profit ones. By the 1970s there were 
about 24 public hospitals in Bangkok. During the 1970s and 1980s the Ministry of Health 
focussed its efforts on improving accessibility to Western medicine in rural areas. This it 
succeeded in doing. By 1987 an estimated 80% of the population were within eight kilometres 
or one hour's walk of a health centre (MOPH 1992). Neglect of the growing demand for 
higher quality health care amongst the increasingly affluent urban population was one of the 
factors which stimulated private sector growth.
The pattern of growth amongst private sector providers is reflected in table 3.2, however a 
more dramatic picture emerges if Bangkok alone is examined (see figure 3.3). Between 1970 
and 1990 the number of private hospitals in Bangkok grew from 11 to 99, and the number of
2Golomb (1985) found that the Thais recognized a huge and colourful range of providers 
including: *herbalists, spirit-mediums, love magic practitioners, masseurs, bonesetters, diviners, 
exorcists, sorcerers, injectionists, amulet makers, drug sellers (both Chinese and non-Chinese), 
eye specialists, skin specialists, morticians, mid-wives, abortionists, snake-bite healers, 
therapists for insane people, specialists in sinuses, detectors of lost or stolen objects'.
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private hospital beds from 765 to 6173. This growth in the private health care sector was 
supported by increasing private household expenditure on health, between 1982 and 1992 
private households' contribution to total health expenditure rose from 63% to 74%.
Table 3.2
Growth in private sector health facilities and manpower in Thailand (1970-1989)
Resources
1970 1978 1986 1989
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Hospitals 93 36.6 186 29.5 264 27.4 354 31.4
Beds 2050 5.4 5842 9.1 8597 10.0 12777 13.7
Doctors 236 6.6 687 11.1 892 9.6 2260 17.8
Nurses 631 8.1 1743 10.6 2014 5.4 4932 8.5
SOURCE: Health Resources Survey, Medical Statistics Division
Private sector hospital growth has been encouraged by incentives provided by the Board of 
Investment (BOI) (see figure 3.3). Hospitals of fifty beds or more were eligible to apply for 
Board of Investment support which entailed corporate tax relief and exemptions from import 
duty for up to 5 years. Hospitals could apply for similar benefits on major expansion projects. 
It is difficult directly to attribute growth in the number of hospital beds in Bangkok to BOI 
support, but the two do seem to correspond closely. In 1983 BOI support to the hospital sector 
was temporarily suspended and there was a corresponding hiatus in hospital construction3. 
Recent negotiations between the MOPH and BOI highlighted the potential over-supply of 
hospital beds in Bangkok (188 persons per bed in Bangkok compared with 719 persons per 
bed up-country in 1989 (Nittayaramphong and Tangcharoensathien 1994)) and led to the
3 Interestingly an analysis of the growth of prostitution in Thailand identifies BOI support 
to hotels and the subsequent over-supply of hotel beds in Bangkok as being a key factor in 
the development of sex tourism in Thailand (Truong 1990). BOI support to hotels and 
hospitals is delivered through the 'Hotels and Hospitals' division of BOI.
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cessation of further BOI support to private hospitals in Bangkok.
A further factor which can often stimulate private sector growth is the spread of health 
insurance coverage thus improving the financial accessibility of private providers. 
Unfortunately good historical data on health insurance coverage is not available but Table 3.3 
compares 1987 data with that for 1992. It can be seen that there is a range of different 
insurance schemes in operation in Thailand, but during the past five years there has been only 
a small increase in health insurance coverage. The one important exception to this being the 
implementation of the Social Security Scheme in 1990.
Table 3.3
Recent expansion of health insurance in Thailand
1987
Population coverage 
M %
Exp per 
capita (Baht)
1992
Population coverage 
M %
Exp per 
capita (Baht)
CSMBS 4.9 92 683.2 6.4 11.3 900
Social
Security
- - - 3.8 6.8 480
Private
health
insurance
0.2 0.5 1855 0.6 1.1 622
Health
Card
2.7 5.1 68 3 5.3 65
Free Care 10 19 214 11.7 20.7 214
SOURCE: Adapted from Tangcharoensathien V (1990) and Hsiao W (1993)
3.2.3 The Structure of the Thai Health Care System
Figure 3.1 is a reasonable reflection of the structure of the health care system in Thailand. The 
roles of and relationships between the main agents in the system are discussed in this section.
Providers
A plethora of public and private providers exist at both primary and secondary levels. 
Although there is a reasonably well established referral system within the public sector, 
particularly in rural areas, referral links between public and private providers, and within the
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private sector are far weaker. Some innovative schemes within one province are experimenting 
with developing referral linkages between private primary providers and secondary 
government care (Nittayaramphong 1991a). The new social security scheme has helped to 
develop links between different level providers within the private sector (Siriwarangsun 1994). 
However in general such referral mechanisms are weak and consumers frequently choose to 
enter the formal health care system at the hospital level. Therefore hospitals have large 
outpatient departments dealing with relatively minor conditions.
In addition to private hospitals there are numerous private clinics in Thailand with more than 
two thousand in Bangkok alone. Many of these clinics are run by government doctors to 
supplement their public sector salary. In recent years a number of private diagnostic centres 
have been established. These specialize in high technology tests such as CT scans and MRIs.
Despite the historically rich culture of traditional practice, traditional healers are thought to 
no longer be a popular source of health care. A 1985 survey indicated that just 1% of urban 
residents sought care from traditional healers, and in the rural areas the corresponding figure 
was 2.8% (IPSR 1988). Even allowing for some reluctance to reveal such utilization patterns 
in a structured interview it would seem that traditional healers are no longer widely used. The 
new form of horizontal product differentiation which is emeiging is that of specialized 
services. This trend is just starting, but a review of the investment potential in the private 
health care sector suggested that as the supply of hospital beds increases in Bangkok, hospitals 
offering more specialized services, such as cardiac centres, will do well (Pianpaktr 1993).
In section 3.1 it was commented that in many parts of the developing world private for-profit 
providers played an extremely significant role. This is indeed the case in Bangkok as reflected 
in Table 3.4. Private for-profit providers account for the bulk of hospital ownership in 
Bangkok with non-profit providers playing a relatively small role. The converse is true in the 
US.
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Table 3.4
Patterns of Hospital Ownership in Bangkok and the US
Bangkok US
Government 23% 23%
Private for-profit 66% 12%
Private non-profit 11% 65%
Source: The Economist 1993 and Medical License Division, Ministry of Public Health.
Some of the smaller private for-profit hospitals are owned and run by physician-owners. 
However the majority of hospitals employ doctors. There are a variety of ways in which such 
doctors could be remunerated. In Bangkok common practice is for the hospital to collect all 
patient revenue and then pass on to doctors a percentage of the fee collected from patients 
they have seen. The precise percentage paid to the physician varies between hospitals and also 
according to the number of hours per week which the physician works at the hospital. Many 
larger hospitals have a number of core full time staff who receive, in addition to their share 
of the patient fee, a salary. Most of the doctors who work part time in the private sector have 
full time public sector posts. There appears to be little difference between private for-profit 
and private non-profit hospitals in methods of remunerating doctors4.
Financers
Figure 3.1 suggested that the main source of finance for public health care providers in 
developing countries tended to be the government budget, and for private providers, out-of- 
pocket payment of fees was the most significant source of revenue. In Thailand the situation 
is only slightly different. Public hospitals and clinics also charge quite significant fees, and 
the Ministry of Public Health recovers on average 48-51% of total operating costs, principally 
through fees (Tangcharoensathien et al 1992).
A number of insurance and medical benefit schemes exist but their total population coverage 
is quite limited, suggesting that out-of-pocket payments are indeed important. Moreover access 
to private providers under these schemes is often limited. The health card scheme and the free
4 Information on remuneration policies in hospitals was collected through interviews with 
hospital directors.
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care scheme (which is really a social welfare scheme rather than a health insurance scheme) 
do not allow any access to private providers. Civil servants seeking private sector care receive 
only limited reimbursement and private health insurance coverage is very limited. In addition 
some people may be insured under more than one of the schemes hence simply summing the 
population covered by each is likely to lead to an over-estimate of population coverage. A 
more detailed description of each of the main insurance and medical benefit schemes operating 
in Thailand is given in Appendix 1.
Of the financing arrangements currently in operation the Social Security Scheme is by far the 
most significant. The Act was passed in 1990 and implemented in 1991 with plans to cover 
all workers in establishments with 10 employees or more by 1994 and to allow other workers 
to join voluntarily in 1995. Medical care provided under the scheme is paid for on a capitation 
basis. There was some concern initially that the low level fee agreed upon (700 Baht per 
annum, approximately US$28) would deter private providers from participating. However due 
to limited administrative capacity employers were asked to choose providers on behalf of 
employees. As a result insured persons often lived a long way from their contracted provider 
and rarely use their contracted hospital, frequently seeking care elsewhere (Nittayaramphong 
et al 1991b). This problem is being resolved as employees’ are gradually being given the 
opportunity to choose their registered hospital. In the meantime the scheme has proved very 
profitable for the private sector and over time there has been a marked shift from public sector 
registrations to private sector registrations. For example between 1991 and 1992 the 
percentage of employees registered with private providers swung from 16.4% to 41.7%.
Limited administrative capacity is a problem with virtually all of the schemes mentioned. The 
Social Security Scheme has clearly the strongest administration; it pays on a capitation basis 
and has computerized records, though the planned health information system is still not fully 
functioning. In contrast the large Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme keeps paper records 
which are only analysed in terms of levels of expenditure and has no record of medical 
procedures carried out. At the moment none of the financing schemes in Thailand (including 
private sector insurance companies) act as effective purchasers of health care, exerting 
discipline in the market. Thai policy makers hope that the Social Security Scheme may 
develop this capacity in the near future.
Consumers/Patients
Hsiao (1993) describes the Thai health care system as a three tier one; the bottom tier being
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free care for the poor, the middle tier consisting of the middle classes who are often covered 
by some form of insurance, and the top tier being those sufficiently wealthy to pay out of 
pocket (Hsiao 1993). However in reality there is considerable overlap between these tiers; 
middle and even lower income people may use private providers and pay out-of-pocket, the 
very wealthy may well be covered by some form of insurance which they will elect to use 
when necessary. Little data on utilization by socio-economic group exists in Thailand. In one 
study in Northern Thailand a positive association was found between income and admission 
into private sector hospitals, but even in the lowest income quintile 37% of admissions were 
in the private sector (see table 3.5). It is likely that for primary care there is an even higher 
rate of private sector utilization amongst the poor as the services are so much cheaper.
Table 3.5
Hospitalization by Household Income Group in a Northern Thai Town
Income Quintile N Admission
rate
% Admission in each sector
Public Private
1 (lowest) 62 9.9% 59.3 37.0
2 58 8.2% 44.1 50.8
3 67 8.9% 26.7 68.0
4 70 9.2% 16.9 80.3
5 (highest) 84 9.7% 18.6 75.6
Source: Pannurunothai 1993
There have been few studies in Thailand examining attitudes towards and behaviour in seeking 
health care from the allopathic health care sector.
3.2.4 Implications of Private Sector Growth
Increasing numbers of private hospital beds in Bangkok have clearly brought some benefits 
to the consumer; access to hospitals has improved and there is greater choice in terms of the
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quality and price of care available. It is also possible that the private sector may stimulate 
more competitive behaviour amongst public hospitals. On the other hand, private sector 
growth has imposed an indirect cost on government as competition for scarce skilled 
manpower has increased wages. Virtually all government doctors also carry out private work 
and often double or triple their income through such employment (Chunharas et al 1990). 
Such high levels of private sector participation may lead doctors to neglect their public sector 
responsibilities. Recently the MOPH introduced a B 10,000 private practice allowance for 
doctors who do not engage in any private sector activity. It is too early to tell how successful 
this will be.
Cost escalation stimulated by private sector competition is also a concern of the authorities 
(Nittayaramphong and Tangcharoensathien 1994). Private hospitals have been the leaders in 
acquiring high technology equipment in Thailand. Bangkok in particular is very well supplied 
compared to cities in industrialized countries. Once high technology equipment has been 
acquired there is a financial imperative to use it frequently in order to cover costs. It is feared 
that this has led to supplier-induced demand in Bangkok, although there is no hard evidence 
to support this claim. The potential problem of induced demand is acknowledged by the 
population who refer to it as 'liang jai* meaning literally 'to feed an illness'. The media also 
recognize the problem, for example one newspaper article suggested that fee structures may 
be partially to be blame for high rates of Caesarian sections in the private sector (up to 60% 
of births in some private hospitals) (Combe 1992).
Thailand already spends a comparatively high percentage of GNP on health care without 
reaping the same level of health benefits as that in lower spending countries. MOPH estimates 
suggest that more than 8% of GDP may be spent on health care by the year 2000 (MOPH 
1992).
Finally there is a concern that the rapid rise of private hospitals has led to the 
commercialization of health care. Anumber of incidences have been reported in the national 
press where emergency cases have been refused care as they were unable to pay a deposit 
(Cheang 1992). There are also common complaints that private hospitals charge unreasonably 
high prices for care. Hospitals make a considerable investment in the advertising of their 
services, on radio, in newspapers, as well as in huge neon lights outside their facility.
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3.3.5 Regulation of Health Care Providers
The two principle means for regulating health care providers in Thailand are:-
i. The 1963 Medical Institutions Act (Government of Thailand 1963)
This applies to the health care institution rather than individuals working within the 
institution. Key articles in the Act include:-
Compulsory annual registration with the Medical License Division, MOPH for 
all private hospitals and clinics in Thailand;
Definition of certain structural aspects of quality of care (such as adequate 
toilet facilities, space per bed etc) and provision for enforcement of these 
standards by the Medical License Division;
Provision for the MOPH to require private hospitals to give to the Ministry 
certain medical (as opposed to financial) data;
Provision for private hospitals to advertise their services so long as they do 
not 'make false claims in order to induce the patient to go to that facility'.
ii. Professional legislation such as the 1983 Medical Council Rules on Medical Ethics 
(Medical Council 1983).
These rules apply to individuals rather than institutions. The Medical Council rules 
cover a variety of ethical questions including the prohibition of payments for onward 
referrals, provision of unnecessary services for financial gain, refusal to assist patients 
who are critically ill, working in an unregistered facility etc. The rules are enforced 
in a passive manner ie. the Medical Councils will deliberate on any complaints which 
are brought to their attention.
There are a number of problems associated with the enforcement of the regulation described 
above. For example some of the recent unethical behaviour decried in the press (such as 
refusing treatment to emergency patients who are unable to pay in advance) has been carried 
out by hospital managers or administrators. No action can be taken against such behaviour; 
the Medical Institution Act does not cover any procedural aspects of quality of care regulation 
and the Medical Council whilst covering ethical behaviour is unable to take action against 
non-medical administrators (Cheang 1992). It seems that the Medical Institutions Act is 
outdated. Thirty years ago there were virtually no private for-profit hospitals in Thailand and 
the regulation described was able to regulate effectively small proprietor-operated clinics. 
However the growth in numbers of investor-owned hospitals in Thailand, and the consequent 
separation of medical and management functions, has raised a new set of problems which the
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current regulations are inadequate to deal with.
Even though the powers given to the MOPH by the Medical Institutions Act are fairly limited, 
they are not fully exercised. For example the annual Health Resource Survey carried out by 
the Health Planning and Statistics Division, MOPH, has a very low response rate 
(approximately 30% of private hospitals in Bangkok), but no action has ever been taken to 
enforce hospitals to respond. This can partly be explained by vested interests. As mentioned 
above virtually all public sector doctors in Thailand also have private sector employment. It 
is common for more senior officials within the Ministry to have financial interests in private 
hospitals and clinics. (A recent Minister of Health first set up, and now is the principal 
shareholder in, one of the largest private hospital businesses in Thailand.) Given such close 
interlinkages between policy makers and the world of commerce it is unsurprising that more 
effective regulatory controls have not been effected.
Unlike many other lower and middle income countries Thailand has a rich civil society 
including many non-government organizations and pressure groups. At the moment such 
groups are not active on this issue, but the press certainly is. Considerable coverage has been 
given in the newspapers to questions concerning the ethics of private health care providers, 
and this may catalyse a more active role on the part of consumer groups. Unfortunately 
doctors in Thailand have always been viewed as being at the top of the social pyramid and 
hence there is a natural tendency not to question their actions (Smith 1982). This tendency is 
reinforced by a cultural abhorrence of personal conflict, particularly with persons seen to be 
socially superior to oneself.
3.3 SUMMARY
Although developing country governments have often attempted to provide their population 
with access to public sector health care services, in many countries a large, relatively free 
market in health care exists with substantial private sector involvement. This is particularly 
true of urban areas where a willingness and ability to pay for private sector services is 
concentrated. In very low income countries the private sector is focused at the primary level, 
but increasingly private sector hospitals and nursing homes are playing an important role. In 
many developing countries referral mechanisms between primary and secondary levels are 
weak to non-existent and patients commonly seek care direct from the hospital level. This is 
particularly true in South and South-east Asia.
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A high degree of product heterogeneity exists in the health care sectors of developing 
countries. Horizontal product differentiation is rooted in people's varying tastes for different 
types of health care; in the developing world people often appreciate both western and 
traditional forms of medicine. Vertical product differentiation is rooted in differing ability to 
pay which in turn is related to inequities in income and wealth. Thus in the private segment 
of developing country health care markets, certain providers offer very high quality of care 
whereas others may provide care of an unacceptable standard. Low standards of care in 
developing countries are only partially driven by the population's limited ability to pay. 
Anecdotal examples of over-servicing are widespread. Weak regulatory authorities and the 
large number of for-profit providers probably contribute to this problem.
In most developing countries patients are the main purchasers of health care; insurance and 
medical benefit schemes are limited in scope. Where schemes do exist they tend to have 
limited bureaucratic capacity. This has two main implications. Firstly insurance schemes in 
developing countries are rarely sufficiently large or well organized to exert purchasing power 
over providers and encourage appropriate behaviour. Secondly because patients commonly pay 
out-of-pocket they are likely to be more price sensitive than their industrialized country 
counterparts.
In certain respects the private health care sector in Bangkok is unusual; growth in the sector 
is principally attributable to rising real incomes and the emergence of a middle class. Despite 
this, the private health care market in Bangkok shares many features of urban health care 
markets in other developing countries. It is large, diverse and weakly regulated.
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CHAPTER 4 
TOWARDS HYPOTHESES
4.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the principal differences between hospital markets in the US and those in 
Bangkok. It first provides an overview of possible factors affecting competition, and then focuses 
in upon key dimensions of the market in Bangkok. Whilst many of the studies of hospital 
competition described in Chapter 2 focused on testing one particular model of competition, more 
recent studies have allowed more complex relationships between models. The shortcomings of 
earlier studies and recent more sophisticated studies are reviewed in section 4.2. Building upon 
section 4.2, section 4.3 sets out a model describing the possible responses of hospitals to 
competition, and how these responses are interrelated. This model feeds directly into a 
consideration of hypotheses and modes of analysis in section 4.4.
4.1 FACTORS AFFECTING COMPETITION
Much of the previous debate described in Chapter 1 has been about the extent to which problems 
of imperfect information inherent in health care lead to distorted markets. Figure 4.1 emphasizes 
that although this is clearly an important consideration, there are a number of institutional factors 
which will vary from country to country and will significantly affect the form of competition. 
The variable of central interest is the intensity and form of competition. A number of factors are 
seen to affect it directly including the inherent degree of imperfect information in health care, the 
predominant payment mechanisms, market concentration, regulation, provider ethics, the degree 
of consumerism in the market, the extent of product differentiation, search activity and the 
potential gains to be made from signalling.
The predominant form of payment mechanism in a market defines the incentives which 
providers face (Glaser 1987), for example a capitation based payment mechanism forces 
providers to compete on the number of patients which they attract, thus hospitals may attempt to 
provide pleasant facilities, polite staff etc.
In standard economic theory market concentration is seen to be the core element affecting the 
degree of competition. However this may not necessarily be the case in health care. Firstly 
product differentiation (both vertical and horizontal) is acknowledged to have potentially a 
direct impact on competition through market segmentation. Secondly if problems of imperfect 
information are sufficiently acute then price competition may be much weakened or not present at 
all.
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The strength of both provider ethics and regulation may affect the degree to which providers 
engage in less acceptable forms of competition. Consumers may also help to prevent certain 
unacceptable forms of provider competition depending on the extent to which they behave in a 
consumerist manner.
Figure 4.1
Variables affecting the intensity and form of competition in health care
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Forceful consumers who question whether care recommended is adequate and/or necessary, or 
who prosecute if they think they have been poorly treated, may help prevent providers from 
engaging in inappropriate behaviour.
If there is imperfect information then consumers may attempt to overcome the problems 
generated by searching for more information. The extent to which consumers will engage in 
search activity will depend partly on the cost of search. If information is hard to come by and 
unreliable when found, then search costs are high, and people will choose to carry out only a 
limited amount of search. The level of search activity will also be affected by people's general 
inclination to search. If people do not view health care as a 'consumer good' then they may be 
happier placing their trust in one provider and avoiding search activity.
Problems arising out of asymmetric information may encourage high quality providers to attempt 
to signal information to consumers, which will affect the nature of health care competition.
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BANGKOK AND US HEALTH CARE 
MARKETS
This section uses the framework set out above to consider what the key aspects of institutional 
differences between health care markets in Bangkok and the US are. Whilst Bangkok is not 
typical of health care markets in developing countries, several health care markets in South East 
Asia have similar characteristics.
4.2.1 Coverage and strength of health insurance schemes
In Thailand health insurance schemes cover a minority of the population (see Table 3.3). Without 
health insurance coverage, many of those purchasing health care in Bangkok will pay for care on 
a fee-for-service basis, out-of-pocket. This form of payment mechanism presents strong 
incentives to the patient to contain the cost of care ie. demand for care amongst uninsured patients 
is likely to be more price elastic than demand amongst the insured. However even amongst the 
insured population in Bangkok there may be a relatively high price-elasticity of demand, as most 
insurance schemes, with the notable exception of the Social Security Scheme, impose high levels 
of co-payment on those choosing to seek private sector care.
The form of payment amongst the uninsured population is also important. Fee-for-service
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payment creates incentives for the provider to increase service intensity. Where the bulk of the 
population does not have insurance coverage it is very difficult to shift the predominant form of 
payment mechanism from fee-for-service to prospective payment. In contrast in the US, much 
wider insurance coverage provides greater scope for alternative forms of payment mechanism. 
Although historically fee-for-service was the most common way to pay providers in the US, there 
is increasing use of prospective forms of payment such as DRGs.
Not only is insurance coverage more limited in Bangkok than it is in the US, but insurance 
organizations in Bangkok have been relatively weak purchasers. For example under the CSMBS 
no records are computerized, no form of utilization review or review of summary statistics on 
service use takes place, and the Scheme does not attempt to negotiate prices with providers. The 
Social Security Scheme has taken a slightly more active stance in relation to purchasing services: 
it at least requires that contracted service providers supply the scheme with a minimum data set of 
patient information, but limited capacity of the Scheme has, up till now, prevented effective use of 
this information. The average health care consumer in the Bangkok market does not have an 
effective agent purchasing care for him or her.
In the US, financers of health care have become increasingly active purchasers of care, 
particularly through preferred provider schemes where insurance schemes will agree to channel 
patients towards particular providers in return for favourable prices. This shift in behaviour was 
initiated by public purchasers (Medicare and Medicaid) but has since spread significantly 
amongst private insurers. California changed state regulation in 1982 to encourage selective 
contracting amongst insurance plans (Zwanziger et al 1994), and by 1990 more than 80% of 
insurance beneficiaries were enrolled in a scheme which involved selective contracting. It has 
been shown that this move towards selective contracting has succeeded in strengthening price 
competition within the market (Gruber 1994, Hadley et al 1996, Zwanziger et al 1994).
4.2.2 The Provider Market
Product differentiation on the part of providers may serve to weaken the effects of competition by 
segmenting the market. This effect has been observed in hospital markets in the US (Succi et al 
1997, Zwanziger et al 1996).
In Bangkok there is substantial product differentiation, which is probably greater than that 
observed in industrialized country health care markets. This higher level of product differentiation
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is likely to be rooted in the higher degree of income inequity observed in developing countries. 
Two aspects of product differentiation are particularly noteworthy. First, weak regulation in the 
Thai context means that for many aspects of care, such as staffing, there are no fixed minimum 
standards. This creates greater potential for hospitals in Bangkok to ‘skimp’ on services than is 
feasible for hospitals in the US. Second, it is commonly suggested, although there is little 
empirical evidence to support it, that the primary form of product differentiation in the Bangkok 
market is between public hospitals which offer high clinical aspects of care but with poor waiting 
time and hotel aspects, and private hospitals which offer good hotel aspects of care but tend to 
provide poorer clinical quality. This second factor is of particular importance given the very large 
number of for-profit providers in the hospital market in Bangkok compared to the US.
4.2.3 The internal organization of hospitals
Until recently, a key dimension of competition in the US derived from patterns of physician 
employment in the market. Most hospitals have a small salaried medical staff but depend 
primarily upon privately practising physicians choosing to admit their patients. Thus it has been 
suggested that one of the primary forms of competition between hospitals was to enhance medical 
amenities in order to attract physicians to the hospital. As physicians are likely to be very 
insensitive to prices (and patients only price sensitive to a limited degree due to health insurance 
coverage) hospital price competition was limited.
In Bangkok hospitals tend to have a core staff paid partly salary and partly fee-for-service. In 
addition they will have other physicians who are employed on a part time basis, and probably 
work in a public sector facility the rest of the time. Referral mechanisms are extremely weak. It is 
more likely that a patient will him or herself elect to go directly to a hospital outpatient department 
than be referred from a first level provider. Even if referral is made from a first level provider 
there is unlikely to be any formal linkage between primary and secondary level providers, and 
informal linkages (such as backhanders or ‘cut practice’) appear not to be widespread in Thailand.
Thus in the Thai model, the principal (ie. the patient) is likely to take full responsibility for 
choosing a source of hospital care, in contrast to the US situation where at least one of two key 
agents (an active purchaser and a physician with admitting rights) will play a critical role. In the 
US the balance between price competition and quality competition will in part relate to the 
relative strengths of purchaser and physician. Where physicians drive patient choice, little price 
sensitivity is likely to be observed and the main form of competition is most probably quality
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competition. However as insurance organizations have come to dominate patient choice in some 
states, demand has become more price sensitive and competition has increasingly focussed on 
price. In Thailand, the preferences and price sensitivity of consumers will be critical in 
determining the form of competition.
4.3 RECENT ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING HOSPITAL COMPETITION 
Most of the studies reviewed in section 2.5 were relatively simple: they focused on one particular 
model of competition (with the notable exception of Freeh and Woolley 1993 and Noether 1988), 
and attempted to test this model by assessing the relationship between one pair of variables. For 
example the studies of quality competition focused primarily on establishing linkages between 
higher levels of competition and higher quality dimensions. This rather narrow approach means 
that the studies ignored or did not consider the simultaneous presence of alternative forms of 
competition in the market. Many of the studies focusing on quality competition ignored the 
possibility that price competition may also exist.
A further concern is that the partial approach adopted by the studies may result in 
misinterpretation of data as more complex explanations of the phenomenon observed are not 
considered. Feldman and Sloan (1988) have pointed out how the early simple studies establishing 
correlation between high physician density and high service intensity which were taken as 
evidence of supplier induced demand may have misinterpreted the data. Such studies ignored the 
demand side of the equation: easier access to physicians would be predicted to result in greater 
patient-initiated demand.
During the 1990s, partly as a result of health sector reforms in the US and other OECD countries 
which stressed a greater role for informed purchasers, analyses of hospital competition have more 
commonly allowed a role for traditional price competition, combined with other forms of 
competition. Noether (1988) and Freeh and Woolley (1993) were amongst the earlier studies, but 
several more recent analyses have pushed the ideas further.
Gruber’s (1994) primary focus is the effect of selective contracting upon hospitals’ delivery of 
uncompensated care. He hypothesizes that selective contracting has placed hospitals in more 
competitive markets under financial pressure which will result in a decrease in the amount of 
uncompensated care they are able to provide. Price shopping by purchasers implies that hospitals 
face a more elastic demand curve and will be more inclined to reduce prices. However their 
objective in reducing prices is to increase the quantity of services provided. As revenue is a
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function of price and quantity of services sold, the balance of these two effects will determine the 
degree of financial pressure which a hospital faces. Gruber finds that in more competitive markets 
hospitals net revenues tend to be less, suggesting that the price effect is greater than die quantity 
effect and therefore that hospitals in such markets face financial pressure.
Hospitals may respond to declining net revenues by increasing efficiency. Ideally in order to 
investigate this relationship, mark-up over cost should be examined. Lacking such data on mark­
up, Gruber assesses factors affecting net income. The regressions on net income produce similar 
results to those on net revenue, suggesting that even if costs were reduced this was insufficient to 
offset the decline in revenues.
Hadley et al (1996) are also interested in the impact of increased financial pressure on the hospital 
industry. They explore the impact of base period financial position and competition on change in 
hospital performance. A large number of measures of performance are examined including 
change in total expenditure, revenues, profitability, prices and efficiency. The researchers are 
particularly interested in whether hospitals respond to financial pressures by constraining cost 
growth or by cost shifting (to less aggressive purchasers). The study finds that hospitals in more 
competitive areas have lower growth in expenditure and revenues, however the impact on 
revenues is greater, leading to lower growth in profit rates than in less competitive markets. This 
implies that hospitals facing financial pressure do attempt to contain costs but are unable to do so 
to such an extent that they fully offset lower revenues from competition. The authors find no 
evidence that hospitals under financial pressure are able to increase total revenue or prices.
Other studies in the US, whilst using rather less comprehensive approaches have demonstrated the 
changes which selective contracting has brought about. Zwanziger et al (1994) compared the 
Californian hospital market in 1980/82 with that in 1990. During the early period the quartile of 
hospitals in the most competitive markets were 17% more costly and had 14% higher revenues 
than those in the least competitive quartile. A decade later the cost gap had narrowed to 3% and 
revenues in less competitive markets were more than those in the highly competitive market. 
Santerre and Bennett (1992) find that the relationship between higher levels of competition and 
higher costs only holds for not-for-profit hospitals, where, presumably, a continuing role for 
prestige in hospital managements’ objective functions means that there is a stronger emphasis on 
enhancing quality. Dranove et al (1992) challenges previous studies which supported the medical 
arms race theory by demonstrating that failure to measure fully the extent of hospital markets 
results in a bias which over-states the significance of quality competition.
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Studies of the impact of competition in the UK internal market have been somewhat hampered by 
the newness of the market and by regulatory structures which would appear to dampen scope for 
price competition. However work by Propper (1994) and Propper et al (1997) indicates that the 
regulatory structures are not strictly adhered to. Furthermore an examination of extra-contractual 
referral prices (Propper 1994) and hospital prices to GP fund holders (Propper et al 1997) finds 
evidence to suggest that in markets with higher levels of competition there tend to be lower prices. 
The UK studies include variables on teaching status and availability of high tech equipment as 
proxies for quality. Whilst a hospital’s teaching status may allow it to charge higher prices, 
surprisingly high-tech status is often negatively associated with price. Another interesting result 
emerging from these studies is that the results differ somewhat for different specialities reflecting 
structural differences in the UK market for different types of services.
Recent studies of hospital competition have advanced our understanding in a number of respects. 
First recent reforms in market structures which have generated greater price sensitivity amongst 
purchasers, appear to have shifted the nature of competition in the US market. Second, recent 
studies are more likely than earlier studies to allow multiple forms of competition to co-exist. 
Third, they explicitly acknowledge the complex inter-linkages between different hospital decision 
variables such as quality, cost, and price, and that if multiple models of competition co-exist then 
unravelling which forms of competition are present in the market can be very complicated.
4.4 MODEL’S PREDICTIONS ON HOSPITAL RESPONSES TO COMPETITION 
Figure 2.1 captured the simple, direct, effects predicted by different models of a decrease in 
market concentration (ie. an increase in competition). It was observed that even if models 
operated in their pure form it may be difficult to tell them apart. The variables of interest were:-
- fees/price
- provider income (or revenue)
- quality
- service intensity
Here we consider in a little more detail the interrelationship between these variables and the 
various competition models.
Economic theory is clear as to how prices are determined under monopolistic or perfect 
competition. But most health care markets are monopolistically competitive and therefore price 
cannot be predicted in a straightforward manner. Common practice amongst companies is some 
form of ‘cost plus pricing’ which implies that firms set price based upon a measure of average
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cost (usually average variable cost) plus some percentage mark-up for profit.
The percentage mark-up adopted may depend on a number of factors most notably the 
competitive environment. So for a particular service (i), price will equal average cost of that 
service (Ci) plus a mark-up (ji) which will be a function of the level of competition for that 
service (COMPi).
Pi = (l+p)Ci where |i = f(COMPi) (1)
The most direct test of price competition, would be whether more competition leads to a lower 
mark-up. However as mark-up is generally unobservable it is common to look instead at price. 
However average cost (Ci) will be a function of other decisions made by the hospital such as the 
level of quality selected (Qi), the scale of production activities (Xi), as well as range of exogenous 
variables such as factor prices (denoted by Zi).
Ci = f(Qi, Xi, Zi) (2)
According to equations (1) and (2) if both quality and price competition occur in a market then the 
impact on price is indeterminate. According to the model of price competition: higher competition
has a direct effect on mark-up in equation (1) driving price down. But according to the model of
quality competition: higher competition will result in higher levels of quality. If average cost is a 
positive function of quality then higher quality will drive up costs, which will in turn result in 
higher prices.
Some studies, such as Gruber (1994), have used profitability, or net income as a proxy for mark­
up. However it is a rather imperfect measure.
Profit = total revenue - total cost
PROFITi = PiXi - Ci(Qi, Xi, Zi) Xi (3)
This can be re-written as the identity: profit = Xi(Pi-Ci) (4)
Which simply states that the total profit made on service (i) will be the mark-up multiplied by the
1 The product of number of services sold and mark-up over average variable cost gives total 
gross profit. In order to arrive at net profit, average fixed costs should also be taken into
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number of units of service (i) sold. If price competition prevails, mark-up in more competitive 
environments will be less, placing downward pressure upon profits, but there may be a 
compensating effect due to the higher number of services provided.
The quantity of a service sold will depend upon the price of that service (Pi), the quality (Qi) and 
a vector of other variables such as household income, morbidity patterns etc (Yi).
Xi = f(Pi, Qi, Yi) (5)
If there is some degree of price sensitivity in the market, higher competition will result in lower 
prices which will imply higher consumption. The net effect on revenue depends upon the price 
elasticity of demand. If demand is inelastic (ie less than 1) then a decrease in price will result in 
lower revenues, however if demand is elastic (ie. greater than 1) then a decrease in price will 
result in higher revenues.
The demand for health care is often said to be price inelastic, implying that in the face of greater 
competition hospitals will not manage to maintain revenue levels by lowering prices. However the 
price elasticity of demand will be specific to different markets and different services. Recall that it 
was hypothesized that in the Thai market demand would be more price sensitive than in the US 
due to the low levels of health insurance coverage.
Introducing quality into this picture, further complicates the issue. Equation (3) suggests that 
quality is positively related to cost and equation (5) suggests that quality is positively related to 
demand. Thus if quality competition induces higher levels of quality this will raise costs, but also 
possibly raise demand (depending upon the sensitivity of demand to quality). Again quality 
competition brings about two competing effects, and the impact on profit depends on which of 
these two effects is stronger.
Quality is a multi-dimensional attribute. For our purposes it is worth disentangling a number of 
dimensions including:- 
technology
account.
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staff quality 
service intensity 
hotel aspects.
Quality responses by hospitals could link to any or all of these dimensions. If the primary 
response of a hospital to greater competition is to augment service quality by providing higher 
service intensity, for example through running more diagnostic tests for ante-natal care, then the 
supplier induced demand model may easily be mistaken for a special case of the quality 
competition model. The key element to differentiate between quality competition and supplier 
induced demand would be whether the increased service intensity has been driven by the demand 
or supply side of the market. It would only be possible to establish this through direct observation 
of the consultation process, and even if this were possible it would not be straightforward.
Hospitals may also make decisions about levels of investment in different aspects of quality with 
an eye to differentiating their product from those of competitors and creating niches in the market 
(Manheim et al 1994). Such market segmentation is a strategy to ameliorate the effects of 
competition, but again could conceivably be mistaken for quality competition.
By focusing on a particular service (i) the above discussion abstracts from questions of case-mix. 
One product of investment in quality could be greater capacity to handle more complex cases. 
This is an alternative form of market segmentation. The possibility of changes in case-mix as a 
result of hospital reactions to competition need to be taken into account when interpreting 
findings.
4.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES
4.5.1 Hypotheses
Role of product differentiation in the Bangkok market
Institutional features of the Bangkok hospital market allow a high degree of product 
differentiation. This has at least two types of implications for competition:-
i. Product differentiation may segment the market. For example if private hospitals offer higher 
quality hotel aspects and promptness, whilst public hospitals offer higher quality in terms of 
clinical aspects of care but poorer quality hotel aspects, then one would expect to see 
segmentation of the market according to severity of condition. Private hospitals would be 
used for less severe conditions and public hospitals for more severe ones.
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ii. High levels of product differentiation allow a greater role for monopolistic competition driven 
by informational asymmetries. The scope for this is likely to be greater in the Bangkok health 
care market than the US one. This is for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is 
the fact that unlike the US there are no informed institutional purchasers or agents for 
consumers. Furthermore in Bangkok institutional mechanisms (such as accreditation) have 
not emerged to provide consumers with reliable information on hospital quality.
Consumerist behaviour and price sensitivity of consumers
In the hospital market in Bangkok the absence of strong institutional purchasers means that 
consumers do not have an effective agent working for them, instead consumers themselves are the 
prime decision makers. In order to understand the competitive pressures upon hospitals in 
Bangkok it is necessary to understand how consumers choose between alternative providers.
Lack of such an effective purchasing agent may mean that consumers in Bangkok are compelled 
to be more active and aggressive purchasers than consumers elsewhere ie. we might see a higher 
degree of consumerist behaviour in Bangkok.
Furthermore many consumers in Bangkok do not have health insurance coverage. Even those 
who do have health insurance, often incur a substantial proportion of the cost of care, because of 
high co-payments. One would therefore expect to see greater price sensitivity amongst consumers 
in Bangkok than elsewhere, and this in turn would be expected to stimulate price competition in 
the hospital market.
Form of Competition
Lack of an informed institutional purchaser in the hospital market is likely to exacerbate all types 
of problems related to informational asymmetry and accordingly provides scope for different 
forms of non-price competition.
However as noted above there are also reasons to think that price competition may simultaneously 
be present in the market. The limited extent of insurance coverage in Bangkok is likely to create 
high price sensitivity amongst consumers, who are the main decision makers within the system.
With regard to the other models of competition presented in Chapter 2, there are certainly factors 
present in the Bangkok context which mean that they may exist. In Bangkok problems in 
identifying high quality health care providers may be substantial, in particular informational
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problems with respect to the characteristics of different facilities are probably more acute than in 
the US. Under such conditions the signalling of quality through high profile investment in 
ESWLs, CT scanners and MRIs may become critical. Hence the relevance of the quality 
competition model may depend partially on why it is assumed to occur. If it is a product of 
managers unconcerned with profits and consumers unconcerned with prices then it is unlikely to 
be applicable. If on the other hand it is thought to be primarily a signalling device then it could be 
extremely relevant.
The widespread use of fee-for-service payment in Bangkok means that in the majority of 
provider-consumer transactions, there is an incentive to the provider to over-provide services. 
Weak regulatory controls over providers and weak provider ethics may contribute to a situation 
where providers are inclined to abuse their informational advantage in order to increase profits.
If consumers in Bangkok are the main agents driving competition in the hospital sector then issues 
pertaining to the costs to consumers of gathering information on the alternative providers are very 
pertinent. However the increasing monopoly model, models the cost of seeking information on 
provider reputation in a very specific way, this leads to the particular result that higher physician 
density results in higher search costs. A variety of alternative models about how reputations are 
formed are conceivable, not all of which lead to the result predicted by Pauly and Satterthwaite.
As demonstrated by Propper (1994) it is probable that the form of competition will vaiy according 
to the type of condition. For example consumer search may be more effective for elective services 
where consumers have time to gather information. Also, consumers may exhibit different degrees 
of price and quality sensitivity according to the type of services. For example, for minor 
conditions prompt service may be important to consumers, but price differences play only a 
limited role in their decision making. In contrast, for more serious conditions, clinical quality of 
care may be very important to the consumer, and consumers may also be very sensitive to price 
differences as high prices may not be affordable.
4.5.2 Analysis
In order to prove the presence of price competition in a market ideally mark-up should be 
examined. However in Bangkok lack of data on costs prevents this approach. One alternative is to 
examine how prices respond to competition, but if there is a possibility that changes in quality 
have occurred at the same time then the result of such an analysis is likely to be indeterminate. 
For example if prices were observed to decline in response to competition then this may be price
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competition, or simply due to lower costs as providers have started to skimp on services. 
Conversely higher prices in the face of greater competition do not disprove the presence of price 
competition: simultaneous quality competition might have increased underlying costs, perhaps 
resulting in lower mark-ups, but still higher prices. Profits may be a proxy for mark-up, but are 
undoubtedly an imperfect one as they are influenced not only be output levels but also by changes 
in efficiency. With cost data and/or reliable data on output it may be possible to unravel some of 
these effects, but in Bangkok, data were not available on either of these key variables.
The most obvious way to prove the presence of quality competition is to examine directly the 
impact of competition upon alternative measures of quality (such as technology, hotel aspects, 
service intensity etc), but there are at least two potential confusions here:-
i. providers may increase service intensity in certain dimensions (eg. number of tests ordered). 
This may reflect two different types of responses to competition: providers may be improving 
quality and hying to meet patient need better, or alternatively the services provided may be 
unrelated to patient need and primarily a mechanism to raise revenue. Thus quality 
competition and supplier induced demand may be difficult to differentiate.
ii. Providers may increase certain dimensions of quality in response to competition, this could be 
quality competition but may also be a way to segment the market and create a market niche 
for the provider. A provider may pursue both these strategies (quality competition and market 
segmentation) simultaneously.
It is inherently difficult to unravel the impact of alternative forms of competition, particularly 
when several forms are simultaneously present in the market. In Bangkok these difficulties are 
amplified by data constraints, notably lack of data on costs, but also lack of reliable data on 
output. Nonetheless there are certain combinations of results which will be suggestive (although 
are unlikely to be conclusive) in terms of the forms of competition present in the market. For 
example, if higher competition was found to be associated with:-
- higher prices
- lower quality
- no change in service intensity
- higher profits (which would be inevitable if there was not a concurrent increase in inefficiency) 
Then it would seem likely that neither price competition nor quality competition were present in 
the market, but rather a perverse form of competition, such as that predicted by the increasing 
monopoly model. Findings from the study need to be interpreted carefully bearing in mind the 
range of possible responses which hospitals might make, and which were set out in section 4.4.
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CHAPTER 5 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
5.0 AIM AND HYPOTHESES
The overall aim of the study is to explore the nature of hospital competition in Bangkok, in
particular the impact which (i) problems of asymmetric information (ii) product differentiation
and (iii) consumer behaviour have upon hospital competition.
Study hypotheses are as follows >
According to economic theory product differentiation is likely to exacerbate 
asymmetric information, in developing country hospital markets a high level of 
product differentiation prevails;
Given the institutional features of hospital care markets in developing countries 
consumers in developing countries (and in Bangkok in particular) will undertake a 
high level of search activities and consumerist behaviour;
The presence of asymmetric information in the market place creates provider market 
power and means that straightforward price competition is unlikely to dominate, price 
competition may be present in the market but quality competition and/or supplier 
induced demand will also exist.
5.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
With the ultimate aim of testing the hypotheses set out above a series of specific research
objectives were formulated.
On the issue o f asymmetric information and product differentiation the objectives are:
i. To chart the different characteristics of hospitals in Bangkok;
ii. To investigate the nature of product differentiation amongst hospitals in Bangkok;
specifically to establish whether (a) hospitals have high levels of certain characteristics 
and low levels of others (horizontal product differentiation) and/or (b) hospitals tend 
to have high levels of all characteristics or low levels of all characteristics (vertical 
product differentiation);
iii. To identify those hospital characteristics which consumers value most and how this
varies between different reasons for seeking health care.
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On the issue of consumerist behaviour and search activity the objectives are:
iv. To assess how well informed consumers in Bangkok are about the hospital market and 
in particular the prices and characteristics of different providers;
v. To describe the type of search behaviour people engage in, in the selection of a health 
care provider in Bangkok;
vi. To assess how 'consumerist' people in Bangkok are with respect to the health care 
market and in particular to investigate their information seeking behaviour and 
willingness to question the judgement of health staff;
vii. To investigate how consumers' knowledge about the health care market affects their 
utilization pattern.
On the issue o f the form o f  competition prevailing in the market the objectives are:
viii. To assess how simple measures of market concentration affect (a) prices (b) quality 
of care (c) profitability and (d) service intensity;
ix. To describe the nature of competition between health care providers, in particular the 
extent of price competition vis a vis quality competition and supplier induced demand;
x. If quality competition is evident in the market then to establish the characteristics 
upon which quality competition is based.
5.2 SUMMARY OF METHODS
The first set of objectives (i-iii) is concerned with describing and analysing the extent and 
form of product differentiation in the hospital market in Bangkok. In order to do this 
Lancaster's notion of characteristics was employed. The principle characteristics embedded in 
hospital services were identified. Then through a survey of private hospitals these 
characteristics were charted across hospitals. The question of which characteristics consumers' 
value (objective iii) is closely related to the nature of quality competition (if quality 
competition exists). Hedonic pricing techniques were used to approach this issue. However, 
as noted in Chapter 2 there are problems with this method and hence it was supplemented by 
a consumer survey investigating the characteristics sought in a health care provider.
The next set of objectives (iv-vii) is concerned primarily with the nature of search activity and 
the extent of consumerist behaviour. These questions were also approached through the 
consumer survey.
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The final objectives (viii-x) concerning the form of competition prevailing in the market were 
most complex to address. By including in the hospital database variables reflecting the degree 
of market concentration for each hospital's market area it was possible to examine the effect 
which market concentration has upon price, quality, profitability and intensity of care in a 
cross-sectional manner. Using this information and the predictions of each model of 
competition (as represented in Table 2.1) the prevailing form of competition was explored. In 
addition to this direct approach to exploring the form of competition, indirect evidence 
gathered from consumer interviews and observations of the institutional forms in the market 
were used to supplement findings.
The following three chapters address in turn each of the sets of objectives. Chapter 6 pursues 
the fust set of objectives on hospital characteristics and product differentiation, Chapter 7 
examines consumer knowledge and behaviour in Bangkok, and Chapter 8 focuses on the form 
of hospital competition. The remaining part of this chapter describes in more detail the 
methods used to collect, process and analyse data. Section 5.3 is concerned with the database 
on hospital characteristics. Section 5.4 discusses the consumer survey.
5.3 HOSPITAL DATABASE
The first step in developing the database was to decide which hospital characteristics were to 
be included; all variables are listed in Table 5.1. Consumers were explicitly questioned about 
the characteristics of health care which they valued in the consumer survey and in addition 
a literature review was undertaken to establish which characteristics of health care 
anthropologists and writers from other disciplines had identified. From both these sources it 
was clear that a number of different facets of health care were considered important. 
Anthropologists and public health specialists particularly noted the non-clinical aspects of 
health care such as reassurance and the provision of information, comforting (both in the 
physical and mental sense), and caring (Ben Sira 1990, Evans and Stoddart 1990, Kleinman 
1980, McKeown 1986). But for characteristics such as reassurance and the provision of 
information, it is extremely difficult to find objective data which can be included in the 
database. Consumers interviewed tended to be more prosaic identifying factors such as the 
skills of doctors although they also mentioned factors such as doctors' willingness to provide 
information.
Variables (1M8) in table 5.1 were selected so as to at least partially reflect some of the 
characteristics described. For example hotel features help to measure the physical aspects of
comfort, a low bed to nurse ratio may imply a high standard of clinical care, a low bed to 
physician ratio may imply that physicians have more time to spend explaining treatments to 
or reassuring their patients.
The second set of variables in the table (variables 9-14) are concerned more with the question 
of competition. The various models of hospital competition examined indicated that changes 
in market concentration may affect price, quality, profitability and service intensity (variables 
9-12). To examine the impact of market concentration on quality some of the hospital 
characteristics were used in the analysis as well as the financial indicators of quality. Variables 
13 and 14 are essentially explanatory variables. In addition to exploring the impact of market 
concentration on hospital behaviour the study also examined the impact of different types of 
private hospital ownership.
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Table 5.1 
Variables for Hospital Database
VARIABLE NAME STRUCTURE SOURCE
1. Bed number BED_NO Total number of beds MLD, Hospital survey
2. Specialization SPEC None
Some eg. maternity, paediatrics.
MLD
3. Equipment indicator SUMEQUIP Total number of the following items of equipment 
possessed by hospital:
- ESWL
- CAT Scanner
- MRI Scanner
Hospital survey checked against 
Health Planning Division data 
from equipment suppliers.
4. Physician inputs BEDWDR
PERCSPEC
PERCFTMD
i. Number of beds per full time equivalent MD
ii. Percentage of specialists over total MDs
iii. Percentage of hours contributed by full time MDs
Hospital survey.
5. Nursing care BEDWNUR
PERCAID
i. Number of beds per FTE qualified nurse staff
ii. Number of FTE nurse aides as % of total FTE 
qualified nurses and nurse aides.
Hospital survey
6. Hotel features PERCPRI Percentage private beds out of total beds Hospital survey
7. Age/ reputation AGE Number of years for which the facility has been 
established
MLD records
8. Distance DISTANCE Number of kilometres from city centre address from MLD plus 
telephone enquiry then mapped
VARIABLE NAME STRUCTURE SOURCE
9. Financial indicators of 
quality
ASSPBED
EXPPBED
i. Assets per bed
ii. Expenditure per bed
Hospital accounts presented to 
Ministry of Commerce
10. Prices IP INDEX
ROOM
NORMDEL
i. price indicator for inpatient care
ii. mean daily charge for room and board
iii. price per normal deliveiy
Survey of insurance records. 
Hospital survey.
11. Profitability ASSRETUR
PROFMARG
i. profits divided by total capital
ii. profits divided by total revenue
The accounting measure of profits was used.
Hospital accounts presented to 
Ministry of Commerce
12. Service Intensity STAND1NV
ALLINV
LOS
ADRATE
i. percentage of total bill going on standard (eg. lab 
tests, X-ray) medical investigations
ii. percentage of total bill going on any investigation 
including standard and special (eg CT, Ultrasound)
iii. Mean length of stay
iv. Admission rate
Survey of insurance records. 
Hospital census
13. Hospital 
ownership
NFP
SET
Not-for-profit/for-profit
Stock exchange owned, private company owned
MLD
Health Statistics Division.
14. Competition indicator COMP2/5
BEDCOMP2/5
HHI2/5
i. Number of hospitals within (a) a 2 km and (b) a 5 
km radius of the hospital under consideration
ii. Percentage of all beds in market (2km and 5km 
radii) owned by hospital under consideration
iii. Herfindahl index based upon the number of beds 
for (a) a 2 km market area and (b) a 5 km market area
From mapping
Abbreviations: MLD - Medical Licence Division
FTE - full time equivalent
5.3.1 Data Collection
One of the greatest problems associated with researching private hospitals is that it is often 
difficult to gain their support and collaboration. Particularly sensitive is information on 
pricing and the financial aspects of care. The study tried to circumvent the problem by using 
secondary data sources as far as possible and cross-checking these where feasible. In particular 
heavy use was made of records kept by insurance organizations on the types and prices of 
care provided by private hospitals, and to a lesser degree of company accounts. Questions 
concerning staffing, specialization and equipment are less sensitive and were approached 
through a survey of private hospitals. However these variables were still cross-checked against 
other data sources where possible.
The two main existing data sources within the MOPH were (i) the routine registration records 
of the Medical Licence Division (MLD), Ministry of Public Health and (ii) the Health 
Resources Survey carried out by the Health Statistics Division, Ministry of Public Health. 
Unfortunately both of these data sources were problematic. The 1961 Medical Premises Act 
stipulates that all private hospitals and clinics in Thailand must register on an annual basis 
with the Medical License Division of the MOPH, however the information requested at 
registration is very limited covering only (i) bed number (ii) specialization and (iii) address. 
It is also possible to calculate from the MLD records the number of years for which a facility 
has been established. The great advantage of the MLD database is that it is comprehensive 
and therefore provides an excellent frame for survey work.
Based on this frame the Health Statistics Division carry out an annual mailed survey of all 
hospitals, requesting information on staffing, bed numbers and throughput figures. 
Unfortunately follow up on the survey form is poor and the response rate is very low 
(approximately 30% in Bangkok). Those forms which are returned are often incomplete. 
Throughput figures in particular are not felt to be reliable. Although the MOPH has the legal 
authority to require that hospitals report basic (non-financial) data, it has never sought legal 
recourse to enforce compliance.
Because of the problems associated with the existing data sources it was decided to carry out 
a special survey of the 105 private hospitals in Bangkok. This is described in more detail 
below. In addition a special survey of insurance records was conducted in order to get 
accurate information on the sensitive question of prices. This is also described below. First 
however the construction of and data collection for the variables in the database (listed in
98
Table 5.1) is reviewed. All data collected relate to the calendar year 1992, except profitability 
data which relate to the financial year 1992/93.
Hospital specialization and the number of beds are normally stated on the MLD registration 
form. This study was concerned primarily with general hospitals and thus for most of the 
analysis, specialist hospitals are excluded. Unfortunately it was not possible to identify from 
MLD records, general hospitals with an extra specialist facility1 this information may have 
been useful in explaining pricing and utilization patterns.
Data for the variables on equipment, medical staff, nursing care and hotel features were 
sought primarily though the survey of private hospitals in Bangkok (described below). In 
addition information on hospital equipment was available from the Health Planning Division 
and this was used to cross-check the private hospital survey.
As discussed in earlier chapters the way in which reputation is formed remains a mystery, 
and there is no obvious indicator to reflect reputation. As a tentative suggestion the number 
of years for which a facility has been established was used as a proxy for reputation although 
this obviously has shortcomings.
In order to measure the distance of a hospital from the city centre, the physical location of 
all hospitals in Bangkok were identified on a 1:50,000 scale map using the MLD records as 
a frame. If it was unclear from the physical address quite where the hospital was located then 
a telephone enquiiy was made to clarify the location. Hua Lamphong railway station2 was 
considered to be the city centre and the number of kilometres from the railway station to each 
hospital was computed.
Two further indicators of quality were taken from the company accounts. These financial 
indicators of quality measure the level of inputs per bed.
xFor example Bangkok Hospital, which is a general hospital, has recently established 
a specialist Heart Institute.
2 Hua Lamphong lies approximately equidistant between the old city centre near Sanam 
Luang, the modem business centre around Silom and the shopping/tourist centre around Thanon 
Sukhum vit.
Establishing prices for medical care is not a straightforward task. There are two main 
approaches. The first is to examine individual fees for each component of treatment, for 
example the fee for an X-ray, fee for a particular surgical intervention, fee for a private room 
per night etc. This is a relatively straightforward approach but suffers from the fact that 
different hospitals are likely to combine charges in a different manner. For example, Davis 
(1972) suggests that the price of some services such as room fees may have a greater effect 
upon utilization than other fees and thus some hospitals may under-charge for the room and 
charge more for various ancillary services. Thus a more aggregate measure of price is 
desirable. Price per inpatient stay or per course of treatment would seem a suitable measure, 
but it is meaningless unless case-mix is controlled for. Ideally one would also wish to control 
for severity and procedures.
Because of the problems associated with the fee per item measure, the focus in this study is 
price per hospitalization. Using the prices found at different hospitals for a specific diagnosis 
an inpatient price index was computed. Thus case-mix was controlled for but not severity or 
procedures. One problem with an inpatient price index is that it assumes that hospitals price 
inpatient care in a standard manner and do not differentiate between diagnoses. For example 
a hospital with a specialist heart institute may place a higher marie-up on cardio-vascular 
services. Thus diagnosis-specific prices were also considered. In addition an examination of 
room fees per night was made to see to what extent hospitals' room charges really reflect the 
total cost of treatment at a particular facility.
A further problem with the estimation of relative hospital prices is that of access to data. The 
level of fees charged is a sensitive issue and most private hospitals in Bangkok would be 
unlikely to reveal this information to researchers. This study used the records kept by 
insurance schemes to estimate diagnosis specific prices for an inpatient course of treatment. 
Three different insurance schemes were examined, all of which were publicly organized but 
would contribute towards the costs of health care sought in either public or private hospitals. 
Using insurance schemes to collect price data raises the question of whether hospitals charge 
insured and uninsured patients the same fee. For each of the specific insurance funds studied, 
patients first pay for care sought in the private sector out-of-pocket and later reclaim expenses 
from the insurance fund. For these cases the hospital is unlikely to know whether the patient 
is insured and therefore should not be able to price differentiate. Problems of moral hazard 
on the consumer side are likely to be constrained by the high levels of co-payment, especially 
as most schemes reimburse a lump sum amount above which patients pay the full cost of care.
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The study of insurance records is described in more detail below.
Profitability data were retrieved from the Department of Commerce. All registered companies 
in Thailand must submit annual accounts to the Department of Commerce including data on 
capital assets, income, expenditures and profits. Unfortunately these records are kept by 
company name which is not always the same as hospital name. However it was often possible 
to find out the company names of hospitals from the invoices which they issued. The 
reliability of accounting data in Thailand has previously been questioned and thus the validity 
of the accounts was crossed checked against alternative sources of information (Pianpaktr 
1993) and discussed with informants.
The best way to explore service intensity would be through a detailed review of medical 
records, examining, for example, rates of surgeiy, the number of investigations given or drugs 
prescribed for certain well defmed diagnoses. Unfortunately accessing such medical records 
was not possible. Instead two types of indicator were used. First insurance fund records were 
used to compute the percentage of the total medical bill going on investigations. The rationale 
for this is that if health care providers wish to 'pad' the bill for care then extra investigations 
are a very obvious way of doing this. Second throughput data from the hospital census were 
used to compute mean length of stay by hospital and admission rates. Unfortunately these 
indicators could not be computed whilst controlling for case-mix and thus they are likely to 
pick up effects other than service intensity alone.
Information on hospital ownership was relatively straightforward to collect from existing 
MLD and Health Resource Survey records.
Competition indicators commonly take the form of concentration indices (such as the 
Herfindahl index) which measure the share of the market that different providers within the 
market have. In Bangkok there are two main problems associated with the use of 
concentration indices. First, data on private hospital throughput are thought to be unreliable. 
Second, they entail the definition of market area which is far from straightforward (Robinson 
et al 1991) and requires detailed information on patient flow which is not available in 
Bangkok. An alternative measure which some studies in the US have adopted is a simple 
count of the number of hospitals within a certain radius of the hospital under consideration 
(Robinson and Luft 1985). Such an indicator has the advantage of simplicity and sufficient 
data are available to compute it. The only problem is that it is unclear quite how far people
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will travel for health care and hence what is the appropriate radius to consider.
The study used three different types of competition indicators. For all indicators a simple 
measure of market area based on a fixed radius from the hospital was used. The radius was 
varied between 2 and 5 kilometres reflecting both what hospital directors said about market 
area and responses to the consumer survey. Two of the measures (COMP2 and COMP5) used 
a simple count of the number of other hospitals within this radius. BEDCOMP2 and 
BEDCOMP5 measured the share in percentage terms that a particular hospital had of all 
hospital beds in the market area. HHI2 and HHIS constructed Hirschman-Herfmdahl indices 
based on the number of beds. The HHI index is simply the sum of the squared shares of each 
hospital in the market ie. HHI = 2s,2 where s, is the share of hospital (i) of all hospital beds.
Special Study No 1 - The Private Hospital Survey
The survey was carried out between September and December 1993 in collaboration with the 
Medical Licence Division, the Health Planning Division and the Health Statistics Division, 
Ministry of Public Health, Thailand.
An English translation of the survey form used is contained in Appendix 2. The form is quite 
similar to that normally sent out by the Health Resource Survey: information was requested 
on staffing (total and by specialists), beds (including special beds such as ICU, delivery), 
throughput and preventive care provided. A section on number of beds per ward and number 
of single rooms was added to capture the hotel aspects of care. Hospitals were also asked 
about the standard prices charged for different types of rooms. The survey questions were 
designed to be neither too difficult nor too sensitive so that hospital administrators would not 
be deterred from responding. The survey form was circulated for comment to fifteen senior 
Thai policy makers in the MOPH and University professors before being finalized.
One of the problems raised by virtually every expert was that of deftning full time and part 
time employees, and indeed whether this was an appropriate distinction to make. The 
questionnaire requested that all those employees working a minimum of forty hours a week 
be classified as full time. However a previous survey (Chunharas et al 1990) showed 
considerable variation in the number of hours worked by public sector doctors outside of their 
main jobs. It is possible that some public sector doctors work more than forty hours a week 
in a private hospital (and thus would in theory be counted as holding two full time jobs 
according to this definition). Secondly some private hospitals have consultants whom they
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call upon to assist with particularly difficult cases. Such consultants may work quite 
irregularly at a private hospital, but potentially could add significantly to its reputation. 
However as no better basis for distinguishing between part time and full time employees was 
found, the original definition was kept.
The survey form was piloted at two non-profit hospitals in Bangkok in September 1993, 
primarily to check that the questions were clear to hospital administrators and that most of the 
data were readily available. Survey forms were then sent out with a covering letter from the 
Permanent Secretary MOPH. Private hospitals were asked to complete the forms and bring 
them with them when they came for their annual re-registration. It was agreed with the 
Medical Licence Division that no new licences were to be granted without a completed form 
being presented. Unfortunately this strategy failed. The principal contact person for the study 
in the Medical Licence Division was taken ill during the crucial re-registration period and 
without her presence the clerks did not feel able to deny registration to hospitals even if they 
had not completed the form.
As the information requested in the survey questionnaire was largely numerical only limited 
coding needed to be carried out. The responses were entered into a DBase III programme and 
validity, structural and logical checks made. The file was later joined with another file 
containing other variables included in the hospital database such as distance, price etc.
Special Study No 2 - Survey of Insurance Records
Fieldwork for this phase of the research was carried out in Thailand during the first six 
months of 1992. In relation to this study the main objective was to collect data on prices and 
service intensity, however other aspects of the survey have been reported separately (Bennett 
and Tangcharoensathien 1994). The three main insurance schemes studied were the Civil 
Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), and the Emergency and Maternity Funds under 
the Social Security Scheme. Most of the data used here came from the CSMBS.
Cases were selected from the Bangkok area alone. Table 5.2 summarizes the sampling 
procedures and number of cases selected. Records for the Maternity and Emergency funds 
were kept in such a manner that it was impossible in advance to distinguish between cases 
using public and private sector facilities. These samples were therefore drawn across both 
sectors although this study uses only the private sector price data. The fourth column of the 
table shows what percentage of the sampled cases used private sector care. Emergency and
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Maternity fund records are kept at the Social Security Office. Records for CSMBS cases using 
private sector care are retained at the government department where the civil servant is 
employed.
Table 5.2 
Samples taken from Insurance Funds
FUND SAMPLING SAMPLE
SIZE
%
PRIVATE
SECTOR
TOTAL
POPUL
ATION
EMERGENCY Census 952 49.9% 952
MATERNITY Simple systematic sampling 1,578 22.4% 2,000
approx
CSMBS Systematic sampling from 
16 purposively selected 
government departments
3,567 100.0% unknown
None of the records kept by the various schemes are computerized. Therefore data collection 
was based upon:-
i. Supporting documents presented by the claimant such as invoices from private 
hospitals giving diagnosis, total charge and a break down of charges;
ii. The transcript of the interview between the clerk and the claimant, although 
unnecessary for the CSMBS, for the other schemes this interview provided supporting 
information which frequently helped clarify the records.
The information contained in each claim was transcribed by a team of students onto specially 
designed data sheets. An English translation of the data sheet used for the CSMBS is included 
in Appendix 3. These data sheets were later coded. Coding was a relatively straightforward 
process apart from the medical diagnosis which had to be translated from Thai to English, and 
then coded in the International Classification of Diseases coding system version 9. These 
coded data sheets were later double entry input into a database set up by the researcher. The 
two databases were then cross-checked for input errors.
This method of collecting data on prices worked well. Access to the health insurance funds 
was facilitated by the MOPH and the data were collected relatively rapidly. One problem 
encountered was the limited information given on medical diagnosis, this was due to the fact
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that hospital invoices are generally completed by hospital administrators rather than medical 
officers. Almost all diagnoses could be specified to three figures in ICD 9, but often it was 
not possible to code to a fourth digit. This shortcoming prevents the development of any more 
sophisticated measure of relative prices between hospitals based upon diagnostic related 
groups (DRGs) or other resource based disease categorizations.
5.3.2 Analysis of Hospital Database
Once data had been collected for the hospital database, there were two main steps to be 
undertaken. Firstly the transformation of the basic data collected into the required indices 
shown in Table 5.1, and secondly analysis of these indices so as to address the objectives set 
out in section 5.2.
The most complex of these tasks was the computation of a price index for inpatient care. 
Basically the method used computed the average price for a range of inpatient services 
provided by the hospitals and then for each diagnosis, estimated the ratio of the average price 
charged by a particular hospital to the average price charged for treatment of that condition 
in the sample as a whole. The overall price index for each hospital was then simply the mean 
of the estimated ratios.
A number of common diagnoses were used to compile these indicators. For inpatient services 
the diagnoses used were:- diarrhoea, normal delivery, diabetes, bronchitis, pneumonia, acute 
appendicitis, dizziness, cerebral thrombosis, peptic ulcer, and gastritis. The criteria for 
selecting these diagnoses were twofold
i. a good spread of cases across hospitals was desirable so that a large number of 
hospitals could be included in the analysis;
ii. there should be little variation in the treatment given for a particular diagnosis so that 
the services being priced were comparable.
The second criterion was occasionally overruled by the first. A number of the diagnoses 
included were not highly specific and thus there may be variation in treatment, reflected by 
a large standard deviation in charge. On the whole the most common diagnoses were taken 
except for specialised treatments such as cataract operations which tended to take place mainly 
in eye hospitals.
The distribution of charges for each of the diagnoses was positively skewed with a few cases
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incurring very high charges. In compiling a price index therefore the mean, median and 
trimmed mean were considered for each hospital and diagnosis. The method for compiling the 
price index is described below using Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 
Matrix for computing Price Indices
D..
Pn
P22
NX
Let D, ...Dx be the set of diagnoses in the basket.
Let H,....Hn be the set of hospitals under study.
pn  Pnx are the average prices charged for a diagnosis (Dx) at a particular hospital (HJ.
Three different matrices were set up one representing the mean, one the median and one the 
trimmed mean.
For a particular hospital Hn and a particular diagnosis Dx
rnx= Pm/CEpax/N)
That is the ratio of a particular diagnosis at a hospital to the mean price of that diagnosis in 
all hospitals was computed. From this an overall price index for each hospital was calculated 
where >
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Thus the average value of the price index at private hospitals is equal to 100. Not all hospitals 
had cases under each of the ten diagnostic categories. So long as a hospital had a minimum 
of four diagnostic categories filled it was included in the final analysis. Although the price 
index was computed using mean, median and trimmed mean it was quickly apparent that the 
median was not an appropriate measure as there was often few cases observed and hence the 
median did not reliably measure the central point of the distribution. Thus the trimmed mean 
was used in the final analysis. The matrix and computations showing the construction of the 
price index for the trimmed mean price is shown in Appendix 4.
The other main complication in converting the collected data into indices was the computation 
of full-time equivalents. Data from the only existing Thai survey of physician's working 
practices suggests that a typical public sector doctor works an extra ten to fourteen hours per 
week in the private sector. No similar data exists for nursing staff. Initially part time staff 
were said to be equivalent to one quarter of a full time employee, but given the uncertainty 
surrounding this figure, it was subjected to sensitivity analysis.
In order to explore product differentiation within the hospital market the first technique used 
was simple correlation analysis to test the extent to which high levels of all characteristics 
went together. In addition multivariate techniques, such as cluster analysis were used to see 
whether distinct groups of hospitals with similar sets of characteristics existed within the 
market.
Identification of the characteristics of hospitals which consumers value was based partly upon 
hedonic price analysis. In Chapter 4 it was suggested that consumers value the services which 
flow from hospitals, however these services such as healing, comfort, information etc are 
difficult to measure in their own right. Instead, following Stanley and Tschirhart (1991), we 
regress price on the underlying characteristics from which these services flow ie P^CZ )^.
The final set of objectives aimed at assessing the impact of market concentration on price, 
quality of care, profitability and service intensity. For certain variables such as service 
intensity and profitability this was relatively straightforward and the relationship between them 
and the competition indicator could be explored through correlation analysis. However the 
relationship between concentration, prices and quality is rather more complex. It was thought
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to be of little value to examine simply the relationship between higher prices and competition 
as higher prices may reflect higher quality. Instead the previous stage of the analysis (ie the 
hedonic price analysis) was used to compute quality adjusted prices ie. the predicted price 
given the characteristics of a hospital, and the difference between die actual and the predicted 
quality adjusted price was then computed. If higher prices in the market are simply a 
reflection of higher quality then we would expect the difference between actual and quality 
adjusted prices to be small. If however there was an alternative form of competition in the 
market such as supplier induced demand then the difference would be larger and one would 
expect to observe a pattern in the residuals. Regression analysis was used to explore the 
variables affecting the difference between actual and quality adjusted prices.
5.4 SURVEY OF CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTIONS AND HEALTH CARE 
SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
The objectives relating to consumerist knowledge, perceptions and health care seeking 
behaviour were pursued through a structured survey questionnaire4. Such questionnaires have 
been widely used by other studies of consumerism, however they are not ideal. In particular 
a structured questionnaire pre-defines the dimensions along which users evaluate health 
services rather than allowing users to define these dimensions themselves (Calnan 1988). In 
order to ensure that the questionnaire closely reflected the way in which respondents thought 
about health care services it was piloted on four different groups of respondents in two 
sequential rounds. Moreover during the pilot testing, open discussions were held with 
respondents about the topics raised in the questionnaire and the adequacy of the defined 
responses. During this period the questionnaire was changed substantially iii order to reflect 
better die respondents' ideas. The quantitative method adopted here would be well 
supplemented by qualitative methods such as focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. 
However as the researcher was not fluent in Thai it would have been difficult both to ensure 
the quality of such research and to analyse responses.
5.4.1 The survey instrument
Section 1 of the survey form sought to establish what are the desirable characteristics of health 
care providers under varying conditions. The first three questions asked consumers about 
characteristics valued in a hypothetical situation. The next set of questions were quite similar 
but specifically asked which hospital the respondent would go to in each of the described
4 Appendix 5 contains an English version of the survey form.
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situations and why. Thus the second set of questions gave a clearer idea of actual priorities 
in decision making and also helped to validate the first set of responses.
Section 2 explored consumers' knowledge about fifteen pre-selected hospitals in Bangkok. By 
asking consumers about a limited list of facilities it was hoped to establish the true prevailing 
level of knowledge about providers in the market. If an open-ended question, for example 
'What is the most expensive hospital in Bangkok?' was asked then the response may or may 
not be correct, but it would be extremely difficult to establish the respondent's frame of 
reference; how many hospitals have they compared with this one? Secondly a closed list of 
hospitals facilitated the verification of responses given.
Basic details about the fifteen selected hospitals are given in Table 5.3. The hospitals were 
selected to represent a range of size, ownership and price. The majority of the hospitals are 
centrally located, as it was felt unlikely that respondents would be familiar with hospitals in 
the suburbs, except in the area where they live.
Section 3 was designed to explore the extent to which people in Bangkok behave in a 
consumerist manner in the health care sector: specifically it investigated (i) to what extent 
people's preferences over health care providers are influenced by advertising (ii) whether 
people engage in search activities in order to improve the information they have available and 
if so what type of activities (eg. asking friends for advice or asking to see price lists) and (iii) 
whether people are willing to change provider if dissatisfied with the quality or price of care 
provided, or do they prefer to place 'trust' in one provider?
This section also asked for information about which hospitals people have been particularly 
dissatisfied with and their perception of differences between public and private hospitals.
Section 4 asked the respondent for some basic personal data so that responses to other parts 
of the form could be put in context.
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Table 5.3
Selected characteristics of hospitals included in consumer survey form
Hospital Bed No. Owner Central Inpatient price 
index
1. Bamroongrad 256 Stock Exch Y 290.52
2. Samitivej 200 Stock Exch N 210.44
3. Phyathai 350 Private Y 147.90
4. Thonburi 435 private Y 29.06
5. Kluay Namthai 150 private N 106.18
6. Krungthon 130 Stock Exch Y 107.42
7. Ramkamhaeng 315 Stock Exch N 94.91
8. Cam i Hi an 100 Not-for-profit N 82.96
9. Bangkok Christian 320 Not-for-profit Y 69.32
10. Huachiew 750 Not-for-profit Y 46.32
11. Chulalongkom 1213 Govt
(university)
Y
12. Ramathibodi 794 (Govt
(university
Y
13. Central/Klang 458 Govt (BMA) Y
14. Rajavithi 900 Govt (BMA) Y
15. Phra Mong Kut 1200 Govt (Military) Y
NOTES:
1. Those hospitals indicated as being central, lie within a 6km radius of Hualamphong railway station.
2. Public hospitals have not been integrated into the price index. Services at BMA hospitals are provided 
free of charge. Services at the university hospitals are charged for but are likely to be cheaper than most 
private hospitals.
3. The military hospitals Phra Mong Kut also serves the civilian population.
5.4.2 Sampling
Different ways of implementing the survey were considered including a telephone survey, an 
exit poll at hospitals and a survey at place of work. Household surveys were dismissed as 
being too expensive. There has been little experience with telephone surveys in Thailand and 
given the complex nature of some questions it was decided that it may be difficult to 
implement over the telephone. Interviewing people as they leave a hospital has the advantage
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of catching them whilst they are actively thinking about health care, but the sample is likely 
to be biased towards 'the sick' and it may have been difficult to get permission from private 
providers. Moreover other studies have found that respondents are unwilling to be critical 
when interviewed on the premises of a health care provider (Atkinson and Correira 1993, 
Kanje et al 1992). Given the concern about capturing those with different types of insurance 
status it was decided to implement the survey at place of work.
The target group for the survey was adults (over 15 years of age) in the middle and upper 
socio-economic groups and working in Bangkok. Initially it was thought that the sample, 
although biased to the higher socio-economic groups, should include some representatives of 
the lower socio-economic groups for comparison. However during the first piloting of the 
questionnaire it became apparent that those with less education found it very difficult to 
answer some of the more conceptual questions. Secondly the respondents from lower socio­
economic groups included in the pilot had very limited experience of private hospitals and 
thus found the survey questions difficult to respond to. Although people in lower socio­
economic groups use private clinics extensively, they tend to have had less experience with 
private hospitals. Thus the survey was limited to those in formal sector employment.
A multi-stage sampling design was adopted for the survey in order to get a reasonably 
representative cross-section of formal sector employees at a reasonable cost. The sampling 
design is illustrated in figure 5.2. The sampling unit chosen was the place of work.
Knowledge of hospitals and health care seeking behaviour in Bangkok is likely to be affected 
by where one lives and works. It was impossible to control for both of these but in order to 
ensure a geographical spread of respondents, work sites were stratified by the district in which 
they were located and five districts from central Bangkok were randomly selected for 
sampling: Phranakom, Huaykwang, Promprab, Klong Tooey, Rajavithi. This strategy also 
helped reduce travel costs in the distribution and collection of questionnaires.
I l l
Figure 5.2
Multistage sampling design for consumer survey
s. Place of work is stratified 
by district.
Simple random sampling of 
five districts
Place of work is stratified by 
type of employer 
Simple random sampling of 
3 employers of each type in 
each district.
Purposive sampling of a 
particular unit or division 
within chosen employer unit. 
Census of all employees 
within chosen unit or 
division
Promprab RajavithiHuaykwang Klong TooeyPhranakom
State enterprise 
3 companies
Civil service 
3 departments
Private company 
3 companies
State enterprise 
Company #2 
All employees in 
planning division
State enterprise 
Company #3 
All employees in 
marketing division
State enterprise 
company #1 
All employees in 
personnel division.
ADULTS IN FORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN BANGKOK
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It was believed likely that responses to the questionnaire would be shaped by insurance status, 
for example those without any insurance may place greater weight on obtaining care at a 
reasonable price, than those with insurance. Thus the sample was also stratified by insurance 
status. The following strata were identified:
i. Civil servants provided with health insurance under the Civil Servants' Medical 
Benefit Scheme;
ii. State enterprise employees covered by the state enterprise medical benefit scheme, 
which operates along very similar lines to the CSMBS;
iii. Private sector employees in large companies (more than 20 employees) thus covered 
by the social security scheme;
iv. Formal private sector employees not covered by social security.
For the first three of these categories it was relatively easy to get a sample frame as lists of 
civil service departments and state enterprises are freely available. The Social Security Office 
provided a list of businesses covered by the Social Security Scheme. Private sector employees 
without social security were rather more difficult to identify. Companies without social 
security could have been identified directly in the field but it was felt that this would be a 
rather time consuming task, particularly as only employees of small companies are not 
covered by social security5. Instead it was decided to take a sample of non-government 
organizations. A sample frame for these organizations is readily available and international 
NGOs are not required to provide social security for their staff. However the NGOs were not 
drawn from the five sample districts but by simple random selection from throughout Bangkok 
as there were an insufficient number of them in the five districts.
For the other groups of employers, from each district three departments or companies from 
each employer type were randomly selected. A particular unit or division within the 
department or company was chosen on the basis of its willingness to cooperate and the 
number of employees in the unit. It was aimed to distribute approximately 20-30 
questionnaires to each place of work, but in order to avoid a selection bias every employee 
within the chosen unit was requested to complete a questionnaire. Thus the number of 
questionnaires distributed at each place of work varied a little.
In a complex survey design such as that adopted, sample size estimations are not
5 At the time of the survey, only companies with less than twenty employees were not 
covered by social security.
113
straightforward. Moreover a variety of different types of questions were being posed with 
different expected means and variance, thus the sample size estimation had to be fairly 
approximate. On the advice of a statistician it was decided to aim to collect at least 275 
completed questionnaires from each insurance category. This would provide approximately 
55 responses by type of employer in each district, which was thought adequate to allow for 
most comparisons. Thus total sample size needed to be 1100. It was estimated that with 
adequate follow-up a response rate of 75% could be achieved, thus at least 1467 
questionnaires needed to be distributed equally between the four groups. In fact 1515 
questionnaires were distributed and with a response rate of 80% 1213 valid questionnaires 
were returned. Appendix 6 gives a full break down of questionnaires distributed and returned.
5.4.3 Implementation of survey
Fieldwork was carried out between July and September 1993. Approximately half of the 
questionnaires were delivered by hand. A work site would be visited and contact made with 
the supervisor of a department or unit. The researchers then explained the purpose of the visit 
and established how many people there were in the unit or department. Questionnaires were 
distributed to all employees in the unit. A completion date for the questionnaire was agreed 
with the supervisor (usually 3-7 days later) and this date and the name of the person 
responsible for collecting the questionnaires was stamped in the space provided on the front 
of the questionnaire.
For the rest of the questionnaires, initial contact was made by telephone. Permission was 
sought to carry out the survey, a unit or department was identified and the number of people 
within the unit established, the name of the person responsible for implementing the survey 
and target completion date were recorded. The questionnaires were then sent by post with 
recorded delivery and a return stamped addressed envelope.
All the forms distributed, both by phone and by face-to-face visits, were recorded on a control 
sheet.
Shortly before the agreed completion date the company or department was contacted by 
telephone to check whether they were on target for completion or not. Regular follow up 
telephone calls were made and visits to the work site for collection of the forms if necessary. 
In this manner a high response rate was achieved.
5.4.4 Data coding, processing and analysis
Most of the fields on the survey form were closed and thus relatively simple to code. A small 
team of just three coders was used in order to ensure accurate coding. Only two questions left 
space for completely open responses (q3.1.2 and 3.6.2) these were initially analyzed manually 
and then a coding system was developed and responses were entered in separate data files. 
These files were later joined with the main data file.
The data were double entry input into a special Foxbase programme by staff of the Health 
Statistics Unit, MOPH. The programme for data entry prevented data of an invalid range being 
entered. The two data sets were then checked against each other using EPI-INFO and any 
errors corrected.
Analysis of the data files was undertaken using SPSS+. In assessing the characteristics which 
consumers value, responses to the questions were assigned scores so that the overall 
importance of different characteristics could be assessed. Analysis of the importance of 
different characteristics was carried out by condition. Cross tabulations with Chi squared 
significance test were used to compare responses by those using public and private sector 
hospitals, by nature of insurance and by other basic characteristics of the respondent. The 
responses to the open-ended questions on complaints were grouped into eleven main 
categories which allowed for analysis of type of complaint by type of hospital.
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CHAPTER 6
HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTATION
IN BANGKOK
6.0 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6 presents the results of the private hospital survey and the investigation of private 
hospital pricing. Analysis undertaken in this chapter addresses the first set of objectives 
identified, that is:
i. the characteristics of hospitals in Bangkok are charted (sections 6.1-6.3);
ii. the nature of product differentiation is explored using multivariate techniques 
(section 6.4);
iii. hedonic price analysis is carried out to investigate the value placed by consumers 
on various hospital characteristics (sections 6.5-6.6).
6.1 RESULTS OF THE PRIVATE HOSPITAL SURVEY
In 1993 there were 105 private hospitals in Bangkok registered with the Medical License 
Division. Due to the problems described in Chapter 5 just fifty-two responses to the private 
hospital survey were received, of these fifty were sufficiently complete and consistent to be 
considered valid. Two of the valid responses were from very small clinics, without doctors 
and with only two beds. It was decided to exclude these two cases from further analysis, 
leaving forty-eight valid cases. A further four of the respondents were highly specialized 
facilities, one being a dental hospital, two eye hospitals and one an ear, nose and throat 
hospital. These facilities are included under a separate category in the following descriptive 
section but are excluded from the later analytical sections.
From the Medical Licence Division records reliable data on the basic characteristics of the 
whole population of hospitals in Bangkok are available. These data were used to compare 
basic characteristics of the respondents against the population as a whole (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1
Comparison of Respondent Hospitals and Population
Polyclinics 
Resp Pop
Other For-profit 
Resp Pop
Stock-exchange 
Resp Pop
Non-profit 
Resp Pop
All
Resp Pop
Response
rate
34.7% 512 % 83.3% 55.6% 45.8%
N 17 49 21 41 5 6 5 9 48 105
Bed Mean
17.4 15.3 113 120 269 267 261 205 111 87
Bed
Median 12 10 100 100 275 266 200 100 200 30
Age
(years)
9.4 8.6 9.4 10.3 10.8 11 24.2 23.6 11.1 11
EH stance 72 8.3 8.3 7.3 8.7 8 1.3 2 7.2 7.4
Source: Private hospital survey and MLD records
The response rate was rather higher amongst larger hospitals; the mean bed size amongst 
respondent hospitals was 111, compared to a mean of 87 beds in the population as a whole. 
This may be due to the fact that many small hospitals do not keep the requested patient 
throughput statistics and thus preferred not to return the form.
The table separates out responses by ownership of the facility. The group of unquoted private 
for-profit facilities encompasses considerable variation in size and services provided, and 
hence the group was further sub-divided into 'polyclinics' and 'other for-profit*. An arbitrary 
cut-off point of thirty beds was used to separate the two groups. More than half of the 
unquoted private for-profit facilities have less than thirty beds. The response rate was highest 
amongst those hospitals listed on the stock exchange and lowest amongst the small polyclinics.
With respect to the age and distance of the facility from the city centre the respondents 
appeared to be largely representative of the population as a whole.
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6.2 DESCRIPTION OF HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS 
What are the different characteristics o f hospitals in Bangkok?
Table 6.2 presents basic data on the respondent hospitals in Bangkok. Where reliable data are 
available comparisons are made between the private hospitals in the sample and public 
hospitals in Bangkok1.
6.2.1 Facilities
On the whole, public hospitals, and university teaching hospitals in particular, are considerably 
larger than private hospitals. Thus although the government has relatively few hospitals in 
Bangkok these account for more than 60% of the total number of hospital beds. Amongst the 
private hospitals those quoted on the stock exchange are the largest, followed by non-profit 
hospitals. Data on both standard items of equipment (ultrasound and x-ray) and high 
technology equipment (CT, MRI and ESWL) are shown in the table. For the standard items 
of equipment there is little difference in equipment levels between the stock exchange 
hospitals, non-profit hospitals and other for-profit ones (data for public facilities were not 
available). For high technology equipment significant differences emerge; the investor owned 
hospitals have a much greater complement of high technology equipment than the other 
private hospitals. The group of 'other for-profit' hospitals have a fairly similar profile of high 
technology equipment to most government hospitals, despite the fact that they are considerably 
smaller in terms of number of beds. Only the small polyclinics appear to have a less extensive 
range of high technology equipment than government hospitals. The University Teaching 
Hospitals have, as would be expected, a fairly large number of items of high technology 
equipment, but other government hospitals are less well equipped.
1 Public hospitals in Bangkok are owned by a number of different ministries and 
organizations including the Ministry of Health, of University Affairs, of Defence and various 
parastatal organizations (such as the State Railways). Also situated in Bangkok are a number 
of specialist facilities such as the National Cancer Institute, the Dermatology Institute etc. In 
order to simplify the presentation specialist and parastatal facilities are excluded from the 
discussion, and only two categories of public hospital are distinguished; the University 
Teaching Hospitals and other government general hospitals.
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Table 6.2
Basic Data on Respondent Hospitals in Bangkok (1992)
Poly-
clinics
Other For* 
profit
Stock
Exchange
Non-profit Specialist All pri­
vate
ANOVA
F-ratio
UTH Other
Govt
All
public
N 14 20 5 5 4 48 3 15 18
FACILITIES (mean by Bed Number 16.6 116.5 269 261 28.3 111 6.93*** 1346 482 626
group of hospitals)
CT Scanner 0.43 0.65 1 0.4 0 0. 54 2.63** 2 0.37 0.64
ESWL 0 0.1 0.4 0 0 0.08 2.39* 1 0.11 0.26
MRI 0 0 0.8 0 0 0.08 4.53*** 0 0 0.0
Eequip 0 0.7 2.2 0.4 0 0.56 14.85*** 3 0.6 0.8
Ultrasound 0.3 1.15 1.4 1.2 0 0.91 4.25*** - - -
Xray 0.93 2.2 2.2 4 3 2.08 2.06 - - -
PHYSICIAN Bed per FT Dr 11.8 10.1 7.6 11.3 11.6 10.6 0.57 3.3 6.8 6.4
INPUTS
Bed per FTE DR 4 4.3 4.3 7.2 8.4 4.86 2.35* - - -
%  of Drs full time 35.6 46.1 61.6 62.5 66.1 48 5.07*** - - -
%  Specialist Dr 34.5 81.9 95.9 74.1 100 70 7.79*** - - -
NURSING Bed per FT Nurse 5.8 4.3 2.2 2.8 9.4 4.8 1.86 1.2 2.1 1.9
Bed per FTE Nurse 3.8 3.1 1.5 2.8 6.3 3.4 2.15* - - -
Bed per FT Nurse Aid 5.5 1.9 4 3.5 0.5 3.5 2.25* - - -
Bed per FTE Nurse Aid 5.2 1.9 4 3.5 0.5 3.3 2.49* - - -
%  Nurse Aid 31.5 46.8 32.9 31.9 23.4 37 0.84 - - -
HOTEL FEATURES %  'private' beds 19.4 41.9 52.6 40.4 64.4 38 2.83** 3 15 18
SOURCE: Private Hospital Survey
Anova test for noil hypothesis that means of different groups of hospitals are equal. Key: ••* Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level
6.2.2 Physician inputs
Three different aspects of physician staffing were examined: the ratio of beds to doctors, full 
time doctors* hours as a percentage of all doctors hours and the percentage of doctors who had 
specialist qualifications. The ratio of beds to doctors is examined both with respect to full time 
doctors alone and all doctors measured in terms of full time equivalents (FTE). One part time 
doctor was assumed to be equivalent to one quarter of a full time physician. Using this ratio, 
there appeared to be little difference between the groups of general for-profit hospitals, 
however both non-profit hospitals and specialist hospitals had significantly more beds per 
doctor than the other groups. This result appears robust even if the relative weighting of part- 
time doctors is altered.
Although part time doctors may provide valuable specialist skills not routinely available in a 
facility, continuity of care may be threatened if hospitals rely too heavily on part-time 
physicians. In the sample of private hospitals as a whole it was estimated that about 48% of 
doctors' hours were contributed by full time staff. The small polyclinics and the unquoted 
private for-profit hospitals have a rather greater reliance on part time staff than stock exchange 
and non-profit hospitals.
The training of the physicians working in the facilities varies considerably. Only 35% of the 
doctors working in polyclinics had specialist qualifications compared to 96% in the stock 
exchange hospitals and 100% of physicians in the specialist hospitals.
With respect to two of the three aspects of physician staffing considered (beds per FTE doctor 
and percentage of doctors who are specialists), investor owned hospitals would appear to offer 
better quality services than the other types of hospitals examined.
Virtually all physicians working in public hospitals are full time employees, therefore it is 
probably appropriate to compare the number of beds per full time doctor in government 
hospitals with the number of beds per full time equivalent doctor in private hospitals. From 
this comparison it is apparent that although the University Teaching Hospitals have a low ratio 
of beds per doctor, this ratio is considerably higher at other government hospitals. In fact 
public non-teaching hospitals have a higher bed to doctor ratio than the group of private 
hositals taken as a whole.
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6.2.3 Nursing
As for physicians, the investor owned hospitals appear to have more intensive nursing profiles 
than any of the other types of private facility. However non-profit hospitals also have a 
relatively high complement of nurses to beds which perhaps partially compensates for their 
high bed to doctor ratios. Specialist hospitals appear to have particularly low staffing by 
nurses.
The final row on nursing shows the percentage of nursing time provided by nurse aids, this 
was included in the table because MOPH officials thought that some private hospitals were 
relying heavily on unqualified nursing personnel. However these figures cannot be properly 
appreciated without considering the overall ratio of beds to nurses. For example although only 
32% of nursing time in polyclinics is said to be provided by nurse aids, the overall ratio of 
beds to nurses is poor. Moreover the statistics in the table are unable to identify actual staffing 
patterns at a particular point in the day. With a high ratio of beds to nurses it is probable that 
during night time hours few or no qualified nurses are available. Interviews with hospital 
directors suggested that during the past two years nursing costs in Bangkok have risen 
considerably due to increasing numbers of private hospitals. It is probable therefore that the 
data in the table present a rather rosier picture than the current situation.
If qualified nurses alone are considered then government hospitals (both teaching and non­
teaching) have a much lower ratio of beds to nurses. However the difference in nursing 
profiles between public and private hospitals becomes less acute if nurse aids are included in 
the picture. Government hospitals do not employ nurse aids, though untrained cleaning staff 
may sometimes be called upon to perform some of the functions of nurse aids. The 
implications of the very different nursing patterns in the two sectors for quality of care is not 
clear.
6.2.4 Hotel Features
Private hospitals were reluctant to provide detailed information about prices charged for 
different levels of private room services. However basic data on the number of beds in general 
wards and the number of private beds were made available. These data were collected with 
the aim of assessing the hotel aspects of facilities, however it is not a perfect indicator as the 
nature of the general wards (whether for example they are four, six or twenty bed wards) is 
unclear. However a significant difference emerges between the stock exchange hospitals and
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the rest of the private facilities; in stock exchange hospitals over half the beds are in private 
rooms, whereas in the rest of the private sector there are 2-3 general beds to every private 
bed. Small polyclinics had the lowest percentage of beds in private rooms, and non-profit 
facilities had a surprisingly high percentage of beds in private rooms. Specialist hospitals 
tended to have a high percentage of private rooms.
6.2.5 Hospital throughput statistics
Table 6.3 presents basic data on hospital throughput. This is presented so as to illustrate 
differences between hospitals in die type of cases seen and treatment practices; however it 
should be interpreted with caution. A number of hospitals did not provide any throughput 
statistics; others provided basic data on number of visits and admissions but did not have 
sufficiently sophisticated information systems to provide data on hospital days, ICU cases, 
surgery cases etc. The response rate for small polyclinics was particularly poor; statistics on 
percentage of ICU cases, percentage of surgical cases and percentage maternity cases in 
polyclinics are not presented in the table because they were felt to be too unreliable. There 
are concerns in the MOPH that private hospitals may understate throughput data so that 
patient revenues will appear low and hence payment to the government in the form of taxes 
will also be low. However it is not clear that this is the case; first there is no routine effort 
by government to link throughput with financial data, second discussions with hospital 
directors suggested that larger private hospitals come under considerable financial scrutiny by 
shareholders and thus if there is a problem it is predominantly amongst smaller hospitals.
Given the differing sizes of the hospitals it is not surprising that there is considerable variation 
in the number of visits and number of inpatient admissions. More interesting differences 
emerge when occupancy rates are considered. There is a growing concern about the over­
supply of hospital beds in Bangkok, and the data available from 1992 would support this 
concern as average occupancy rates hover around 40%. Stock exchange owned and non-profit 
facilities appear to have rather higher occupancy rates than the other hospitals.
Average length of stay in private for-profit hospitals is routinely low, being generally less than 
three days. This agrees with the findings of previous studies (Pannurunothai 1993). However 
length of stay in non-profit hospitals is much higher and is more in line with lengths of stay 
in public facilities. This partly accounts for the higher occupancy rates in non-profit hospitals.
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Table 6.3
Private Hospital Throughput Statistics 1992
Poly­
clinics
Other
for-
profit
Stock
Exch­
ange
Non­
profit
Special­
ist
All
private
N2 12 14 5 5 4 48
Mean No. 
visits
29917 116663 290860 145713 61860 110565
Mean No. 
admissions
1222
(N=ll)
9697 14580 8647 1199 7046
(N=47)
Cases 
admitted to 
ICU as % all 
IP cases
N/A 10.6
(N=8)
9.5 4.9
(N=3)
0 N/A
Surgical as % 
of all IP cases
N/A 35.3
(N=13)
63.9 40.3
(N=3)
90 N/A
Maternity as 
% of all IP 
cases
N/A 4.8
(N=13)
11.4 19.3
(N“ 3)
0 N/A
% maternity 
cases with CS
N/A 39.1 34.5 36.7
(N=3)
N/A N/A
Average LOS 1.5
(N=7)
2.8
(N=8)
2.5 111
(N=3)
3.3 3.3
(N=27)
Mean
occupancy
rate
35.0
(N=7)
38.2
(N=8)
47.5 62.5
(N=3)
23.1 38.8
(N=27)
Source: Private Hospital Survey
Despite the better facilities and higher level of staffing at stock exchange facilities it is not 
obvious that they treat a markedly different case mix to that at other hospitals. Length of stay 
is no higher than at the other for-profit hospitals. The percentage of cases admitted to the ICU 
is similar to other for-profits, but there is a small difference in the percentage of surgical
2 As explained in the text not all of the hospitals provided data for all of the fields in the 
table. Where the number of respondent hospitals differs from the numbers at the top of the 
column this is shown in the individual cell.
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cases.
The high percentage of maternity cases in non-profit hospitals was biased upwards by one 
particular hospital (Huachiew) which is renowned for the maternity care which it offers.
6.2.6 Location
Table 6.4 shows the proportion of hospitals which are located within the city centre3. A 
significantly higher proportion of public hospitals are situated in the city centre (Pearson chi 
square with Yates correction = 10.243, significant at 1% level). The majority of public 
hospitals, and also notably the non-profit hospitals were established some years ago when it 
was easier to obtain land in the city centre. Private hospitals are more likely to be located on 
the periphery: this is probably partly a reflection of the high price of land in the centre but 
also a response to the demand emerging in the residential suburbs.
Table 6.4
Proportion of hospitals located within the city centre
N Percent
PRIVATE HOSPITALS
Small polyclinics 19 38.0
Private for-profit 17 42.5
Stock exchange 2 33.3
Non-profit 8 88.9
All private 46 43.8
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
University Teaching 3 100.0
General Public 13 86.7
Parastatal 3 75.0
Specialist 6 100.0
All public 25 89.3
Source: MLD records
3 Taken to be within a radius of 6 km of Hualamphong railway station.
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Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the location of public and private hospitals respectively: they further 
demonstrate how clustered public hospitals are with many, including Ramathibodi University 
Teaching hospital and several specialist institutes, such as the National Cancer Institute and 
the Tropical Diseases Institute, located in Phyathai district. The few public hospitals located 
on the outskirts of town tend to be small with just thirty or so beds.
In contrast the private hospitals are scattered throughout the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, 
although often clinging to the main arterial routes out of town. This is especially noticeable 
to the west of the city centre on Phetkasem Road, but is also true of hospitals to the north and 
east. Figure 6.2 suggests a tendency for some private hospitals to locate close to existing 
prestigious public hospitals. To the west of the Chao Phrya river a cluster of private hospitals 
have sprung up around Siriraj University Teaching Hospital. Although only two substantial 
private hospitals (Decha and Phyathai 1) have located in Phyathai district where many of the 
most prestigious government hospitals are, there are several large hospitals in Chatuchak 
district just to the north of Phyathai. Part of the reason why private hospitals locate close to 
existing public ones is likely to be because many private hospitals depend upon the part-time 
inputs of physicians employed in the public sector. Locating close to good public hospitals 
ensures the supply of part-time specialists. Indeed several of the private hospitals have well 
known and close links with a particular government hospital: sometimes the staff of the public 
hospital helped to establish the private hospital. Furthermore locating in an area which is 
already renowned for the provision of health care may help to confer a good reputation on the 
private facility.
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Figure 6.1
Location of public hospitals in Bangkok
KEY:
•  University teaching hospital 
© General public hospital 
D Parastatal hospital 
Specialist hospital
Figure 6.2
Location of private hospitals in Bangkok
KEY:
0  Polyclinic or small hospital
•  For-profit non-SET hospital
A SET hospital 
Q Not-for-profit hospital
6.3 HOSPITAL PRICING
Table 6.5 shows some of the most common diagnoses found under the Civil Servants' Medical 
Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) in private hospitals, the mean, standard deviation and median price 
charged for these diagnoses, and the same statistics for length of stay. As the coefficient of 
variation shows, an extremely wide range of prices was found between hospitals even when 
controlling for diagnosis. The mean price charged for an acute appendicitis and a normal 
delivery case are similar, about 16,000 Baht4. The diagnoses for which the lowest charges 
were made were very simple conditions such as diarrhoea, dizziness and gastritis. Supporting 
the hospital throughput data presented in section 6.2.5, lengths of stay in private hospitals 
under the insurance schemes were very short. Even for more complex conditions such as 
pneumonia or cerebral thrombosis length of stay rarely exceeded five or six days.
All of the diagnoses in Table 6.5 were included in the calculations of the price index5. The 
two conditions with the lowest coefficient of variation for both price and length of stay (acute 
appendicitis and normal delivery) were used to consider diagnosis-specific pricing. As the 
severity of these conditions varied least, it was most likely that the prices charged to the 
sample cases were an accurate reflection of hospitals' pricing policy.
The final row of Table 6.5 shows the median room charge per night. This was estimated for 
each hospital for which data was available using primarily information collected from the 
Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme. According to Davis (1972) hospitals may place a 
relatively low price on services such as room and board, in order to attract patients, but make 
up for this by charging more on ancillary services. The standard charge per room per night 
is approximately Baht400-600.
Appendix 6 lists the price indices described above by private hospital.
4 In 1992 $1 = 45 Baht approximately.
5 See Chapter 5 section 5.3.2 for a fuller explanation of construction of the price index.
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Table 6.5
Prices and length of stay by diagnosis at private hospitals
Diagnosis ICD9
code6
N Mean
Charge
(Baht)
SD Coeffici 
ent of 
variation
Min­
imum
Charge
Max­
imum
Charge
Median
Charge
Mean
LOS
(days)
SD Coeffici 
ent of 
variation
Med
-ian
LOS
Diarrhoea 9.0-9.3 302 4,971 5,685 114.4 420 40,350 3,375 2.22 2.53 114.0 1
Normal delivery 650.0 204 16,221 11,168 68.9 204 76,666 13,919 5.46 2.98 54.6 5
Diabetes
. . .
250-250.7 130 16,746 19,910 118.9 905 119,355 8,958 6.24 7.09 113.6 4
Bronchitis 490-490.0 87 7,820 9,148 117.0 1,370 73,262 5,790 3.11 2.54 81.7 3
Pneumonia 486-486.9 71 17,084 24,666 144.4 780 163,558 8,500 5.39 5.22 96.8 4
Acute Appendicitis 541.0 69 16,911 7,246 42.8 1,223 41,752 16,466 4.42 2.29 51.8 4
Dizziness 780.4 63 4,781 5,256 109.9 460 36,495 3,585 2.00 1.71 85.5 1
Cerebral thrombosis 434-434.9 59 16,840 17,099 101.5 1,500 81,263 11,430 5.00 4.33 86.6 3
Peptic ulcer 533-533.9 58 10,422 11,853 113.7 570 47,025 6,370 3.16 2.92 92.4 2
Gastritis 535-535.9 52 4,841 4,512 93.2 780 28,091 3,316 1.96 1.60 81.6 1
Room charge 3481 578 357 61.7 50 1986 450
Source: Survey of Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme Records
6 Classification of cases was carried out using the WHO International Classification of Diseases Version 9.
The Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient between the various price indicators was estimated 
in order to assess how similar the various price indices were. The correlation coefficients 
showed quite a strong positive correlation in rankings between all four of the indices (Table 
6 .6).
Table 6.6
Results of Spearman Rank Correlation test between different price indices
IP price 
index
Delivery
price
Appendix
price
Room
price
IP price index 1
Delivery price 0.76*** 1
Appendix price 0.56*** 0.66*** 1
Room price 0.66*** 0.64’* 0.42** 1
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level
Scatter plots of the IP price index against the other measures of inpatient price were used to 
identify outliers. Decha Hospital appeared to be placed rather higher in the IP index than 
would be expected than would be expected from the individual price indices. It is possible that 
more severe cases in one of the other diagnostic categories biased the price index for Decha 
upwards.
6.4 THE NATURE OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
What is the nature o f product differentiation in the hospital market in Bangkok, and in 
particular what is the relative importance o f vertical and horizontal product differentiation ?
Product differentiation may affect the nature of competition in its own right by segmenting 
the market, but it also exacerbates problems of asymmetric information thus further impeding 
the functioning of the market. This section considers the extent to which there is a pattern 
behind the variation in the indicators listed. In particular is it possible to identify vertical or 
horizontal product differentiation as being dominant? Initially these questions were explored 
through simple correlation coefficients. Multivariate techniques were then employed to allow 
a more detailed analysis of product variation. Multivariate techniques have the advantage of 
helping to identify non-linear relationships between variables (which simple correlation
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analysis does not). In addition principal components analysis is a useful tool for identifying 
underlying dimensions in the data and thus was used in order to see how much of the 
variation in the variables could be seen as vertical product differentiation compared to 
horizontal product differentiation.
In Chapter 5 a set of characteristics underlying product variation in hospital care was 
discussed and possible indicators for examining differences in hospitals were set out. As 
shown by the coefficient of variation in Table 6.7 there was a high variation in the sample in 
most of the variables examined. The table categorises specific indicators but it is not 
necessarily the case that the indicators in one category will all move in the same direction. 
For example, a hospital may have a high percentage of specialists but low overall physician 
staffing levels. The final column of Table 6.7 presents the hypothesized relationship between 
the specific variable and the characteristic.
The final two variables, DISTANCE and AGE, are difficult to interpret. Location is of interest 
because it reflects accessibility, however the nature of its impact is unclear. Hospitals further 
from the city centre are probably easier to access from people's homes. On the other hand, 
transport routes lead into the city centre and many people work close to the city centre. 
Hospital location may also reflect other characteristics, for example some centrally located 
hospitals are close to prestigious public hospitals and this may help confer a good reputation. 
With respect to age, older hospitals may have a more established 'reputation', however 
reputation is a very difficult variable to measure and age is likely to be only one (probably 
minor) component of it.
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Table 6.7
Key Indicators and their relationship to Health Care Characteristics
CHARACTERISTIC INDICATOR MEAN SD CV HYPOTHESIZED EFFECT
Hotel Features % Private beds of all 
beds (PERCPRI)
36% 29 80.5 Higher % private rooms implies more 
comfortable care
Physician inputs % specialists7 
(PERCSPEC)
68% 38 55.9 Higher % specialists implies better doctors' 
skills.
Beds per weighted Dr 
(BEDWDR)
4.54 2.37 52.2 Lower number beds per dr implies better 
clinical care, more time for communication.
% full time Dr* 
(PERCFTMD)
46% 19 41.3 Higher % full time dr implies better 
continuity and clinical quality of care.
Nursing care % nurse aid9 (PERCAID) 
Beds per weighted Nurse
39% 30 76.9 Lower % nurse aids implies better nursing 
care
(BEDWNUR) 3.10 2.5 80.6 Lower number beds per nurse implies better 
nursing care
Facilities Equipment10
(SUMEQUIP)
0.61 0.87 142.6 More high technology equipment implies 
better facilities
Bed number (BED_NO) 118.48 149.79 118.48 More beds implies better facilities
Distance DISTANCE from city 
centre
7.49 4.01 53.5 ?
Age No years established 
(AGE)
10.61 7.17 67.6 ?
7 % specialists was based on full time staff alone as nearly all part time staff working in private hospitals are specialists.
* % of dr time provided by full time physicians [ie. full time dr/(full time dr + 0.25*part time drs)].
9 % of nursing time provided by nurse aids [ie. (Full time nurse aids + 0.25*part time nurse aids)/(full time nurse aids + 0.25*part time nurse aids + full time trained 
nurses + 0.25*part time nurses)]. Very few nurse aids worked on a part time basis.
10 A simple sum of the items of high technology equipment identified in Chapter 4 (ie. MRI, ESWL, CT scanner).
6.4.1 Correlation Analysis
Table 6.8 is a correlation matrix for all of the key indicators. There is a moderate level of 
correlation between a number of the variables but none of the correlation coefficients exceed 
0.562. The correlation analysis was supported by an examination of scatter plots in case there 
were any very evident non-linear relationships between variables which the correlation 
analysis had missed, but this was not the case.
Indicators representing the same facet of care are generally significantly but not particularly 
strongly correlated with each other. A high percentage of nurse aids is significantly associated 
with a large number of beds per full time equivalent nurse, suggesting that these two aspects 
of nursing quality go together. Larger hospitals also tend to be better equipped than the 
smaller facilities. For doctors' skills that the picture is less clear; a high percentage of 
specialist physicians working in a facility is associated with a higher percentage of full time 
doctors, but there is no significant relationship between the number of beds per full time 
equivalent doctor and the other two variables.
There are also a number of significant positive correlations across characteristics which 
suggests that there is some degree of vertical product differentiation. For example hospitals 
with a high percentage of private beds generally appear to be large, well equipped facilities. 
The percentage of specialists working in a hospital is also significantly correlated with the 
percentage of private beds, bed number and the equipment indicator. Low bed:nurse ratios 
are associated with high levels of equipment and a large number of beds.
The final two rows of the table appear to be linked to a lesser degree with the other 
characteristics, although older facilities do appear to have both a higher proportion of full time 
doctors and higher bed to doctor ratios. Older hospitals are clearly more likely to be located 
in the centre of the city. As previously suggested, this probably relates to recent increases in 
land prices in the city centre and the rapid development of the Bangkok suburbs.
Table 6.8 suggests that some hospitals invest in the complete range of characteristics ie. there 
is some vertical product differentiation, but this probably does not fully explain patterns of 
product differentiation. Multivariate techniques were used to explore in more detail the 
distribution of characteristics between hospitals.
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Table 6.8 
Correlation Matrix for Key Variables
PERCPRI PERSPEC BEDWDR PERCFTMD PERCAID BEDWNUR SUMEQUIP BED_NO DISTANCE AGE
PERCPRI 1
PERCSPEC 0.326** 1
BEDWDR -0.140 0.045 1
PERCFTMD 0.090 0.355’* 0.436***“ 1
PERCAID 0.275* 0.220 0.050 0.185 1
BEDWNUR -0.068 -0.203 0.336” 0.173 0.419*’* 1
SUMEQUIP 0.252* 0.496*’* 0.020 0.185 -0.022 -0.423*” 1
BED_NO 0.319** 0.477*** 0.330” 0.242 0.023 -0.268* 0.562*** 1
DISTANCE -0.082 -0.002 -0.160 -0.176 -0.112 -0.089 0.163 -0.210 1
AGE 0.118 -0.025 .294’ 0.373” -0.063 -0.095 0.095 0.219 -0.533*** 1
Key: Two tailed significance test: *’* Significant at 1% level “  Significant at 5% level * Significant at 10% level
N = 44
11 PERCFTMD is defined as [Number of Full time doctoiV(0.25x part time doctors + full time doctors)]. BEDWDR is defined as [No of beds/(0.25xpart time doctor + full time doctor)]. 
As the denominator of both of these indicators is the same, the high correlation observed between them simply reflects the fact that there is a high correlation betwen the numerators ie. the number 
o f beds and the number of full time doctors.
6.4.2 Multivariate Techniques exploring Product Differentiation
Principal components analysis is useful for identifying the main types of differences between 
hospitals. The analysis attempts to identify different underlying dimensions in the data. To do 
this it takes the original variables and finds combinations or indices of these variables (the 
principal components) which are uncorrelated (Manly 1986). The first principal component 
explains the largest proportion of variation in the data and as such captures the most important 
of the variables in explaining differences between the hospitals.
Principal components analysis is particularly useful where the variation in a large number of 
variables is explained by one or two dimensions. This is most likely to be the case where 
there are high correlation coefficients between the variables. In the case of Bangkok hospitals 
there is only moderate correlation between the variables which suggests that several principal 
components will be required to account for a substantial proportion of the variation. This was 
indeed the case. Table 6.9 presents the results of two different principal components analyses 
carried out on the data. In the first analysis DISTANCE from the city centre and AGE were 
included, in the second analysis they were excluded because of the difficulties in inteipreting 
them. In Analysis 1, the first four principal components are all significant with eigenvalues 
over one. They explain about 75.6% of the total variance. Seven principal components are 
required to explain 90% of the variation in the data. In the second analysis three significant 
principal components together explained 74.2% of the total variance.
The first three principal components in both analyses are fairly similar. Moreover it is quite 
difficult to interpret the fourth PC in Analysis 1 as none of the variables are particularly 
strong.
The first principal component identifies large, well equipped hospitals with a high 
percentage of specialists, full time doctors and private rooms. The fact that the first principal 
component is essentially the weighted sum of hospital facilities, hotel aspects, nursing inputs 
and physician inputs underlines the presence of vertical product differentiation in the market. 
Hospitals which scored highly on this principal component were Krungthep hospital, 
Samitivej, Huachiew, Thonburi, Ramkamhaeng and Phyathai. Small polyclinics had low scores 
on this dimension (see appendix 7).
In contrast the second principal component identifies hospitals with poor staffing profiles:
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Table 6.9
Results of Principal Components Analysis
Analysis 1
PC Eigen­
value
Cumul­
ative % 
Var
Eigenvector Coefficients
PERC­
PRI
PER-
SPEC
BED­
WDR
PER-
FTMD
PER­
CAID
BED­
WNUR
SUM­
EQUIP
BED
NO
DIST­
ANCE
AGE
1 2.660 26.6 .484 .694 .314 .578 .168 -.253 .683 .811 -.296 .457
2 2.027 46.9 -.172 -.297 .621 .461 .263 .690 -.483 -.110 -.547 .470
3 1.526 62.1 .409 .331 -.223 .084 .812 .506 -.058 -.119 .217 -.464
4 1.182 73.9 -.439 .103 .532 .301 -.169 .200 .213 .091 .592 -.362
5 0.719 81.1 .300 -.275 .326 -.472 -.037 .165 .011 .406 -.023 -.175
6 0.626 87.4 .485 -.258 .046 .203 -.151 .019 .044 -.230 .379 .244
7 .0493 92.3 -.218 -.288 -.031 -.126 .373 -.022 .378 -.017 .102 .230
8 .0301 95.3 .009 .126 -.066 -.121 -.211 .326 .277 -.155 -.111 .047
Table 6.9
Results of Principal Components Analysis (continued)
Analysis 2
PC Eigen­
value
Cumul­
ative % 
Var
Eigenvector Coefficients
PERCP
RI
PER-
SPEC
BED­
WDR
PER-
FTMD
PER­
CAID
BED­
WNUR
SUM­
EQUIP
BED
NO
1 2.538 31.7 .519 .784 .161 .458 .160 -.353 .785 .808
2 1.798 54.2 -.005 .021 .636 .603 .543 .814 -.266 .015
3 1.373 71.4 .550 .198 -.644 -.224 .683 .174 -.111 -.241
4 0.731 80.5 .488 -.372 .272 -.388 -.075 .105 -.060 .332
5 .577 87.7 -.423 .023 .051 -.405 .337 .111 .241 .217
6 .418 92.9 .047 -.399 -.024 .169 .123 -.039 .420 -.183
7 .348 97.3 .073 .189 .017 -.141 -.259 .344 .251 -.196
high bed to doctor and bed to nurse ratios, with low levels of equipment and a high 
percentage of nurse aids. These hospitals were also characterised by a high percentage of full 
time doctors. This principal component describes hospitals such as Chongchin, Kwong Sui, 
Bangpakow and VS Polyclinic. The first two of these hospitals are small non-profit hospitals. 
Bangpakow and VS Polyclinic are polyclinics which are probably owner-operated; this would 
explain the high percentage of hill time doctors.
The emphasis in the third principal component is on poor nursing standards, both in terms 
of a high percentage of nurse aids and high bed to nurse ratios, combined with quite a high 
level of private rooms. It appears that not all of the private hospitals fit the Tiigh quality in 
all dimensions' type identified in the first PC. Hospitals which typify this third principal 
component are Sukhumvit hospital, Rama Suksawat hospital, Pasichaloen and Yaowarak.
Figure 6.3 shows a scatter plot of hospital specific scores for principal component 1 (PCI) 
against principal component 2 (PC2) by type of hospital ownership (from Analysis 1). It is 
apparent that the non-profit hospitals tended to score highly on both of these principal 
components (they are located mainly in the upper right quadrant of the graph); whilst being 
substantial in size and with considerable facilities they may have lower staffing levels 
(particularly physician staffing) than other hospitals. They also use a high proportion of full 
time staff. Stock exchange owned hospitals on the other hand scored high on PCI but below 
average on PC2 (they are located in the top left quadrant of the graph). They tend to have a 
high level of facilities and a high level of staffing. The majority of for-profit but non-stock 
exchange owned hospitals scored about or below average on PCI (they are located on the 
bottom half of the diagram). This reflects the earlier finding that many private for-profit (non­
stock exchange owned) facilities are quite small in size.
The fact that the first PC focuses upon vertical product differentiation suggests that this form 
of product differentiation is the most important single way in which hospitals in Bangkok 
differ from each other. However the first PC accounts for only 30% of the total variation in 
the variables; six or sevem PCs are required in order to explain 90% of the variation in the 
selected variables. This implies that there is also extensive horizontal product differentiation 
in Bangkok which accounts for a greater proportion of the variation in the variables.
The principal component analysis provided an insight into the most important ways in which
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Figure 6.3 Plot of PCI with PC2
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hospitals might differ from each other. Cluster analysis was used to define specific groups of 
hospitals which shared similar sets of characteristics. Cluster analysis computes the Euclidean 
distance between different cases and then groups cases so that those with similar 
characteristics are close together. One of the main difficulties with cluster analysis is that the 
groups defined are sensitive to (i) the algorithm used and (ii) the variables included. Thus 
sensitivity analyses need to be carried out to explore how stable the groups are when these 
two factors are varied. In order to carry out the cluster analysis all variables were normalized 
so as to ensure that those variables with large numbers (such as bed number) did not dominate 
the analysis.
Six or seven clusters were sought on the basis that this number of PCs were required to 
explain most of the variation in the data. With less than six clusters, one cluster appeared 
artificially large, embracing a wide range of hospitals. Appendix 8 presents the results of eight 
different cluster analyses using two different algorithms as a basis for grouping hospitals, and 
both including and excluding the DISTANCE and AGE variables. Removing other variables 
such as bed number, percentage of nurse aids and bed to doctor ratio had very little effect 
upon the composition of the clusters. Of the two different algorithms used one defines clusters 
based upon the minimum distance between groups (BAV), and the other joins clusters so as 
to minimize the distance within groups (WAV). Although the hospitals in each cluster do not 
remain the same across all estimation techniques, there is considerable similarity between the 
clusters identified.
In most of the analyses Group 3 accounted for a large number of hospitals. The analysis 
which seemed to distinguish best between the various hospitals in Group 3 was that which 
minimized the within group average distance and omitted both the AGE and DISTANCE 
variables. Thus the grouping labelled WAV7 without AGE and DISTANCE was used for 
further analysis.
The groupings defined by WAV7 are also appealing as they reflect, to some degree, both 
hospital ownership and the dimensions defined under the principal component analysis. Two 
of the hospitals in Group 1 (Kwong Sui and Chongchin) are small non-profit hospitals. Group 
3 encompasses most of the stock exchange owned facilities in the sample (Samitivej, 
Ramkamhaeng, Wipawadi). The remaining stock exchange owned hospital (Krungthep) is 
alone in Group 7. The bigger non-profit hospitals such as Mission and St Louis also fall
140
under Group 3.
Table 6.10 gives the means by cluster for each of the key indicators.
Table 6.10 
Means of key variables by cluster
Variable CLUSTER
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anova
F-ratio
N 7 1 13 10 7 5 1
PERCPRI 15.9 31.2 63.2 20.9 21.3 39.9 48.0 5.47***
PERCSPEC 35.7 100 92.8 88.2 7.1 76.7 100 21.23***
BEDWDR 6.4 9.8 3.9 4.3 3.1 4.5 7.0 2.92**
PERFTDR 48.1 64.1 46.5 50.7 28.6 53.4 62.3 1.63
PERCAID 16.0 50.4 40.7 40.5 27.0 83.0 0.0 4.48’**
BEDWNUR 2.9 4.2 1.7 2.3 3.5 8.2 1.1 10.29’**
SUM­
EQUIP
0.0 0.0 1.23 0.7 0.0 0.0 4.0 17.62’**
BED_NO 31 750 215 76 14 28 450 34.45’**
DISTANCE 7.1 1.0 7.4 8.7 8.0 6.4 7.5 .650
AGE 13.1 14.0 11.7 9.7 9.1 6.0 18.0 .808
IPPRICE 16.1 46.3 126.8 57.4 58.1 74.3 151.9
Anova F-test with null hypothesis that means for clusters are equal. 
Key: *** significant at 1%  level, ** significant at 5% level
Group 1 consists of fairly small hospitals with few specialists and a fairly high ratio of beds 
to doctors. Few beds are in private rooms and high-technology equipment is non-existent.
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Limited use is made of nurse aides and bed to nurse ratios are lower than in some groups.
Group 2 consists of Huachiew hospital alone, which is a very large non-profit hospital.
Groups 3 and 7 contain the stock exchange owned hospitals plus the larger non-profit 
hospitals and some of the larger for-profit hospitals. Hospitals in these groups tend to be large, 
well equipped, with a high proportion of private rooms. Both bed to doctor and bed to nurse 
ratios are lower than in most other clusters.
Groups 4, 5 and 6 are entirely for-profit non-stock exchange owned hospitals. They tend to 
be smaller hospitals than those in the other groups. Group 6 identifies those hospitals with a 
high percentage of private beds and specialists but poor nursing profiles (previously identifed 
by principal component 3). Group 5 would appear to consist mainly of small polyclinics with 
very limited access to specialist physicians. Group 4 consists of mid-size hospitals which are 
not that different from those in Group 3 except with respect to the facilities available and the 
hotel features of the hospitals.
Clearly the groups defined by the cluster analysis are loose: slightly different estimation 
methods result in slightly different groupings. However all of the analyses suggest a similar 
pattern in terms of horizontal and vertical product differentiation amongst hospitals in 
Bangkok. At the top end of the market (Groups 3 and 7), vertical product differentiation is 
dominant: hospitals distinguish themselves from one another through investing in higher 
quality all round. At the lower end of the market however much more horizontal product 
differentiation occurs; some hospitals (such as those in Group 6) invest in hotel aspects of care 
whilst providing much more limited inputs into nursing, other veiy small hospitals have 
average doctor and nurse to bed ratios but a very limited number of specialists (such as those 
in Group 5).
The mean inpatient price index shown in the final row of Table 6.10 also supports this pattern 
of product differentiation. Whilst the higher quality hospitals in groups 3 and 7 clearly charge 
considerably more than hospitals in other groups, price differences between the other hospital 
groups are much less clear.
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6.5 THE VALUE PLACED UPON HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Which hospital characteristics do consumers value most?
In empirical work on product differentiation, hedonic price analysis has commonly been used 
to estimate the implicit values which buyers place upon different characteristics (see Chapter 
2 for a fuller discussion). This technique is used here to explore which hospital characteristics 
consumers value when selecting inpatient care. Estimates are based both upon the inpatient 
price index and item specific and diagnosis specific prices. Given the range of potential 
problems with hedonic price analysis (again see Chapter 2) the results presented here should 
be interpreted with caution and in the light of the fmdings of the consumer survey presented 
in the following chapter.
6.5.1 Estimations using the IP price index
Hedonic price equations were first estimated using the inpatient price index (IP_PRICE). The 
hedonic price equation is a reduced form equation (reflecting both supply and demand 
equations), as such the functional form is unclear. It would therefore be inappropriate to 
impose an a priori form on the data and many empirical studies have used the very general 
Box-Cox transformation12. However use of the unconstrained Box-Cox form has been 
criticized (Cassel and Mendelsohn 1985, Rasmussen and Zuelhke 1990). The main thrust of 
these criticisms is that the general Box-Cox form is complex and makes it difficult to 
interpret the coefficients, moreover use of the Box-Cox transformation increases the number 
of parameters in die model thus increasing the variance around each parameter. Given the 
small number of cases in our sample the second of these concerns is particularly relevant.
It was decided therefore to test for linearity in a more direct manner; linear and semi-log 
forms of the hedonic equation were first modelled and the residuals examined for evidence 
of non-linearity. In addition quadratic and log-linear forms were experimented with. The 
ordinary least squares method of estimation was used. As there is no a priori functional form 
the aim was to select the best-fitting equation.
Table 6.11 presents the results of the hedonic price regressions carried out. The sample size 
(N=31) is rather smaller than for the analysis of hospital characteristics as reliable price data
12 The Box-Cox transformation is said to be very general as it has all the principle forms 
(quadratic, log-linear, semi-log etc) nested within it.
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Table 6.11 
Hedonic Price Equations Nol
IPPRICE IPPRICE IPPRICE IPPRICE IPPRICE IPPRICE
(small
sample)
IPPRICE
(small
sample)
LOGPRIC
E
LOGPRIC
E
LOGPRIC
E
LOGPRIC
E(small
sample
DISTANCE -5.15*
(2.48)
-5.43***
(1.83)
-5.29***
(1.77)
-5.23***
(1.78)
-5.48***
(1.78)
-5.66***
(2.06)
-5.87***
(195)
-0.046
(0.028)
-0.057***
(0.020)
-0.060**’
(0.020)
-0.078***
(0.042)
AGE -0.35
(1.48)
- - - - - - 0.003
(0.017)
- - -
PERCPRI 23.61
(29.09)
25.86
(26.29)
28.61
(25.24)
31.89
(25.13)
- 28.46
(27.98)
- 0.203
(0.328)
0.288
(0.293)
- -
BEDWDR -14.34*
(7.14)
-9.94**
(4.46)
-9.01**
(3.95)
10.70***
(3.64)
11.16***
(3.66)
-9.86**
(4.60)
-9.69***
(3.81)
-0.191*’
(0.081)
-0.125***
(0.050)
-0.131’”
(0.049)
-0.136*"
(0.047)
PERSPEC 58.76
(36.67)
65.95*
(33.17)
62.29’
(31.73)
53.81*
(30.82)
61.66*
(30.55)
39.72
(39.56)
43.01
(33.74)
1.44*’*
(0.415)
1.50*”
(0.37)
1.60” *
(0.36)
1.42***
(0.39)
PERFTDR -39.81
(49.08)
-49.80
(45.80)
-47.14
(43.93)
- - -12.22
(49.50)
- -1.177**
(0.555)
-1.21”
(0.50)
-1.28’”
(0.496)
-0.92*
(0.51)
SUMEQUIP 29.97*’*
(10.15)
36.38*”
(9.53)
28.24***
(8.25)
27.94***
(8.27)
28.64***
(8.35)
33.70***
(9.88)
31.61’**
(8.47)
0.326***
(0.115)
0.346’**
(0.106)
0.384***
(0.105)
0.377” ’
(0.102)
BEDNO 0.063
(0.08)
- - - - - - 0.001
(0.001)
- - -
BEDWNUR 5.96
(5.66)
1.95
(4.10)
- - - 2.17
(4.10)
- 0.118’
(0.064)
0.067
(0.046)
0.076*
(0.045)
0.078*
(0.042)
PERCAID -38.63
(27.35)
- - - - - - -0.343
(0.309)
- - -
CONSTANT 122.40**’
(38.41)
103.38*’*
(32.90)
105.80***
(31.98)
95.83***
(30.70)
106.66***
(29.83)
104.22***
(34.39)
117.07***
(33.80)
4.20***
(0.43)
4.08***
(0.37)
4.17*”
(0.354)
4.20” *
(0.344)
ADJR2
F
SIG
N
0.48
3.78
0.006
31
0.49
5.13
0.0013
31
0.51
6.15
0.0005
31
0.50
7.10
0.0003
31
0.49
8.28
0.0002
31
0.49
4.63
0.0036
27
0.52
8.09
0.0004
27
0.60
5.54
0.0006
31
0.62
8.03
0.0001
31
0.62
9.2
0.0000
31
0.63
8.47
0.0001
27
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; *** significant at the 2% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
were not available for all hospitals. Initially all variables were entered into the equation, but 
it was clear that some variables, namely AGE, BED_NO and PERCAID (proportion of nurse 
aids) had no effect upon price in any of the regressions analysed. The core variables which 
consistently explained the largest percentage of variation in price were the ratio of doctors to 
beds (BEDWDR), the equipment profile of the hospital (SUMEQUIP) and the DISTANCE 
variable. The remaining variables (PERSPEC (percentage specialists), PERCPRI (percentage 
private beds), PERCFTMD (percentage full time doctors) and BEDWNUR (the nurse to bed 
ratio)) appeared to be of some importance but were not always significant.
The adjusted R2 of the equations is not particularly high, but is acceptable for cross-sectional 
data. F values were consistently significant. Multicollinearity between independent variables 
may result in unstable parameter estimates, low t values combined with high R2 and high F 
values. However as the results show, the parameters were fairly stable and always of the 
anticipated sign. It is inevitable that there is some degree of multicollinearity as there was 
some correlation between variables. However it does not appear to be a substantial problem. 
Higher order terms included in the regression equation were found to be insignificant. Log- 
linear forms also yielded poor results. Scatteiplots were made of the residuals against both 
predicted values and the independent variables: the residuals did not appear to increase or 
decrease with any of the variables suggesting that the assumption of homoscedasticity was not 
violated.
In order to check further the stability of the estimates four cases were removed from the 
analysis and the equations re-estimated (in Table 6.11 these estimates are marked as being 
based on a 'small sample*). The cases which were removed were those which had only a 
limited number of price observations, and thus where the inpatient price index used was of 
dubious reliability. As can be seen from the table, estimations based upon the remaining 
sample of 27 hospitals yielded similar results to those based on all 31.
On the basis of these initial estimations it appeared that the semi-log equations yielded slightly 
better results than the simple linear model, having a rather higher adjusted R2, whilst retaining 
significant variables.
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DISTANCE to the city centre was found to be a highly significant variable, yet its 
interpretation is difficult, particularly given the negative coefficient which suggests that the 
closer to the centre of town a facility is located, the higher the prices charged. Initially it was 
thought that people would be prepared to pay a premium for care which was located close to 
their homes and was easily accessible. As most people live in the suburbs one would expect 
DISTANCE to have a positive coefficient if this was the correct interpretation. It therefore 
seemed likely that the proxy of accessibility was measuring different underlying effects. There 
are three possible underlying effects. Firstly it has already been noted that several private 
hospitals locate close to existing university teaching hospitals partly in order to ensure 
adequate staffing, but perhaps more importantly because of the good reputation this confers. 
As all university teaching hospitals are located in the centre of town it is possible that the 
accessibility variable picked up this effect. Secondly, there could be a supply side effect; 
property in the centre of town is likely to cost more and hence prices may need to be higher 
in order to reflect this. Thirdly the distance variable could be proxying for a measure of 
competition. Those hospitals close to the centre are more likely to have several competitors 
close by. Competition is investigated separately in Chapter 8. In order to examine the 
relevance of the other two effects, DISTANCE was removed from the model and replaced by 
variables measuring (i) the potential reputation effect from locating close to a university 
teaching hospital and (ii) the potential cost effect from being located in the centre of the city. 
A dummy variable (PRESTIGE) was used to measure the potential reputation effect. Any 
hospital within a two kilometre radius of a university teaching hospital had a value of one 
awarded to the dummy variable. Hospitals outside of these areas had a value of zero awarded 
to the dummy. The cost effect arising from location was also modelled through a dummy 
variable (LOCATION) taking the value zero when a hospital was in the city centre and 1 
when it was outside of the centre. The results of these regressions are shown in table 6.12.
The dummy variable representing the reputation effect (PRESTIGE) was of the anticipated 
sign and significant at the two percent level13. Surprisingly the LOCATION variable was not 
found to be significant; location in the city centre does not automatically raise the price of 
care.
13 Decha hospital for which the price index was previously noted to be surprisingly high, is 
close to Ramathibodi teaching hospital and as such had a PRESTIGE value of 1. Decha 
increased the value of the coefficient on the PRESTIGE variable, but even if Decha was 
excluded from the analysis, then the variable was still significant and produced a better fit 
than the use of the access variable.
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In this new set of estimates three key variables emerged in addition to the PRESTIGE variable 
these were BEDWDR, PERSPECF and SUMEQUIP. Thus the profile of physician staffing 
appears to be a key factor affecting the total price of care at a facility. Indeed the prestige 
variable could be seen as also reflecting the reputation of a hospital's medical staff. Given the 
proxy nature of some of these variables it would seem inappropriate to interpret the 
coefficients strictly, however the coefficients are indicative of the relative importance of the 
effect of a particular characteristic on price. The equipment profile of a hospital also appears 
to be particularly influential in determining the price charged for inpatient care. Nursing 
profile and hotel aspects of care appear to have veiy little if any effect on total price. In the 
re-estimated equations the simple linear model is able to explain a considerably larger portion 
of the total variation in price than the semi-log models.
Table 6.12 
Hedonic Price Equations No 2
1
IPPRICE
2
IPPRICE
3
LOG(PRICE)
4
LOG(IPPRICE)
PRESTIGE 87.13*** 90.86*** 0.58* 0.83***
(22.51) (19.55) (0.33) (0.27)
LOCATION -5.08
(14.35)
- -0.19
(0.19)
-
BEDWDR -9.70*** -9.38*** -0.14*** -0.12***
(3.25) (3.06) (0.05) (0.04)
PERSPEC 54.56* 55.46** 1.41*** 1.23***
(26.84) (26.27) (0.37) (0.36)
SUMEQUIP 18.72*** 18.08*** 0.28*** 0.175*
(7.50) (7.13) (0.11) (0.099)
PERFTDR - - -0.79
(0.57)
-
BEDWNUR - - 0.07
(0.05)
-
CONSTANT 68.72*** 63.47*** 3.81*** 3.65***
(27.55) (22.84) (0.40) (0.316)
ADJR2 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.57
F 10.36 13.37 7.18 10.82
SIG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 31 31 31 31
Notes
standard errors in brackets
*** Significant at the 2% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level
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6.5.2 Estimations using diagnosis specific and item specific prices
How do the hospital characteristics which consumers value vary with different reasons for 
seeking care?
Hedonic price analysis was also carried out for diagnosis specific and item specific prices, as 
it was thought that the value placed upon different hospital characteristics may vary with the 
reason for seeking care. The remaining price measures (price of a normal delivery, price of 
care for acute appendicitis, and room charge for one night) were all in absolute Baht terms, 
and it was found that the semi-log model was preferable to the linear one. However for the 
price of care for acute appendicitis none of the regressions considered were satisfactory, they 
all yielded extremely low R2, insignificant coefficients on the variables and the value of the 
F statistic suggested that the regression as a whole was not significant.
The hedonic equations estimated for the price of a normal delivery and for room charge are 
shown in Table 6.13. In both cases a fairly substantial proportion of the variation in price is 
explained and the individual explanatory variables are highly significant. Because of the large 
number of potential variables which may affect price and the small number of observations 
(particularly in the case of normal delivery) stepwise regression was used to select the most 
significant variables.
The most important factor affecting the price of normal delivery appeared to be various 
measures of physicians' inputs. Both the percentage of specialists out of total physicians 
(PERSPEC) and the ratio of beds to doctors (BEDWDR) were highly significant and of the 
expected sign. Indicators of the facilities available at the hospital (BED_NO and SUMEQUIP) 
were not as significant as in the regression on the IP price index, but bed number was nearly 
significant at the 5% level.
For room charge a completely different pattern emerged. The most important variable 
affecting room price was the equipment profile (SUMEQUIP), followed by the percentage of 
beds in private rooms (PERCPRI). Also found to be significant were the bed to nurse ratio 
(BEDWNUR) and the DISTANCE variable. These are exactly the factors which one would 
expect to affect the cost of a room or bed at a hospital. The nature of the effect of location 
on room charge was explored further by replacing the ACCESS variable with PRESTIGE and 
LOCATION, as described above. In contrast to the results for the hedonic price regression on
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the IP_PRICE variable, PRESTIGE was not found to be significant, whereas LOCATION was. 
Again this may reflect the underlying costs of providing the service; hospitals located in inner 
city areas have higher capital costs due to the higher price of land, which may in turn be 
passed on through the price of the room.
Table 6.13 
Hedonic Price Regressions No 3 
Price of Normal Delivery and Room Charge as dependent variables
(1)
LNDEL
(2)
LNROOM
(3)
LNROOM
(4)
LNROOM
PERSPECF 2.204**
(0.929)
BEDWDR -0.371***
(0.117)
BED_NO 0.003*
(0.001)
SUMEQUIP 0.270***
(0.067)
0.254***
(0.065)
0.251***
(0.063)
PERCPRI 0.652***
(0.187)
0.658***
(0.187)
0.651***
(0.182)
BEDWNUR -0.065***
(0.024)
-0.065***
(0.024)
-0.064***
(0.024)
DISTANCE -0.031**
(0.015)
PRESTIGE
LOCATION
-0.052
(0.200)
-0.269**
(0.118)
-0.256’*
(0.104)
CONSTANT 8.61***
(0.95)
5.977***
(0.164)
5.94***
(0.153)
5.93***
(0.146)
AdjR2
F
Sig
0.644
10.66
0.0008
0.673
16.98
0.0000
0.679
14.13
0.0000
0.690
18.28
0.0000
N 17 33 33 33
Notes
standard errors in brackets 
*** Significant at the 2% level 
Significant at the 5%  level 
Significant at the 10% level.
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It is interesting that a stable hedonic price relationship emerges for a normal delivery but not 
for acute appendicitis. A normal delivery constitutes elective care; the patient has adequate 
time to search between hospitals and choose one which best suits her preferences. In contrast 
many people are likely to see acute appendicitis as an emergency, and to seek care at a local 
hospital. For acute appendicitis there is certainly very limited time to carry out any search 
activities. This difference may filter through to hospital price setting strategies; prices for a 
normal delivery reflect underlying aspects of the service provided whereas for acute 
appendicitis the price which hospitals charge reflects less the underlying characteristics of the 
service offered.
6.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has mapped the characteristics of private hospitals in Bangkok, examined the 
form and extent of product differentiation amongst private hospitals and used hedonic price 
analysis to examine which hospital characteristics are most sought by consumers.
The results of the private hospital census confirm that a high degree of heterogeneity exists 
in the hospital market in Bangkok. In particular hospitals differ with respect to their bed 
number, their possession of high technology equipment and the proportion of doctors 
employed who have specialist qualifications. There was some significant correlation between 
different hospital characteristics suggesting the presence of vertical product differentiation; 
larger hospitals tend to have better staffing, a high proportion of specialists, more high 
technology equipment and a higher proportion of beds in private rooms. The principal 
component analysis confimed the presence of vertical product differentiation but indicated that 
horizontal product differentiation accounted for a greater proportion of variation in the 
variables. In particular there were significant differences in the characteristics of hospitals 
clustered at the lower end of the market. For example several hospitals appeared to have a 
high proportion of private rooms and specialists, but very limited nursing inputs compared to 
other hospitals.
In terms of the value placed by consumers upon hospital characteristics, the key variables 
affecting the total price per case were found to be bed:doctor ratios, the percentage of doctors 
who were specialists and the high technology equipment profile of the hospital. In addition 
the distance from the hospital to the city centre was found to be important. Two potential 
explanations for this were suggested: hospitals which were centrally located are more likely 
to have higher land costs which could be passed on in the form of higher prices, or
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alternatively some hospitals may benefit from a prestige effect generated by locating close to 
university teaching hospitals. Further analysis suggested that the latter reason was the principal 
explanation for variations in price per case.
Hedonic price analysis was also used to explain variation in charge per case measures for 
selected diagnoses and for room charge. Of the two diagnoses considered only that for normal 
delivery yielded a significant regression equation. This may suggest that the market for normal 
delivery works more efficiently than that for acute appendicitis (the other inpatient diagnosis 
examined) where consumers probably suffer from greater problems of asymmetric information. 
For room charge a very different set of variables were found to affect price, these were the 
percentage of private rooms, bed to nurse ratios and whether the hospital was centrally located 
or not. It is most probable that these variables reflect the underlying cost of hospital beds.
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CHAPTER 7
CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOUR IN BANGKOK
7.0 INTRODUCTION
After briefly reviewing the basic characteristics of the respondents to the consumer survey, 
this chapter is structured around five of the objectives identified in Chapter 5. The chapter: -
- further explores the hospital characteristics which consumers value and how this 
varies with reason for seeking care (objective iii);
- examines how well informed consumers in Bangkok are about the hospital services 
market (objective iv);
- considers how 'consumerist' people in Bangkok are with respect to hospital care and 
describes the type of search behaviour they engage in (objectives v and vi);
- investigates how consumers' knowledge about the hospital care market affects their 
utilization pattern (objective vii).
The consumer survey also revealed interesting information about hospital product 
differentiation and marketing strategies; these issues are discussed in section 7.6.
7.1 PROFILE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS
The respondents were fairly equally divided between the four different types of work place, 
with 29.3% working for government, 24.3% in state enterprises, 21.4% in non-governmental 
organizations and 24.9% in the private for-profit sector (see Appendix 9). The majority 
(67.7%) of respondents were women. To some extent this reflects the composition of 
Bangkok office workers, particularly in the public sector.
Respondents were markedly more educated than the population as a whole. 67.6% had a first 
degree or higher1 and 25% had a vocational qualification leaving just 7.4% with only school 
level education. Average age of respondents was 35 years.
Respondents were asked to indicate their own personal income rather than to make estimates 
of household income. A relatively normal distribution of responses was found, see Table 7.1, 
with modal income in the range B6,000-9,999 per month. The latest household socio­
economic survey for which data are available indicates that the mean income per earner, in
1 For comparison it is estimated that in the country as a whole 1987 higher education 
enrolment rates were about 12% (Tan 1991).
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Greater Bangkok, working in a professional, technical or administrative post in 1988 was 
approximately 8,700 Baht per month (NSO 1990). Inflation has been low in Thailand and 
mean income is normally considerably higher than modal. Hence the income distribution 
amongst respondents is probably fairly typical of the professional and administrative classes 
in Bangkok.
Table 7.1
Frequency of respondents by monthly income
Income in Baht N %
< 3,000 14 1.2
3,000 - 5,999 200 17.1
6,000 - 9,999 379 32.4
10,000 - 14,999 304 26.0
15,000 - 24,999 203 17.3
25,000 - 34,999 48 4.1
35,000 - 44,999 11 0.9
>= 45,000 12 1.0
TOTAL 
(missing = 42)
1171 100.0
It was thought that there was likely to be significant correlation between some of the personal 
characteristics of respondents; particularly income, education, sex and age. Estimation of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient indeed demonstrated that this was the case (see Appendix 10). 
There was a strong positive correlation between age and income, and education and income 
were also found to be associated. Women tended to earn less than men and were on the whole 
younger2, however the pattern varied somewhat between public and private sector employees. 
In the private sector, education had a stronger impact on income and age a weaker one than 
in the public sector. Furthermore women in the private sector were significantly better 
educated than men and did not earn significantly less, nor were they significantly younger.
2 Regression analysis indicated that sex probably had an effect on income independent 
of age.
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96.3% of respondents said that they had some form of health insurance or medical benefit. 
However as Table 7.2 shows the pattern of insurance coverage emerging is quite a complex 
one.
Several respondents had more than one form of insurance, including types of insurance which 
one would not have expected them to have given their employment status. This can be 
explained in a number of ways:-
Public sector employees may be covered by their spouse's employer based 
scheme, similarly private sector employees may be covered by their spouse's 
or parents' civil service medical benefit;
A surprisingly large number of NGO employees are covered by Social 
Security (SS) despite the fact that this is not compulsory;
Employees in the private sector who are not covered by Social Security could 
be newly hired or part time;
Many employers, particularly the more prestigious ones, continue to operate 
employer based medical schemes in addition to social security. Since this 
study was implemented a further survey has confirmed this finding. 
Panichpathompong (1994) found that the majority of bank employees had 
employer based insurance schemes in addition to their Social Security 
coverage and that less than 10% of outpatient attendances took place at their 
registered social security facility .
In a self administered survey questionnaire such as this, it is possible that 
respondents made mistakes in identifying their insurance status. However 
given the highly educated profile of respondents this effect is unlikely to be 
substantial.
The responses suggest a considerable complexity in health insurance coverage amongst the 
sample. This is particularly the case for private sector employees. Whilst public sector 
employees tend to rely upon the Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme, private sector 
employees have a wider range of insurance. Indeed 64.2% of private sector employees were 
covered by at least two forms of health insurance. This multiplicity of insurance cover 
amongst private employees reduces the probability that they use exclusively the hospital they 
are registered with under the SS Scheme.
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Table 7.2
Number of respondents with different types of insurance by type of employment
TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Insurance
Scheme
Govt empees Parastatal empees NGO employees For-profit employees Whole Sample
N % N % N % N % N %
SSS 10 2.9 9 3.1 151 62.9 271 95.1 441 38.1
CSMBS 328 96.5 285 97.6 26 10.8 7 2.5 646 55.8
Private 32 9.4 26 8.9 76 31.7 78 27.4 212 18.3
Employer 3 2.9 35 12.0 154 64.2 171 60.4 363 31.4
Other 0 0 2 0.7 1 0.4 1 0.4 4 0.3
Total N 340 292 240 285 1157
Missing 16 3 20 17 56
The majority of the sample (68.6%) described themselves as being 'quite healthy', 16.8% said 
they were 'very healthy', 13.2% not very healthy and only 1.4% 'not healthy at all*. Despite 
the relatively high degree of self-perceived healthiness', utilization of health facilities was 
quite high. The mean number of total outpatient visits during the past year was 4.66 although 
this was obviously skewed upwards by the minority with chronic complaints who attended 
regularly. The median number of visits was 3. These visits were relatively evenly spread 
between public hospitals, private hospitals and private clinics. There was no significant 
difference in the number of outpatient visits by different types of employment status.
Just 8.4% of the sample had been admitted to hospital during the previous year. Over two- 
thirds of these admissions had been to private hospitals. Mean length of stay was 9.61 days 
and median length 5 days, however there were significant differences in length of stay 
between private hospital admissions (mean 5.69 days, median 4 days) and public hospital 
admissions (mean 18.34 days, median 10 days) (t value = 2.10 two-tailed, separate variance 
estimate, significance 0.04). Similar differences between lengths of stay in public and private 
hospitals have been found in other studies (Pannurunothai 1993), although the average self- 
reported lengths of stay given in this survey are rather longer than that previously found. 
There was a significantly greater number of admissions amongst those respondents employed 
in the parastatal sector and the not-for-profit sector than amongst civil servants and for-profit 
employees (Pearson chi-square 8.989, significance 0.029). This is difficult to explain on the 
basis of insurance cover alone, and there were no other obvious differences between the 
different employment categories (such as age or sex). Those with private health insurance had 
a slightly higher number of total health care visits and were slightly more likely to be 
admitted to hospital, but this was not significant.
Women were more likely to be admitted to hospital than men; 74% of those admitted to 
hospital were women whereas only 67.7% of the sample as whole were women. Women also 
had a higher mean number of outpatient visits, 5.03 compared to 3.89 amongst men (t value 
= 2.68, two tailed with separate variance estimate, significance = 0.008). Given the mean age 
of the sample these differences could be at least partially due to maternity care.
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7.2 HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS SOUGHT
Which hospital characteristics do consumers value most and how does this vary between 
different types of reasons for seeking health care?
Table 7.3 shows the scores the respondents gave to each of the hospital characteristics in three 
different scenarios, which were (i) a cut finger (ii) an appendicitis operation and (iii) a normal 
delivery. A characteristic was scored ’l 1 if extremely important down to '5' for not 
important at all, thus low scores imply a high degree of importance.
Table 7.3
Mean scores for characteristics of health care sought for three different conditions
Characteristic Cut Finger Appendicitis Delivery
Ease of access 1.41 (1) 1.23 (1) 1.29 (3)
Comfortable surroundings 2.46 2.11 1.76
Dr who clearly explains 
treatment
2.08 1.66 (5) 1.44 (4)
Skilled doctor 2.00 (4) 1.30 (2) 118(1)
Sympathetic and polite 
nursing
2.05 (5) 1.96 1.79
Inexpensive care 2.16 2.16 2.17
Prompt service 1.65 (2) 1.51 (4) 1.51 (5)
A contact (ie patient knows 
someone who works at the 
hospital)
3.54 3.18 3.05
Modem equipment 1.83 (3) 1.34 (3) 1.23 (2)
N 1112 1116 770
Note: The number in brackets represents the ranking of the most important reasons given.
In general the variables which were rated highly were accessibility, skilled doctors, prompt 
service and modem equipment. However respondents clearly differentiated between the 
different scenarios. Scores significantly differed across scenarios for all characteristics except 
the price of the service (see Appendix 11). For a relatively minor complaint such as a cut
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finger, access followed by promptness were the main characteristics valued. For an 
appendicitis, easy access was still considered the most important factor, but skilled doctors 
became more important, presumably because of the greater complexity of the condition. For 
a delivery less emphasis was placed upon ease of access and more on clinical quality of care 
as reflected in doctors skills and the standard of equipment. Although equipment was never 
the most critical factor it was highly valued in all three scenarios.
When respondents were asked to identify the hospital which they would actually choose to 
use if suffering from a cut finger, an acute appendicitis, or if they were expecting to deliver 
a baby then their responses changed a little, as shown in Table 7.4. In this analysis if a 
characteristic was the most important reason given then it was awarded 3 points, the second 
most important reason was awarded 2 points and the third reason given, one point. In table 
7.4 high scores represent highly valued characteristics; if all respondents selected a 
particular characteristic as their primary reason for selecting a certain hospital then this 
characteristic would have a mean of 3.
The factors which were previously considered high priority (namely access, skilled doctors, 
equipment and promptness) were still thought to be important. However price became a rather 
more important consideration when real decisions had to be made. This is true for all 
insurance groups. Presumably this implies that amongst those covered by the CSMBS or the 
State Enterprise Medical Benefit Scheme, co-payment levels are sufficiently high to induce 
some degree of price sensitivity.
This section of the questionnaire also provided a space for respondents to add their own 
reasons why they chose a particular hospital. Few respondents made use of this space, but of 
those who did there were only two responses: the first said that the patient was registered at 
this hospital under the SS scheme and the second that this was their 'regular' hospital. 
However surprisingly few respondents listed these reasons.
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Table 7.4 
Scores for characteristics:
Based on the three most important reasons for choosing a particular hospital
Characteristic Finger Appendicitis Delivery
Ease of access 2.52 (1) 2.09 (1) 1.47 (2)
Comfortable surroundings 0.25 0.19 0.32 (5)
Dr who clearly explains 
treatment
0.29 0.24 0.37
Skilled doctor 0.88 (2) 1.59 (2) 1.91(1)
Sympathetic and polite 
nursing
0.32 0.17 0.24
Inexpensive care 0.46 (4) 0.35 (5) 0.37 (4)
Prompt service 0.72 (3) 0.46 (4) 0.29
A contact (ie patient 
knows someone who 
works at the hospital)
0.08 0.16 0.23
Modem equipment 0.34 (5) 0.65 (3) 0.74 (3)
SS registered hospital 0.02 0.05 0.05
Regular patient at this 
hospital
0.01 0.01 0.01
NOTE: The number in brackets represents the ranking of the most important reasons given for choosing 
a particular hospital.
7.3 Knowledge of hospitals
How well informed are consumers in Bangkok about the hospital services market and in 
particular the prices and characteristics of different providers?
In order to make informed decisions consumers must be aware of the possible options they 
have in seeking health care. There was an extremely high rate of recognition of the hospitals 
listed in the second section of the questionnaire (see Table 7.5). Most people had heard of 
most of the named hospitals. There was also a fairly high use rate particularly for the public 
hospitals and Phyathai private hospital. Excluding the small public hospital Klang, 25-40% 
of the respondents said they had used each of the named public hospitals on at least one 
occasion. There was wide variation in utilization patterns, whilst 17.5% of the respondents
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had not used any of the listed hospitals, nearly 10% of the sample had used five or more of 
the hospitals listed.
Table 7.5
Respondents' experience with selected hospitals in Bangkok
Heard of Used Family/friend used
Hospital N % N % N %
Phyathai 1157 99.2 284 25.8 817 74.5
Phra Mongkut 1146 98.5 318 28.5 687 63.8
Chula 1147 98.9 349 31.2 795 73.4
Bangkok Christian 1110 91.5 130 11.7 485 45.0
Krunghdon 1010 87.1 68 6.2 386 36.0
Camillian 791 68.5 62 5.6 206 19.1
Central/Klang 1114 95.6 143 13.0 485 45.1
Samitivej 1119 96.6 66 6.0 46 42.8
Kluay Namthai 1124 97.1 86 7.8 338 31.5
Ramkamhaeng 996 86.1 87 7.9 406 37.7
Huachiew 1150 98.8 143 13.0 603 55.7
Rama 1145 98.7 428 38.5 796 73.7
Bamroongrad 1120 92.3 107 9.8 492 45.7
Thonburi 1012 87.7 91 8.4 453 41.9
Rajavithi 1145 98.5 272 24.7 704 65.1
Respondents' knowledge about the hospitals in the market was examined by asking them to 
identify the most expensive, the cheapest, the most and least comfortable, the best equipped 
and the best staffed hospitals from the list. Table 7.6 summarizes the responses across 
hospitals for each question. Samitivej was the most popular choice for most expensive 
hospital, followed by Bamroongrad and Phyathai. This closely reflects the actual ranking in 
terms of price. Thus more than 85% of the respondents were able to identify one of the three 
most expensive hospitals. Respondents were less certain about which private hospital was the
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cheapest; some were unsure which were public and which were private hospitals. Nonetheless 
Huachiew which is the 'correct* answer was nominated the most times. When asked which 
hospitals had the best doctors there was a clear vote towards the university teaching hospitals, 
the two university hospitals cornered 57.4% of the vote between them. Of the private hospitals 
Samitivej and Phyathai came out best.
Table 7.6
Percentage of respondents identifying a particular hospital for each of the questions
Hospital Expens­
ive
Cheap Best
Drs
Comfort
-able
Uncom­
fortable
Best
Equip­
ped
Phyathai 11.8 8.4 10.6 24.9 0.7 13.3
Phra Mongkut 0.3 3.6 4.2 2.4 7.1 4.5
Chula 0.0 5.5 29.3 7.7 7.0 22.4
Bangkok Christian 5.0 6.4 1.3 2.2 2.1 1.5
Krunghdon 0.0 6.1 0.0 0.7 3.2 0.0
Camillian 2.5 4.7 0.1 2.5 0.5 0.4
Central/Klang 0.1 3.6 0.2 0.3 35.0 0.3
Samitivej 59.3 1.3 15.7 32.6 0.6 22.3
Kluay Namthai 0.5 10.5 0.0 0.9 6.3 0.9
Ramkamhaeng 2.1 5.2 0.3 5.4 1.2 0.0
Huachiew 1.5 25.8 0.8 2.0 3.2 1.3
Rama 0.2 3.1 28.1 3.8 8.1 21.6
Bamroongrad 14.9 3.1 5.8 11.1 1.4 9.5
Thonburi 1.7 6.6 2.3 2.0 4.8 0.8
Rajavithi 0.0 6.2 1.3 1.6 18.9 1.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 1039 850 983 966 855 957
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In terms of comfort the scores were highest for the trio of private hospitals which were also 
the most expensive; this is also likely to be correct. Again confusion is evident when 
respondents were asked about the most uncomfortable hospital as is apparent from the high 
non-response rate to this question. The public hospitals gained the majority of the votes; Klang 
with the highest, then Rajavithi, then Ramathibodi. Finally in terms of the best equipped 
hospitals Ramathibodi (UTH), Chulalongkom (UTH) and Samitivej all received roughly the 
same votes. Bamroongrad which was perceived as expensive did not do very well in terms 
of consumer perception of availability of equipment or comfort of surroundings.
It is clear from these answers that respondents have considerable knowledge about the 
characteristics of different hospitals and there is a surprising degree of consensus about the 
attributes of different hospitals. Moreover the respondents were able to discriminate between 
different characteristics of care. Whilst the university teaching hospitals were perceived to 
have very good staff and reasonable equipment they did quite badly in terms of comfort. 
Samitivej is seen to be good all round but to be prohibitively expensive. Respondents were 
relatively well informed about the top of the market but were far less sure at the lower end 
of the market; which are the cheapest hospitals, which are the most uncomfortable? This may 
reflect the relatively high socio-economic profile of the respondents. It is likely that people 
gather information more about the hospitals which they would like to use rather than those 
which are generally perceived as not being very good.
7.4 CONSUMERIST BEHAVIOUR
How consumerist are people in Bangkok with respect to the health care market?
Respondents were asked questions concerning different types of consumerist behaviour 
including :-
- Information seeking behaviour; attention paid to advertisements, advice sought from 
friends and relatives, tendency to seek information on price;
- Quality and price sensitivity; willingness to change provider due to changes in price 
and quality, inclination to complain about low quality care or high prices;
- Independence from medical advice in decision making; willingness to seek a second 
opinion.
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7.4.1 Advertising
Nearly one third of the respondents said that they had heard or seen an advertisement for a 
private hospital within the past one month. Many of those hospitals with recent heavy 
advertising campaigns were relatively new hospitals (Pharam 9, Ladphrao, Theptarin, Chao 
Phrya) which were presumably still fighting for market share. However some of the relatively 
well-established hospitals also had surprisingly active advertising campaigns this is particularly 
the case for Phyathai, Kluay Namthai, and Bamroongrad. It is unclear from this survey 
whether these three hospitals happened to have advertising campaigns which coincided with 
the survey or whether they constantly maintain high levels of advertising. It was also 
interesting to note that some of the non-profit hospitals (including Bangkok Christian, Mission, 
Huachiew and St Louis) had recently issued advertising material.
The key test of advertising is not so much recall, but rather the extent to which it shapes 
perceptions of different hospitals and ultimately utilization. Interestingly advertisements, as 
recalled by the respondents, did not appear to differentiate clearly one hospital from another, 
except with reference to special services delivered. For example one might expect a hospital 
such as Kluay Namthai to promote itself on the basis say of prompt service and reasonable 
price, whereas Phyathai may try to raise public awareness of its access to specialist skills and 
high technology equipment. However from the rather limited data available this does not 
appear to be the case. Samitivej, one of the most expensive hospitals in Bangkok was focusing 
advertisements on promptness of service.
The three attributes mentioned in advertising and most commonly recalled by respondents 
closely match those which were in general most valued; promptness, specialist physicians and 
equipment. Unfortunately because the characteristics mentioned by different hospitals in the 
advertising campaigns were all so similar it was difficult to discern the impact of the 
campaigns on consumer perceptions of different providers. Moreover the survey form asked 
only about recent advertising and thus takes a snapshot rather than looking back at previous 
campaigns which may have influenced consumer choice. It is clear however that advertising 
may have very little impact on consumer perceptions. Take for example Kluay Namthai whose 
advertising campaign several respondents recalled; the campaign focused principally on the 
specialists working at Kluay Namthai and the modem equipment available. However in part 
2 of the questionnaire not one respondent had suggested that Kluay Namthai had the best 
doctors of the listed facilities, and only nine thought that it had good equipment.
163
With a questionnaire of this type it is only possible to examine the impact of advertising on 
perceptions and utilization in a simplistic manner. Table 7.7 shows for a select number of 
hospitals the proportion of respondents who chose to use the hospital for treatment of a cut 
finger or an inflamed appendicitis3 in the first section of the questionnaire, categorised by 
whether or not they recalled an advertisement for that hospital. Advertising had no apparent 
direct effect on utilization of Phyathai, Kluay Namthai or Bamroongrad; proposed utilization 
rates did not differ between those who did and those who did not recall the advertisements. 
Those respondents who recalled advertisements for Pharam 9 and Ladphrao appear more likely 
to use these hospitals, however this could be due to the fact that many respondents who 
recalled advertisements for these hospitals lived close to them.
Table 7.7
Proposed utilization of hospitals by those recalling and not recalling advertisements
Recalled advertisement Did not recall
Hospital Total
N
Will 
use N
Will 
use %
Total
N
Will 
use N
Will 
use %
Chi
Sq
sign.
Pharam 9 62 3 4.8% 966 9 0.9% 7.71 0.006
Phyathai 35 2 5.7% 993 58 5.8% 0.00 0.975
Kluay
Namthai
28 1 3.6% 1000 18 0.1%
0.471
0.47 0.492
BMG 22 0 0.0% 1006 29 0.1% 0.65 0.419
Ladphrao 25 1 16.0% 1003 22 1.8% 18.86 0.000
NOTE: Chi square with Yates correction was used but due to the small expected number in some cells tests were 
also run with Fisher's exact test. Fisher’s exact test confirmed the significance of differences in proposed utilization 
rates for Pharam 9 and Ladphrao hospitals.
7.4.2 Advice from friends and relatives
About 75% of respondents said that they had sought advice about which hospital to go to 
from a friend, relative or health care professional on at least one occasion. A small minority 
of the group (6.2%) sought advice regularly, but the majority (48.7%) had sought advice just 
once.
3 The question regarding a normal delivery was excluded from this analysis as only women 
were asked to respond to this question.
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Table 7.8 shows whom respondents had sought advice from. Colleagues and friends were the 
most common source of advice about which hospitals to use but it was also common to 
consult parents and other relatives. Although about one quarter of those who had sought 
advice had asked a doctor, doctors were nonetheless relatively insignificant in influencing 
patterns of hospitals usage compared to friends and relatives.
Table 7.8
People from whom advice was sought
Source of Advice Number seeking 
advice
% who had 
sought advice 
from this source
Parent 211 23.3
Brother 100 11.0
Sister 185 20.4
Son or daughter 26 2.9
Other relative 316 34.8
Colleague or friend 747 82.4
Doctor 239 26.4
Other health personnel 44 4.9
Total N 907
NOTE: the percentage column sums to more than 100% as respondents sought advice from more than one source.
7.4.3 Price seeking behaviour
The evidence relating to price presented in section 7.2 was mixed: it appeared that although 
price was not the prime factor in decision making about health care it did play some role. 
Further evidence was sought on this issue by asking respondents whether they specifically ask 
to see the price list or enquire about the price of a service before being treated. The question 
was asked separately for public and private hospitals and an extra question was posed asking 
whether hospitals themselves informed patients (so that patients would not need to ask). As 
Table 7.9 shows about one third of respondents said that if they sought care in a private 
hospital they would ask the price before being treated. A further 92 respondents claimed that 
the private hospital would inform them of the price before treatment.
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Table 7.9
Price seeking behaviour in public and private hospitals
Public hospitals Private hospitals
N % N %
Ask price 156 13.4 380 33.6
Don't ask 1009 86.6 751 66.4
Missing (48) (82)
Respondents, for understandable reasons, were considerably more likely to ask the price in the 
private than in the public sector (McNemar test for two related samples, Chi sq = 175.28, 
probability = 0.000). Both public and private hospitals are statutorily required to display a 
price list. Most public hospitals do this. The practice is less commonly observed amongst 
private hospitals, but even if it is, it may be difficult for patients to estimate what the total bill 
will be unless they ask.
Insurance coverage is likely to affect consumer sensitivity to price, but no significant 
difference in the proportion of respondents asking for price was found between respondents 
in different types of employment with different insurance schemes. However as already 
discussed, public sector employees are likely to incur significant co-payment in the private 
sector and as SS workers tend to use hospitals where they are not registered, they may bear 
the full price of care. More tellingly no significant difference was found in price seeking 
behaviour between those with private health insurance or employer provided insurance and 
those without either of these types of insurance (Chi sq = 1.026, probability = 0.311). There 
appears to be a general disinclination to ask the price of a service which cannot be explained 
by insurance coverage.
7.4.4 Price and quality sensitivity
Just over 50% of respondents said that they had a hospital which they used on a regular basis. 
Further analysis showed that 54.4% of these regular hospitals were privately owned, 44% were 
publicly owned, and the remaining 1.5% were small private clinics rather than hospitals. The 
most popular 'regular' hospitals were Phyathai (private) and Ramathibodi (public UTH). Others 
in the 'top ten' were Chulalongkom, Rajavithi, PhraMongkut, Siriraj, Krungthep, Thonburi, 
Bamroongrad and Ramkamhaeng (in descending order of popularity).
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We were interested in how strong an allegiance people had to a particular hospital. To test this 
three scenarios were suggested and people were asked whether they would change hospitals 
under these conditions. The three scenarios were (i) a 50% price increase (ii) a change of 
doctors (iii) if the respondent were to move away from the hospital.
Table 7.10
Allegiance to regular hospital in face of three changes
50% Price increase 
N %
Change of doctor 
N %
Moved away 
N %
Keep using 243 40.9 278 46.4 184 31.0
Change hospital 119 20.0 123 20.5 274 46.1
It depends 232 39.1 198 33.1 136 22.9
Total 594 100.0 599 100.0 594 100.0
Table 7.10 reveals a relatively strong allegiance to the respondents' regular hospital. Only 20% 
would definitely change hospital if the price went up by 50% or if there was a change in 
doctors. Respondents were rather more sensitive to accessibility. Nearly half would change 
their regular hospital if they were to move away from the locality.
Table 7.10 hides quite distinct differences between those whose regular hospital is under 
private ownership and those who use public hospitals (see table 7.11). Allegiance to public 
hospitals is considerably higher in all three of the scenarios given. People seem to act in a 
rather more consumerist fashion if they seek care in the private sector: respondents who use 
a private hospital were particularly likely to change hospital if there was a price increase or 
if they moved. This is probably due to the generally higher prices in private sector and the 
fact that accessibility is a common reason for using a private hospital. In contrast, in the 
public sector the price is low (and therefore people are relatively insensitive to price changes) 
and as most public hospitals are in the centre, people are probably already travelling in order 
to use them.
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Table 7.11
Allegiance to regular hospital by ownership of hospital (in %)
50% price increase 
Private Public
Change of doctor 
Private Public
Moved away 
Private Public
Keep using 26.5 58.9 41.2 52.7 21.1 43.8
Change hospital 31.2 6.2 26.1 14 56.8 33.2
It depends 42.3 34.9 32.7 33.3 22.1 23
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 317 258 317 258 317 258
Pearson chi square 80.53 13.57 41.31
significance 0.000 0.001 0.000
7.4.5 Dissatisfaction with hospital services
Nearly 50% of respondents said that they had on at least one occasion been very dissatisfied 
with the service which they had received at a hospital. The majority of these complaints (68%) 
related to public hospitals. To some degree the pattern of dissatisfaction by hospital reflects 
utilization patterns; those hospitals which were used more commonly tended to have a larger 
number of complaints about them. Appendix 12 takes a selection of the most commonly used 
hospitals in Bangkok and compares the percentage of complaints received by a hospital with 
the percentage of proposed utilizations in part 1 of the questionnaire. The final column of the 
table shows the ratio of complaints to predicted utilization. If the ratio is greater than one this 
implies that there are more complaints than average given the utilization fate.
In general respondents were disproportionately dissatisfied with care received at public 
hospitals. However there were some exceptions to this; amongst private hospitals Kluay 
Namthai, Paolo Memorial and Samitivej received rather more complaints than one would 
expect. Of the public hospitals, Central/Klang and the three university teaching hospitals 
received an exceptionally high level of complaints.
Even if respondents were unhappy with the service received they were on the whole reluctant 
to do much about it. More than 30% of dissatisfied respondents simply accepted the poor 
quality of service and did nothing. The next most common option was to resolve not to use 
the facility again. Of those who had made such a resolution, about 17% had actually returned
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to the facility. Table 7.12 summarizes the actions taken by dissatisfied respondents.
Table 7.12
Actions taken by respondents when dissatisfied with care4
Public Hospital Private hospital All hospitals
N % N % N %
Accept and do nothing 112 33.33 36 23.22 172 30.44
Resolve not to use again 114 33.92 43 27.74 187 33.10
Make a complaint 27 8.04 31 20 64 11.33
Change hospital immediately 27 8.04 19 12.26 51 9.02
Resolve not to use again and 
change hospital immediately
31 9.23 10 6.45 47 8.32
Complain and resolve not to 
use again
16 4.76 7 4.52 25 4.42
Other combination of actions 9 2.68 9 5.81 19 3.36
TOTAL 336 100.00 155 100.00 565 100.00
Missing 9 6 13
Again there is a noticeable difference between attitudes to public and private hospitals. People 
are far more willing to complain at private than public hospitals; only about 14% of those who 
were dissatisfied with service in a public hospital complained versus about 25% in private 
hospitals. There are a number of possible explanations for this including:
i. Consumers' tendency to complain about a problem may depend on the nature of the 
problem. As problems differ between public and private hospitals so does the 
tendency to complain.
ii. People are more willing to behave in a 'consumerist' fashion in private hospitals as 
they view the transaction more like a normal market transaction.
iii. People are less likely to complain in a public hospital as they feel it to be a futile 
activity, unlikely to lead to improvements in quality of care or any form of
4 The first two columns (public and private hospitals) do not sum to the final column (all 
hospitals) as several respondents made a complaint but did not specify which hospital they 
were complaining about, thus hospital ownership is unknown.
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compensation.
In order to test the applicability of the first of these explanations respondents' tendency to 
complain was examined by the nature of the problem (see Table 7.13). Although not all the 
results are statistically significant, respondents seemed more likely to complain in the private 
sector than in the public, for each of the problems identified with the exception of doctors' 
skills. Thus explanations (ii) and (iii) would appear to be more relevant.
Table 7.13
Tendency to complain by nature of problem
Manner 
Priv Public
Promptness 
Priv Public
Dr Skills 
Priv Public
Poor Man- 
gement
Priv Public
Overall
Priv Public
Complain N 10 24 13 9 4 3 6 5 38 43
% 26 18 37 9 18 21 32 16 25 13
Total N 38 137 35 98 22 14 19 32 155 341
Chi Sq with 
Yates correct.
1.47 14.61 0.058 1.789 11.05
Significance Not signif sig at 0.001 Not signif Not signif sig at 0.001
Overall % 19.4 16.5 19.4 21.6 16.33
7.4.6 Consumer reactions to high fees
Respondents were also asked whether they felt that they had ever been charged too much for 
a service. Only 28.3% of respondents (N=328) said that they had been over-charged and the 
vast majority of these complaints related to the private sector (94.9% of complaints). Table 
7.14 lists the hospitals which were most commonly cited as charging too much for service. 
However like the general dissatisfaction with hospitals, these complaints need to be placed in 
the context of hospital utilization. Thus the final column of the table compares the proportion 
of complaints about a hospital against predicted utilization of that hospital. Again ratios greater 
than one suggest a larger number of complaints than expected. For most of the private 
hospitals listed there are more complaints about the price than one would expect given 
utilization of these hospitals. The difference however is particularly marked for (i) Samitivej 
(ii) Bamroongrad (iii) Kluay Namthai and (iv) Paolo Memorial.
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Table 7.14
Hospitals with most complaints about expensive care
Hospital Number
of
complaints
As % of 
all
complaints
Number of
proposed
utilizations
As % of 
all
proposed
utilizations
Ratio
Complaints
:Use
1. Bamroongrad 29 10.51 60 2.11 4.98
2. Phyathai 27 9.78 142 5.01 1.95
3. Thonburi 25 9.05 126 4.44 2.04
4. Samitivej 23 8.33 23 0.81 10.28
5. Ramkamhaeng 20 7.25 165 5.82 1.25
6. Paolo 
Memorial
15 5.43 50 1.76 3.09
7. Kluay 
Namthai
12 4.35 34 1.20 3.63
8. Bangkok 
Christian
8 2.90 39 1.38 2.10
9. Krunthep 8 2.90 65 2.29 1.27
10. Wichaiyudht 7 2.53 49 1.73 1.46
11. Wipawadi 7 2.53 67 2.36 1.07
12. Mayo 6 2.17 63 2.22 0.98
Total N 276 2834
As for general dissatisfaction with a hospital service, respondents were extremely reluctant to 
complain about the high price of care. 38.15% of respondents simply accepted the bill and 
paid as required, 50% decided not to use the hospital again. Less than 5% of respondents who 
felt they had been over-charged tried to negotiate or question the bill. However of those who 
had resolved never to use a particular hospital again the vast majority (86%) had never 
returned. Amongst the whole group of those who felt they had been over-charged 38% had 
returned to that hospital.
171
7.4.7 Independence from medical advice
Respondents were asked about their tendency to seek a second opinion in order to assess the 
extent to which consumers were willing to question the authority of a doctor and seek extra 
advice from elsewhere. A surprisingly high proportion of the sample (39.7%) said that on at 
least one occasion they had sought a second opinion. Respondents were then asked whether 
they would recommend a close family member to get a second opinion for (i) cancer diagnosis 
and (ii) a Caesarian section when the initial diagnosis had been provided in three different 
types of hospital settings [(i) by a general doctor in a public hospital, (ii) by a specialist in a 
university teaching hospital and (iii) by a specialist in a private hospital]. The results of these 
questions are shown in Table 7.15. Respondents felt that it was more important to get a second 
opinion for the diagnosis of cancer than for the recommendation to have a Caesarian section. 
There were also differences in respondents' inclination to get a second opinion in different 
hospital settings: for both conditions respondents were most inclined to get a second opinion 
when the first had been given by a specialist in a private hospital (see Cochran's Q test results 
in Table 7.15). This finding again suggests a greater tendency to act in a consumerist manner 
when seeking care in the private sector.
Table 7.15
Proportion of sample agreeing and disagreeing with need to seek a second opinion for 
diagnosis of cancer and recommendation for Caesarian Section
General Dr
Public
Hospital
Specialist 
Dr-UTH 
Hospital
Specialist
D r-
Private
Hospital
Cancer Agree 77.9% 75.8 80.6% Cochran Q 
test for 
difference 
between 
hospitals:
Q = 15.33 
sign = 0.0005
Disagree 22.1% 24.2 19.4%
N 1112 1108 1117
Missing or 
uncertain
101 105 96
Caesarian
Section
Agree 49.3% 52.5 53.6% Cochran Q 
test for 
difference 
between 
hospitals 
Q = 12.88 
sign = 0.0026
Disagree 50.7% 47.5 46.4%
N 1046 1044 1047
Missing or 
Uncertain
167 169 166
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7.5 KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOUR
How do consumer knowledge and preferences about the health care market and consumer 
characteristics affect utilization patterns?
When patients were asked to indicate the hospital which they would actually choose for a cut 
finger, a normal delivery or an appendicitis, private sector hospitals were more commonly 
chosen than public hospitals for all three of the conditions. For the group of respondents as 
a whole it appeared that there was a greater tendency to seek private care for relatively minor 
conditions (such as a cut finger), but as the condition became more complicated, respondents 
were more likely to go to the public sector. However on closer examination it became clear 
that this was mainly true of public sector employees where there was a clear financial 
incentive to seek public sector care, particularly for more serious conditions where the level 
of co-payment in the private sector would be high (see Table 7.16). Amongst private sector 
workers there was only a moderate drop in the percentage of people using private hospitals 
as the condition became more complicated.
Table 7.16
Respondents saying they would seek care in a private hospital
Condition Public sector Private sector Whole sample
employees employees
N % N % N %
Cut finger 386 66.1 369 74.8 755 70.1
Appendicitis 336 57.4 357 73.5 693 64.3
Delivery 160 42.7 218 70.1 378 55.1
Dividing the sample into those who elected to use a private hospital and those who chose a 
public hospital very little difference was found between the reasons given by the two groups 
(see Appendix 13). The principle difference lay in price. For example using the scoring system 
described in section 7.2 where a variable was awarded three points if it was the main reason 
for seeking care at a particular hospital, two points if it was the second most important reason 
and one if it was the third, the mean score for 'inexpensive care* as a reason for seeking 
treatment at a private hospital was 0.37 compared to more than double that (0.86) in the public 
sector. The private sector consistently scored better on promptness, and surprisingly also on 
skilled doctors, but some of these differences were small. The scoring patterns of public and
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private sector employees were compared, but appeared to be very similar.
Very few respondents covered by social security gave as a reason for using a particular 
hospital the fact that they were registered with that hospital. In fact it would appear that few 
persons covered by social security elected to use the hospitals with which they were registered. 
However this is hardly surprising given the fact that 68.9% of workers with SS questioned 
were also covered by more flexible forms of health insurance such as private insurance or 
employer schemes.
The stated choice of hospitals was explored by each of the three conditions given. It was clear 
that different individual hospitals had quite different patterns of selection (see Figure 7.1). 
Some private hospitals such as Ramkamhaeng, Mayo and Bangpho have a high frequency of 
attendances for the minor complaint of a cut finger but selection of these hospitals drops off 
steadily for appendectomy and delivery. Other private hospitals such as Phyathai and 
Bamroongrad exhibit quite a different pattern; their share of the market increases as the 
condition becomes more severe. Similar distinctions are evident in the group of public sector 
hospitals. Hospitals such as Wachira lose market share as the condition becomes more 
complicated whereas the university teaching hospitals (Ramathibodi, Siriraj and 
Chulalongkom) gain.
The reasons given by consumers as to why a particular hospital was selected also varied across 
hospitals. Appendix 14 presents the total scores (for all three conditions) given to eight 
different hospitals. The main reason for choosing Ramkamhaeng or Mayo (which are both 
selected less as the condition becomes more severe) was easy access. For Bamroongrad and 
Phyathai skilled doctors are the most important reason for choice, although these hospitals also 
score well relative to most public sector hospitals in terms of comfort, equipment, promptness 
and sympathetic nursing staff. Amongst the public sector hospitals the reasons for choosing 
Wachira are strikingly similar to those for Ramkamhaeng and Mayo, except Wachira is also 
cheap. Rajavithi is viewed rather more like the university teaching hospitals, people often 
chose to use it because of the skilled doctors and equipment also gets a good rating. 
Respondents clearly had different perceptions about different hospitals and adapted their 
utilization behaviour accordingly.
Respondents claimed that access was the main consideration in selecting a hospital for both
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Figure 7.1 - Patterns of choice of selected hospitals by condition
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a cut finger and an appendicitis. In order to explore this further the location of selected 
hospitals was compared against respondents home address. Actual choice of hospital was 
found to reflect the priority which respondents gave to access (Table 7.17). Nearly one third 
of the sample chose a hospital in the district where they lived for the treatment of the cut 
finger. Only 15% chose a hospital in their residential district in which to deliver.
Table 7.17 
Location of chosen hospital by condition
Location of hospital Finger 
N %
Appendicitis 
N %
Delivery 
N %
In home district 240 32.1 187 22.3 79 14.9
Outside home district 529 68.8 651 77.7 452 85.1
Missing or outside . 
Bangkok
444 357 452
Cochran Q = 71.68 
DF = 2
Significance = 0.000
Respondents' dependence upon their local hospital varied according to where they lived. For 
those in the central districts there is considerable choice of facility. However in some of the 
outlying districts of Bangkok choice is limited. Bangkapi district is a good illustration. Just 
over 10% of the respondents lived in Bangkapi district, yet at the time of the survey there 
were only three hospitals there, Ramkamhaeng (a big private hospital), Ladphrao (a relatively 
new private hospital) and Nopparat (a public hospital). As the district is located on the 
outskirts of Bangkok these hospitals had considerable geographical monopoly, particularly for 
less serious conditions. 62% of respondents living in Bangkapi said they would seek care for 
a cut finger at one of the three hospitals within the district (mainly Ramkamhaeng). 30.8% 
said they would seek maternity care within the district. Thus although the overall rate of 
people seeking care within the district is higher than for other districts it still declines with the 
seriousness of the condition. Over 90% of the respondents who said that they would use 
Ramkamhaeng hospital came from Bangkapi or one of the districts further to the east of the 
city which were also very badly served by hospitals.
By contrast hospitals in the centre, such as Phyathai and Ramathibodi are in close proximity
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to other hospitals and have a very low degree of geographical monopoly. Consequently for 
minor conditions, such as a cut finger, where consumers' prime concern is easy access they 
were used infrequently. As the condition becomes more complicated, and consumers desire 
characteristics such as skilled doctors and good equipment, these hospitals attracted a higher 
share of the market by drawing in patients from throughout the city.
The pattern of complaints amongst those educated to degree level and those without a degree, 
and between those in lower and higher income groups3 was examined. It was found that those 
who were educated to degree level or above were significantly more likely to have been 
dissatisfied with hospital services (Chi sq with Yates correction = 10.39, significance = 0.001); 
52.8% of graduates had been dissatisfied compared to 42.6% of non-graduates. Moreover the 
nature of complaints by graduates and non-graduates differed. Graduates were more concerned 
about promptness than those without a degree; 41.3% of those who were dissatisfied with care 
amongst the graduates complained about promptness, compared to just 31.5% of those without 
a degree (Chi square with Yates correction = 4.33, significance 0.038). The more educated 
group was less concerned about the manner of hospital staff than the less educated group. 
56.8% of those without a degree who complained did so about staff manner, compared to only 
47.3% of graduates (Chi square with Yates correction = 3.88, significance 0.0489).
In terms of income a very similar proportion of the higher and lower income groups had been 
dissatisfied, but again there were discernible differences in the nature of their dissatisfaction. 
The pattern was very similar to that for education with higher income groups more concerned 
about promptness (although this result was not significant - Chi square with Yates correction 
2.72, significance 0.099) and the lower income groups more concerned about manner of staff 
(Chi square with Yates correction = 5.58, significance 0.018). It is possible that these 
differences are due to wealthier, more educated people commanding more respect from staff 
and therefore being more politely treated, but also having higher opportunity costs.
5 For the purposes of this analysis a respondent was classified as being in a lower income 
group if they had reported a monthly salary of less than B 10,000. Although this would not be 
low by general Thai standards, this amount split the respondents to the survey evenly between 
high and low income groups.
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7.6 HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS
What are the characteristics o f different hospitals in Bangkok?
Although it was not a central aim of the consumer survey, some of the data collected, in 
particular that on advertising and complaints, shed light on the differentiating characteristics 
of hospitals in Bangkok and their marketing strategies.
Vertical product differentiation was to some extent reflected in advertising strategies. More 
expensive and prestigious hospitals, such as Phyathai and Bamroongrad hope to draw clientele 
from a large market area. They made considerable use of television for advertising (Table 
7.18). The respondents recalling these advertisements were more widely spread throughout the 
city than those recalling advertisements for the less prestigious hospitals (such as Ladphrao 
and Pharam 9) which used mainly billboards for advertising.
Respondents frequently recalled hospital advertisements for special services. For example 
Bamroongrad had been advertising its health promotion programme and surgery facilities for 
myopia, Kluay Namthai had been promoting itself as a carer for the elderly, Krungthep 
hospital had been advertising its cardiac unit, Theptarin its thyroid and diabetes centre, Pharam 
9 its infertility clinic and Phyathai its HIV and Hepatitis B screening service. Special offers 
were also touted; Pharam 9 was offering free dental care services and Krungthep hospital was 
offering its clients vouchers giving discounts on various leisure activities including hotels at 
holiday resorts.
Personal recommendations by famous people or use of the facility in well-publicized 
circumstances were also capitalized upon. Phyathai had been using the personal endorsement 
of Dr Athit, its owner (and subsequently the Minister of Health), to promote its services. Paolo 
Memorial hospital claimed that it was used t y  film stars' and Kluay Namthai advertised the 
fact that it had treated the victims of a recent traffic accident. Further publicity was also 
gained by Pharam 9 and Phyathai through the sponsoring of TV programmes, Pharam 9 even 
had its own 'mini-series'.
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Table 7.18
Recall of individual hospital advertisements by media type and 
residential district of respondent6
Pharam 9 Phyathai Kluay
Namthai
BMG Ladphrao
Media Type
Radio 25.0% 25.0% 52.2% 30.0% 16.7%
Television 25.0% 43.8% 21.7% 60.0% 27.8%
Newspaper 65.6% 43.8% 52.2% 45.0% 55.6%
Billboard 45.3% 34.4% 39.1% 35.0% 72.6%
N 64 32 23 20 18
Residential
district
Same as 
hospital
16.9% 23.1%7 10.3% 4% 28%
Neighbouring 27.7% 5.1% 24.1% 28% 52%
Elsewhere 55.4% 71.8% 65.5% 68% 20%
N 65 39 29 25 25
Insights into the differences between hospitals can also be gained from the types of complaints 
made about different hospitals. Appendix 15 shows the nature of respondents' dissatisfaction 
with care received. The most common complaints by the group as a whole were (i) slow (ii) 
long queue (iii) poor service (iv) rude and (v) apathetic. If public and private hospitals are 
analyzed separately then this ranking held true for public hospitals but for private hospitals 
it differed slightly as the price of care was the second most commonly cited concern. It is also
‘The percentages in the columns for media type sum to more than 100% as frequently 
respondents recalled more than one media type where they had seen or heard an advertisement 
for that particular hospital.
7 Advertisements appear not to distinguish between Phyathai 1 hospital and Phyathai 2 
hospitals which are in different but neighbouring districts. Hence the probability of a 
respondent living in the same district as the hospital is doubled.
179
interesting to note that complaints about 'wrong diagnosis', 'poor examination' and 
'incompetence' were all higher in the private sector. There were several complaints in public 
hospitals about unfair or discriminatory treatment whereby certain patients queue jumped or 
received preferential care.
7.7 SUMMARY
The focus of this chapter has been consumer behaviour and consumer search activity for health 
care in Bangkok. In particular we have sought to establish:
the characteristics which consumers seek in hospital care; 
how well informed consumers are about the hospital market; 
the type of search behaviour which consumers undertake; 
the extent of 'consumerist' activity in the market; 
how consumer knowledge affects utilization behaviour.
The main characteristics which consumers sought in hospital care were found to be easy 
access, skilled doctors, prompt service and good equipment. Many respondents gave some 
importance to a reasonable price, but price was certainly not one of the key factors in choosing 
hospitals. Little difference in the reasons given for choosing public or private hospitals was 
found, except for price: some respondents said that they would choose a public hospital 
because of the reasonable price, whereas very few gave this as a reason for choosing a private 
hospital.
The reasons given for selecting a hospital varied with the condition for which care was sought 
and also with the particular hospital chosen. For minor conditions and for emergency care, 
access was perceived to be a very important factor in choice. For a normal delivery greater 
emphasis was placed on the clinical quality of care (doctors skills, equipment etc). For some 
of the hospitals more commonly selected it was possible to identify particular reasons for 
choosing that hospital. It appeared that whilst certain hospitals in both public and private 
sectors were chosen because of the perceived high quality of clinical care, others tended to be 
chosen because they were easy to access. This was supported by the stated utilization patterns 
of respondents. Hospitals such as Ramkamhaeng were found to be used mainly by local 
residents for more minor conditions. Utilization of such hospitals dropped off for cases 
requiring more complex care.
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Middle class consumers in Bangkok appear to have extensive experience and considerable 
knowledge of the private hospital care sector. Most respondents were able to identify the most 
expensive, most comfortable and best equipped facilities out of fifteen hospitals listed. 
Respondents appeared less well informed about facilities at the bottom end of the market.
Three main dimensions of consumerism were considered: information seeking behaviour, 
quality and price sensitivity and independence from medical advice. Respondents were aware 
of the substantial amount of advertising activity undertaken by private hospitals. However the 
limited evidence available from this survey suggests that advertising information played a 
minimal role in explicitly shaping consumer opinions. More important was advice from known 
individuals. Three quarters of respondents had sought such advice on at least one occasion and 
their preferred source of information was friends and relatives over health care professionals.
Price sensitivity appeared fairly limited, even in the private sector. Only one third of 
respondents said they would ask about the price before being treated in a private hospital. Of 
the respondents who said they regularly used a private hospital only one third said that they 
would switch hospitals if their regular hospital increased its prices by 50%. This lack of price 
sensitivity is probably, at least partially, the result of more widespread insurance amongst the 
respondents than was anticipated. Over 96% of respondents said they had some form of health 
insurance or medical benefit scheme. The surprising factor here was the high level of employer 
insurance (31.4% of the sample) which was not anticipated at the outset of the study (although 
other studies in Thailand have since confirmed this result). Private health insurance was also 
quite high, covering 18.3% of the sample.
On the whole respondents appeared reluctant to complain if they received a poor quality of 
care. Again differences between public and private sectors were evident; respondents were 
more likely to complain in the private sector if they were unhappy with care (25% did so 
compared to 14% in the public sector). This difference persisted regardless of the nature of 
the problem. Although unlikely to complain about care received respondents were happy to 
seek a second opinion. Indeed nearly 40% of the sample said that they had done this on at 
least one occasion.
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CHAPTER 8 
THE FORM OF HOSPITAL COMPETITION
8.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates the form of hospital competition prevailing in Bangkok. In particular it> 
assesses how simple measures of market concentration affect (a) prices, (b) quality of 
care, (c) profitability and (d) service intensity (objective viii);
analyses the nature of competition between hospitals, particularly the extent of price 
competition vis a vis quality competition and supplier induced demand (objective ix).
Table 8.1 reproduces the anticipated effects of different forms of competition in the health care 
sector. This table guided the analysis in this chapter
Table 8.1
The effect predicted by different models of a decrease in market concentration
Model
Variable
Traditional
model
Induced
demand
Quality
Competition
Increasing
Monopoly
Fees/price - +
Provider income - +
Quality +
Service intensity +
Key: - decrease in variable
+ increase in variable
blank space indicates no impact or unclear impact 
Source: Adapted from Reinhardt 1978.
A chain of interlinked questions was pursued. First, the existence of price competition was 
explored. If low levels of competition (ie. highly concentrated markets) were seen to be associated 
with high prices, and vice versa, then this would suggest that price competition was dominant. 
If on the other hand there was no association or a positive association between level of 
competition and price then alternative forms of competition need to be explored.
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Of the three alternative models considered it was difficult to test the increasing monopoly model 
directly. Instead this was seen as a 'residual' model which may be applicable if there was no 
evidence of quality competition or supplier induced demand. Quality competition was first tested 
for directly; were higher levels of competition associated with high quality indicators? Secondly 
the relationship between competition measures and quality adjusted prices was examined; if 
quality competition was the principal form of competition in the market, then once quality had 
been adjusted for there should be little evidence of any relationship between price and competition 
indicators.
Supplier induced demand was also tested for using two different methods. First there was direct 
investigation of the relationship between measures of service intensity and competition. Second 
evidence of a link between item specific price, in particular room charge, and competition was 
examined on the basis that if supplier induced demand was dominant then although the overall 
price of care may increase with competition there would not be a relationship between item 
specific prices and competition.
The principal form of analysis used in the Chapter is correlation analysis supported by scatter 
plots of the variables (see Appendix 16 for scatter plots), and ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. A key shortcoming of correlation analysis is that it may fail to detect an association 
between variables if this is non-linear in form. Furthermore one or two extreme observations may 
significantly affect the value of the correlation coefficient. The scatter plots were used therefore 
to check for both non-linear relationships and outliers. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that one of 
the problems in analysing competition in hospital markets was the potential for several models 
of competition to prevail simultaneously, and the over-lapping, often unspecific, nature of the 
predictions of the different models. The analysis carried out here was exploratory rather than 
conclusive in nature, but allowed for the existence of more than one form of competition in the 
market.
Two new bodies of data are introduced in this chapter. Firstly a set of competition (or 
concentration) measures were computed. These measures were based upon the hospital mapping. 
Secondly, financial data collected from company accounts, including hospital company 
profitability, and asset and expenditure measures, were used. These two data sets are briefly
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reviewed before presenting the main analysis of competition.
8.1 COMPETITION MEASURES
As described in Chapter 5 three types of competition measure were used. The first (COMP2 and 
COMP5) was based upon a simple count of the number of competing hospitals within a certain 
radius. The second (BEDCOMP2 and BEDCOMP5) measured the share of total beds that the 
hospital of focus had in its market. The third (HHI2 and HHI5) was the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index based upon the squared shares of each hospital in the market summed across the market. 
This latter type of concentration measure is the most sophisticated; it reflects both the number of 
firms in the market and the degree of inequality in firm sizes. According to oligopoly theory both 
of these factors will affect market power. The first (COMP) measure only relates to the number 
of firms in the market, whereas the second (BEDCOMP) measure only relates to the relative size 
of the hospital under consideration.
Two different radii around the hospital were used to define the market area; one of two kilometres 
(COMP2) and one of five kilometres (COMP5). The values of the competition measures for the 
hospitals in the analysis are given in Appendix 17.
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 plot the market share of different hospitals (BEDCOMP) and the Hirschman- 
Herfindahl index (HHI) measures for the set of hospitals. The HHI plots also demarcate the level 
where the index is equal to 0.18, the US Department of Justice uses this level to identify highly 
concentrated markets (Robinson et al 1991).
Naturally concentration appears to be significantly less if the 5 kilometre rather than the 2 
kilometre measure is used to define the market. Only seven out of the fifty-two hospitals 
considered had more than a 20% share of the market using a five kilometre market radius. Fifteen 
of the hospitals (approximately 29%) were situated in markets with an HHI greater than 0.18.
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Figure 8.1
Scatter plots of market share by hospital
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Figure 8.2
Scatter plots of Hirschman-Herfindahl indices by hospital
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8.2 FINANCIAL DATA
Data for thirty of the main hospital companies were collected from the Ministry of Commerce1. 
A number of approaches were used in order to check the reliability of the data:-
i. Various accounting identities were checked; this process found that some companies 
presented profit data before tax and others after tax. As a few hospitals were exempted 
from tax by the Board of Investment it was decided to use pre-tax profits in all cases.
ii. The data were checked against other sources, notably Pianpaktr 1993. The analysis by 
Pianpaktr covers only Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) listed companies, but was 
compiled with the support of the companies concerned and with data provided directly 
by them. The financial data in Pianpaktr exactly matched the hospital accounts retrieved 
from the Ministry of Commerce.
iii. Advisors including a lecturer in accounting at one of the Thai universities, a financial 
advisor to one of the Thai banks and a private hospital director reviewed the data.
As a result of these approaches two of the records were excluded from the analysis. One very 
clearly under-recorded hospital revenue, the other presented data for a hospital which had only 
been open for part of the year. The other records were felt to be reasonably reliable.
Table 8.2 presents basic financial data for the hospitals and selected ratios including expenditure 
per bed, profit margin and return on assets. Considerable variation is evident in the various ratios 
calculated. For example expenditure per bed varies from a low of 87 thousand Baht per annum 
at Saenvejchakan Hospital to a high of just over 3 million Baht per annum at Samitivej Hospital. 
These differences are expected given the very different characteristics of hospitals in the sample.
Average profit margin or profitability in the sample was about 11% and average return on assets 
was about 12%. Cleverly (1992) defines a high return on assets for hospitals in the US to be more 
than 9.2% per annum and a low return on assets to be less than 1.05% per annum. If this 
definition were to be used in Thailand then more than 60% of the hospitals in the sample have 
a high return on assets and only 10% have a low return on assets.
1 It should be noted that the set of hospitals for which financial data were collected do 
not exactly match those hospitals used in the analysis of Chapter 6. The hospitals on which 
financial data were accessed tended to be the larger ones.
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Table 8.2
Basic financial data by hospital
Hospital name
Bed
Number Total assets Total revenue Liquidity
SUKSAWAT POLYCLINIC 8 2,176,505 2,147,086 1.39
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC 10 1,651,859 1,857,778 4.22
LADKABUNG HOSPITAL 25 6,841,186 5,828,186 1.57
BANGBORN HOSPITAL 26 1,599,689 4372325 n/a
SAENAVEJCHAKAN HOSPITAI 27 29,957,507 2,450,632 18.65
YANHH POLYCLINIC 28 3,947393 5,137,462 0.60
PASICHALOEN HOSPITAL 30 809,823 2376,070 n/a
YAOWARAK HOSPITAL 40 5,534369 11,652,486 n/a
RATBURANA HOSPITAL 50 29,105,892 34,994365 2.50
PROMMITR HOSPITAL 80 92,479,837 76,181,134 1.50
BANGPHOO HOSPITAL 100 195,793352 124,401,840 1.05
DECHA HOSPITAL 100 174,914,123 53,533,857 0.29
PETCHAVEJ HOSPITAL 100 65,609,051 132,850,990 0.11
KARUNA PHITAK HOSPITAL 100 41,608,194 37340381 0.25
BANGMOD HOSPITAL 100 32,068,841 57,583,452 1.42
KASEMRAD HOSPITAL 100 86,652,000 43,032,000 0.88
KRUNGHDON HOSPITAL 130 255,603,788 220309,763 5.13
WIPAWADI HOSPITAL 175 508,479,147 287,072,748 0.98
SAMHTVEJ HOSPITAL 200 955,831329 764,842,873 0.11
MAYO HOSPITAL 200 160,804,793 247,943,602 1.37
BAMROONGRAJ HOSPITAL 256 1373,878,653 892,906,821 0.13
SIAM HOSPITAL 266 93,785,583 120339,029 0.92
PAOLO MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 300 59,158317 282,508344 0.14
RAMKAMHAENG HOSPITAL 315 782352,804 426,823,451 0.30
PHYATHAI 2 350 821,851,000 688,847,000 0.69
PHYATHAI 1 350 768304,740 727,147,772 1.15
BANGKOK HOSPITAL 403 631337,000 697,026,000 0.48
THONBURI HOSPITAL 435 1,075,545,000 712,784390 0.39
Definitions
Gearing = external borrowing/total capital 
Liquidity, current ratio = current assets/current liabilities
Profit Return on Expenditure Assets
Gearing Margin Assets per bed per bed
24.24%
17.90%
10.15%
68.76%
0.05%
72.69%
95.02%
0.55%
17.28%
51.14%
52.81%
86.59%
67.89%
61.39%
64.78%
78.59%
9.15%
39.50%
39.49%
62.43%
41.49%
27.63%
100.00%
44.22%
46.41%
25.59%
25.26%
52.25%
8.08%
4.85%
11.41%
1.92%
4.13%
3.64%
15.57%
1.63%
14.26%
20.63%
20.19%
-40.12%
18.59%
-14.29%
5.43%
5.39%
25.48%
14.83%
20.77%
10.61%
28.20%
16.10%
-1.81%
21.45%
24.79%
27.94%
20.94%
18.46%
7.97%
5.45%
9.70%
5.24%
0.34%
4.74%
45.69%
3.44%
17.15%
15.72%
12.65%
-12.27%
36.38%
-12.82%
9.76%
2 .66%
21.96%
8.17%
16.06%
16.24%
19.75%
19.19%
-8.63%
11.66%
20.23%
23.49%
22.03%
12.23%
246,696
1,192,070
206,595
164,938
87,011
176,795
67,202
286,551
600,052
770,561
996346
749,946
1,089,802
426,763
544,544
278,050
1375,946
1,403,133
3,056,790
1,109,129
2,504,896
384,743
876,950
1,065394
1,493,023
1,546302
1384,491
1336,180
272,063
165,186
273,647
61,527
1,109,537
140,978
26,994
138359
582,118
1,155,998
1,957,934
1,749,141
656,091
416,082
320,688
866,520
1,966,183
2,905,595
4.779.156 
804,024
4,976,088
352,577
197,194
2,483,660
2348,146
2.195.156 
1,566,345 
2,472,517
8.3 PRICE COMPETITION
Is there any evidence of negative association between measures o f the intensity o f competition 
and price per case suggesting that price competition is prevalent in the market place?
Table 8.3 shows the simple Pearson r2 correlation coefficient between the different measures of 
competition and the inpatient price index. The level of significance for a two-tailed test are shown 
in brackets. Only the coefficient on the COMP2 indicator is significant (at the 2% level) but the 
signs of the coefficient all suggest the same picture ie. that higher levels of competition are 
associated with higher prices. The negative sign on the BEDCOMP indicators suggests that as a 
hospital's share of the local market increases then prices are likely to be lower.
Table 8.3
Correlation coefficients between competition and inpatient price index
COMP2 COMP5 BED-
COMP2
BED-
COMP5
HHI2 HHI5
IPINDEX 0.443
(0.013)
0.249
(0.177)
-0.101
(0.591)
-0.066
(0.726)
-0.147
(0.430)
-0.197
(0.288)
Notes: 2 tailed significance levels shown in brackets 
N= 31
The results indicated in table 8.3 were supported by a consideration of the price charged for a 
normal delivery and competition measures, although none of the correlation coefficients were 
significant at the 10% level. Correlation coefficients on acute appendicitis did not yield any clear 
pattern.
In conclusion there was no negative correlation between measures of the intensity of competition 
and price. This suggests that price competition was not present, or at least was not the dominant 
form of competition, in the market. The analysis indicated that there may be a positive association 
between intensity of competition and price per case.
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8.4 QUALITY COMPETITION
Is there any evidence o f positive correlation between competition measures and quality 
indicators suggesting that quality competition is prevalent in the market place?
Two separate sets of data were used to explore this question. First the financial data collected 
from the hospital accounts were used to explore the links between financial measures of input 
(specifically expenditure per bed and assets per bed) and competition. Second the indicators of 
structural quality (previously used in the hedonic price analysis), specifically, the percentage of 
private beds, the beds per doctor and per nurse and the equipment profile of the hospital were 
investigated. The correlation coefficients between these variables and the competition indicators 
are presented in table 8.4
Table 8.4
Correlation coefficients between competition measures and quality measures.
COMP2 COMP5 BED-
COMP2
BED-
COMP5
HHI2 HHI5 N
EXP PER 
BED
0.417
(0.014)
0.462
(0.007)
-0.238
(0.112)
-0.137
(0.243)
-0.445
(0.009)
-0.322
(0.047)
28
ASSETS 
PER BED
0.427
(0.012)
0.415
(0.014)
-0.229
(0.121)
-0.036
(0.429)
-0.337
(0.040)
-0.238
(0.112)
28
PERCPRI 0.106
(0.260)
0.101
(0.271)
0.199
(0.113)
-0.032
(0.424)
-0.110
(0.250)
-0.091
(0.288)
39
BEDWDR 0.125
(0.223)
0.127
(0.221)
-0.045
(0.392)
0.036
(0.414)
-0.172
(0.144)
-0.105
(0.260)
39
BEDW-
NUR
-0.143
(0.193)
-0.093
(0.287)
-0.215
(0.094)
-0.144
(0.191)
-0.002
(0.496)
-0.077
(0.318)
39
SUM-
QUIP
-0.004
(0.490)
-0.080
(0.314)
0.396
(0.006)
0.447
(0.002)
0.079
(0.314)
0.254
(0.057)
39
Notes:
One-tailed significance levels shown in brackets.
In the upper part of the table there appears to be a clear and significant positive correlation 
between the COMP indicators and expenditure per bed and assets per bed, and a clear and
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significant negative correlation between the HHI indicators and expenditure per bed and assets 
per bed, suggesting that when competition is higher, hospitals are forced to invest more in 
facilities and other inputs. This finding however should be interpreted cautiously. Most of the 
hospitals which face a high degree of competition are in the centre of the town where property 
prices are high and thus assets per bed are also likely to be high. This effect may filter through 
to expenditure per bed, as depreciation would form one, albeit small, element of expenditure.
No clear pattern emerges amongst the correlation coefficients in the lower part of the table, where 
specific measures of quality were investigated. Only the relationship between equipment profile 
and the BEDCOMP and HHI indicators appear to be significant. It is probable that the significant 
correlation coefficients here are picking up on the strong positive correlation between the market 
share and size of a hospital, and the number of items of equipment it possesses.
Thus although the asset per bed and expenditure per bed indicators do suggest the presence of 
quality competition amongst hospitals in Bangkok, the evidence presented so far is not 
overwhelming.
If quality competition was the dominant form of competition in the market place then there would 
be little difference between the observed price and quality adjusted price. If quality competition 
was not dominant but some other form of non-price competition was, then we would expect there 
to be a sizeable difference between actual price and quality adjusted price which could be 
explained (at least partially) by variation in market concentration. Using the hedonic price 
regression analysis of Chapter 6, specifically model 2 of Table 6.12, quality adjusted prices were 
estimated (Cowling and Cubbin 1971). Quality adjusted price is essentially the predicted price of 
care at a hospital, given its characteristics and the parameters established by the hedonic price 
equation.
Thus quality adjusted price (P') was given by:
P' = 63.47 + 90.86(PRESTIGE) - 9.38 (BEDWDR) + 55.46 (PERCPRI) + 18.08 (SUMEQUIP)
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and hence the difference (D) between quality adjusted prices and actual price:
D = P - P
It was hypothesized that (D) can be explained by market conditions, specifically competition and 
hospital ownership ie.
D = f(competition indicators, NFP, SET)
Where NFP is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the hospital is owned and operated by 
a non-profit organization and zero otherwise, and SET is another dummy variable equal to one 
if the hospital is quoted on the stock exchange and equal to zero otherwise. Table 8.5 shows the 
results of several ordinary least squares regression analyses including different sets of variables 
in the model.
None of the models estimated succeed in explaining a high proportion of the difference between 
the estimated quality adjusted price and the actual price, suggesting that the market for hospital 
services in Bangkok will bear significant, unjustified price variation. However, when included 
singly each of the competition variables was significant2. The COMP2 and the HHI2 indicators 
of competition offer slightly better fit and higher levels of significance than the other measures 
of competition. Moreover the COMP variable coefficient was found to have a consistently positive 
sign and the BEDCOMP and HHI variables a consistently negative sign. This implies that even 
after quality factors are taken into account, prices are higher in hospitals which face greater 
competition. This finding further refutes the presence of price competition in the market and 
suggests that the increasing monopoly model and/or the supplier induced demand model may offer 
insights into the nature of hospital competition in Bangkok.
Equations (l)-(7) in Table 8.5 are also interesting due to the light which they shed on how 
hospital ownership affects pricing. The coefficient on the NFP dummy variable was not
2 A high degree of multicollinearity between the competition variables probably explains why 
neither was found to be significant when more than one was included in the model.
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significantly different from zero in any of the models estimated, implying that once quality of care 
has been taken into account, non-profit hospitals do not charge significantly more or less than for- 
profit hospitals. On the other hand the coefficient on the stock exchange variable was consistently 
highly significant and strongly positive suggesting that privately owned hospitals on the stock 
market tend to charge considerably higher prices than is warranted by the quality of care which 
they provide.
Table 8.5
Equations explaining difference between quality adjusted price and actual price
1
D
2
D
3
D
4
D
5
D
6
D
7
D
COMP2 1.422
(1.772)
2.496***
(0.991)
- - - - -
COMP5 0.418
(0.573)
- 0.696***
(0.280)
- - - -
BED-
COMP2
- - - -0.369**
(0.161)
- - -
BED-
COMP5
- - - - -0.525**
(0.243)
- -
HHI2 - - - - - -48.92***
(18.89)
-
HHI5 - - - - - - -54.54**
(25.98)
SET 31.20**
(13.18)
31.52***
(12.74)
30.66***
(12.73)
32.72***
(13.06)
32.62***
(13.19)
28.57***
(12.55)
27.73**
(12.99)
NFP -3.69
(19.54)
- - - - - -
CONSTAN
T
-23.08**
(10.29)
-18.37**
(7.52)
23.24***
(9.13)
7.99
(7.46)
0.378
(5.64)
16.28*
(9.43)
5.23
(0.754)
Adj R2 
F
Sign
0.188
2.734
0.05
0.229
5.46
0.099
0.226
5.37
0.011
0.204
4.83
0.016
0.190
4.51
0.020
0.237
5.67
0.009
0.183
4.36
0.022
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Notes: standard errors in brackets
significance levels: *** 2% level ** 5%  level * 10% level
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If higher prices in more competitive areas are not entirely due to higher quality then it is possible 
that profitability is also higher in such areas. Using the data taken from company accounts simple 
correlation coefficients between the two measures of profitability (PROFMARG and 
ASSRETURN) and the various competition measures were calculated. These failed to reveal any 
significant correlation. However inspection of a scatter plot of the data (figure 8.3) suggested that 
there was one extreme outlier, Decha hospital, which had made highly negative profits during the 
year under consideration (profit margin -  -40.12 and return on assets = -12.82). If this one 
hospital was excluded from the analysis a significant pattern emerged as shown in Table 8.6. 
Again the COMP2 and HHI2 indicators yielded stronger results than the other indicators of 
competition used.
Table 8.6
Correlation between competition measures and profitability measures in hospitals
PROFMARG ASSRETURN
COMP2 0.577 0.333
(0.001) (0.045)
COMP5 0.307 0.121
(0.059) (0.274)
BEDCOMP2 -0.256 -0.235
(0.099) (0.119)
BEDCOMP5 0.091 -0.002
(0.325) (0.496)
HHI2 -0.427 -0.422
(0.013) (0.014)
HHI5 -0.089 -0.112
(0.330) (0.289)
Notes:
One tailed significance levels shown in brackets 
N= 27
It is unclear why Decha constituted such an extreme outlier. The hospital faces very high 
competition and if the financial data are to be believed, is doing very badly. Decha was also noted
194
Pr
of
it 
m
ar
gi
n
Scatter plot of profit margin against 
COMP2 indicator
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
-10 
-20 
-30 
-40 
-50
0 5 10 15 20 25
COMP2
 m...............................................  E3
EE E3
4-®-* -m r* -
13m m
11 ■—  .
E3
m
Decha
m .........
195
to be an outlier in the computation of the inpatient price index (see section 6.3). Some other 
hospitals in Bangkok appear also to have made heavy losses due principally to a combination of 
high capital costs and very low utilization rates. Unfortunately occupancy data for Decha were 
not available.
The previous analysis of quality adjusted prices suggested that competition was not the only factor 
affecting the difference between actual price and predicted price. Ownership was also significant. 
In order to explore the impact of both the competition variables and ownership variables on 
profitability, regression analysis was carried out. Decha Hospital was excluded from the analysis 
as it appeared to be such an extreme outlier and there may be questions about the reliability of 
the financial data. There is considerable disagreement about the appropriate functional form of 
profit functions (Waterson 1983) thus various forms were experimented with. The plot of 
PROFMARG against COMP2 (Figure 8.3) suggested that the relationship may not be a linear one, 
and indeed the semilog form of the equation worked best. Table 8.7 shows the results of the 
regressions. A substantial amount of variation in PROFMARG appears to be explained by the 
COMP2 and SET variables, with stock exchange hospitals trading in more competitive areas likely 
to make substantially higher profits than other hospitals. Neither the BEDCOMP nor the HHI 
variables were found to be significant even when they were the only competition variable included 
in the analysis, however the estimated coefficients on these variables were consistently negative. 
The use of ASSRETURN as the dependent variable also yielded weak results. It is possible that 
the methodology used in Thailand for valuing assets for company accounts is not entirely reliable, 
in turn implying that the denominator of the ASSRETURN variable was unreliable.
Broadly speaking this investigation of profitability confirms the previous analysis of predicted 
quality adjusted prices and actual prices; hospitals located in more competitive markets are more 
profitable, and stock exchange ownership also increases profitability. According to Table 8.1 
increased profitability with a higher degree of competition is a direct prediction of the increasing 
monopoly model. However it is not inconsistent with supplier induced demand, to the extent that 
increased service intensity increases revenues more than costs.
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Table 8.7
Regression analyses explaining variations in profitability
(1)
PROFMARG
(2)
PROFMARG
(3)
LN(PROFMAR)
(4)
ASSRETURN
COMP2 1.136***
(0.294)
- 34.13***
(5.32)
0.794
(0.470)
COMP5 - 0.156
(0.112)
- -
SET 10.61*** 10.73*** 267.23*** 4.17
(3.41) (4.22) (61.74) (5.46)
CONST 5.65** 6.76** 61.19 8.46***
(2.01) (3.25) (36.45) (3.22)
Adj R2 0.485 0.230 0.706 0.060
F 13.24 4.82 32.15 1.82
sig 0.0001 0.017 0.0000 0.183
N 27 27 27 27
Notes: standard errors in brackets
significance levels: *** 2% level ** 5% level * 10% level
8.5 SUPPLIER INDUCED DEMAND
Two approaches were used to investigate the presence of supplier induced demand in the market 
place. The first investigated the existence of a relationship between the measures of competition 
and the price for a particular service (room charge). It is argued that if supplier induced demand 
was present, then although the overall price per case may increase with competition, there would 
not be a link between individual fees and competition measures. Secondly the relationship 
between service intensity and competition was investigated directly.
Is there any evidence o f positive or negative correlation between the competition measures and 
the room charge?
Table 8.8 shows the simple Pearson correlation coefficients between room charge and the 
competition measures. None of the correlation coefficients are significant and the signs on the 
BEDCOMP variables are inconsistent with those on the COMP and HHI variables. Therefore we
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must reject the hypothesis that there is any relationship between competition and room charge. 
This suggests that the relationship between overall price and competition could be due to higher 
service intensity in hospitals in more competitive areas. However this conclusion should be treated 
with caution. As pointed out in Chapter 5 it has been suggested that price competition may be 
observed in the amount charged for the room, as this is a relatively easy variable for consumers 
to observe (Davis 1972). If there were price competition in room charge then this may offset a 
quality related increment.
Table 8.8
Correlation between room charge and competition indicators
COMP2 COMP5 BED-
COMP2
BED-
COMP5
HHI2 HHI5
ROOMCHG 0.218
(0.23)
0.199
(0.27)
0.172
(0.35)
0.057
(0.76)
-0.129
(0.484)
-0.027
(0.886)
Notes: two tailed significance levels in brackets 
N * 32
Is there any evidence o f a positive relationship between service intensity and competition?
There are a number of aspects of health care services which could be manipulated by physicians 
or hospital managers in response to increased competition. Given data availability this study 
focused upon investigation rates, admission rates and length of stay. However there are some 
shortcomings with these measures.
Discussions with hospital managers indicated that the majority of physicians employed by private 
hospitals receive as payment a percentage of the doctor's fee charged to the patient. Sometimes 
they also receive a salary Thus for doctors employed by a private hospital there is no financial 
incentive to order more investigations or prescribe more drugs. Some smaller facilities are 
physician owned and operated; in such cases as the physician's income relates to the profit of the 
facility there is a direct financial incentive to prescribe extra tests and drugs. Moreover there is 
also a possibility that managers can influence investigation rates through, for example, putting 
subtle pressure on physicians to order investigations or prescribe expensive drugs.
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Using data collected from the Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme two measures were 
computed. STANDINV measures the percentage of the total bill covering standard investigations 
such as laboratory tests, X-rays etc. ALLINV measures the percentage of the total bill going on 
any investigations including the standard investigations and special investigations such as CT 
scans, ultrasound, EKG etc. The mean value of STANDINV was approximately 9.0% with a 
range of 2-16% and the mean value of ALLINV was about 11.3% with a range of 2-27%.
There are a number of variables which even physicians working as hospital 'employees' can 
influence which will affect their income. These include the number of repeat visits, admission 
rates and length of stay. Unfortunately some of die throughput data provided by hospitals under 
the private hospital census was thought rather unreliable. From the census of private hospitals 
the average length of stay at each hospital during 1992 and admission rates3 for 1990, 1991 and 
1992 were explored. Data on number of re-attendances were not available. Data on length of stay 
were thought to be most unreliable because although hospitals appeared to record the number of 
admissions, the number of hospital days was less likely to be recorded.
The results for correlations examining the percentage of the bill going to investigations were 
confusing; although some were just significant at the 5% level, the signs were inconsistent. The 
correlation coefficient on the admission rate and length of stay variables were consistent and 
significant, however inspection of the scatter plots (see Appendix 16) found that in each case there 
was one extreme outlier. For length of stay this was Kwong Sui, a small non-profit hospital, 
which we know from the cluster analysis has quite different characteristics to many hospitals in 
the market. Excluding Kwong Sui from the correlation analysis rendered the results on length of 
stay insignificant. For admission rate the outlier was Phyathai 2. There was no reason to doubt 
the reliability of the data from Phyathai 2 nor to believe that it is fundamentally different from 
other hospitals in the maxket. However, even if this observation was excluded, the results on 
admission rates were still fairly strong and significant. Although evidence on length of stay was 
unclear, it appears that admission rates were significantly higher at those hospitals facing greater 
competition.
3 Admission rate = number of inpatient cases/number of outpatient attendances.
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Taken at face value these results would suggest that at least in some respects supplier induced 
demand is a problem in the market, with hospitals facing higher competition artificially increasing 
service intensity. However there is an equally plausible explanation for the results found here. In 
the previous chapter it was observed that for simple conditions people would tend to use their 
local hospital, but for more severe conditions they would be more likely to travel into the centre 
of Bangkok to seek care. The data presented above do not allow for differences in case-mix or 
severity between the hospitals and thus may be misleading. Unfortunately assessing service 
intensity whilst controlling for case-mix would require special primary data collection.
Table 8.9
Correlation coefficients between service intensity variables and competition measures
VBL COMP2 COMP5 BED-
COMP2
BED-
COMP5
HHI2 HHI5 N
LOS 0.560
(0.019)
0.424
(0.090)
-0.292
(0.255)
-0.128
(0.625)
-0.349
(0.170)
-0.371
(0.142)
17
ADRATE90 0.623
(0.000)
0.368
(0.050)
-0.091
(0.640)
-0.045
(0.818)
-0.424
(0.022)
-0.333
(0.780)
29
ADRATE91 0.481
(0.005)
0.300
(0.090)
0.081
(0.656)
-0.104
(0.566)
-0.255
(0.152)
-0.727
(0.126)
33
ADRATE92 0.459
(0.007)
0.246
(0.168)
0.031
(0.863)
-0.099
(0.583)
-0.272
(0.126)
-0.253
(0.156)
33
STANDINV 0.048
(0.386)
0.068
(0.340)
0.271
(0.048)
0.264
(0.052)
0.147
(0.186)
0.262
(0.054)
41
ALLINV 0.026
(0.437)
0.080
(0.314)
0.283
(0.040)
0.234
(0.075)
0.173
(0.146)
0.208
(0.102)
41
Notes:
2-tailed test significance levels shown in brackets.
8.6 THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS ON COMPETITION
The competition indicators used in the analysis above do not discriminate between the competitive 
pressures exerted by public or private hospitals; both types of hospital were included in the 
indicators. However it is possible that being located close to public hospitals has a different effect 
to being located close to private facilities. More specifically it may be the case that whereas
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competition with other private hospitals may tend to increase prices through quality competition, 
competition with public hospitals may tend to decrease prices through price competition.
In order to (briefly) investigate these possibilities the sample was divided into two groups; those 
which had a public hospital within a two kilometre radius, and those hospitals whose sole 
competitors were other private hospitals. Correlation ratios between the COMP2 measure and 
indicators of (i) price and (ii) quality were computed for the two groups separately and the 
significance of any difference between the correlation ratios was tested using the z test of 
difference for unrelated Pearson's correlation.
The value of the correlation coefficients did not support the initial hypothesis that public hospitals 
may stimulate price competition whereas private hospitals stimulate quality competition. 
Correlation ratios between measures of price and competition were slightly higher amongst the 
group o f hospitals in close proximity to a public hospitals (r = 0.538) than amongst the group 
which was not (r = 0.291) however this difference was not significant at the 5% level (z = 1.50). 
Correlations between COMP2 and quality indicators did not yield a clear pattern, but it was 
certainly not the case that there was greater quality competition between those hospitals with only 
private hospitals in their market area.
8.8 SUMMARY
In this chapter the database on private hospitals in Bangkok was supplemented with financial data 
and indicators of competition so that the form of hospital competition in Bangkok could be 
explored. Concentration measures suggest that the hospital market in Bangkok has fairly low 
levels of concentration. Even using market areas with very short radii many hospitals appear to 
face high levels of competition. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of hospitals in Bangkok 
are making positive, and reasonably substantial profits. Profitability compares favourably with that 
in the US hospital market.
Table 8.10 summarizes the relationships found between measures of competition based on a two 
kilometre market area and the four variables of interest indicated in Table 8.1.
The competition indicators based on a two kilometre market radius revealed more significant
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results than those based on a five kilometre market radius. The COMP measures which simply 
counted the number of competing hospitals within a given radius yielded more significant results 
than the BEDCOMP measures which measured the share of beds that the focal hospital had in 
the market area. The Hirschman-Herfindahl indices (based on bed numbers rather than cases) also 
yielded significant results. This pattern suggests that the important factor affecting the form and 
intensity of competition in Bangkok is not the degree of inequality in hospital sizes but rather the 
sheer number of competing hospitals.
Table 8.10
Relationship found in Bangkok between key variables and competition indicators
COMP2 Sig at
5%
level
BED-
COMP2
Sig at
5%
level
HHI2 Sig at
5%
level
Fees/price + yes - no - no
Profitability4 + yes - no - yes
Quality
Financial indicators + yes - no - yes
Structural indicators ~ no ~ no ~ no
Service intensity per 
visit
Investigations ~ no no ~ no
Throughput data + yes *** no * mainly
no
Key: + indicates a positive correlation between the two variables
- indicates a negative correlation between the two variables 
~ indicates that no clear correlation pattern emerged 
yes indicates significance at the 5% level 
no indicates that the correlation was not significant at the 5% level
Although several of the correlation coefficients were significant at the 5% level, few of them were 
very strong. The strongest evidence relates to profitability and admission rates. Hospitals in market 
areas where there was low concentration (ie. where there would be thought to be high
4 Excluding Decha Hospital.
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competition) tended to have higher profitability and also possibly higher prices. The evidence on 
quality and service intensity was somewhat mixed but pointed in the direction of higher 
competition also being associated with higher quality and higher service intensity. Thus the 
analyses refute traditional models of price competition, but do not definitely conclude which forms 
of competition prevail in the market.
The correlation analyses and scatter plots were supplemented by an examination of factors 
explaining the difference between actual price and estimated quality adjusted price. The 
regressions reported in Table 8.5 show that even once quality considerations are taken into 
account, prices are higher in hospitals facing more competition. This provides further evidence 
contradicting the existence of price competition and suggests that quality competition is not 
dominant but probably co-exists with supplier induced demand and/or increasing monopoly due 
to informational asymmetries and high search costs.
The chapter also provides interesting evidence relating to the impact of hospital ownership upon 
competition. Hospitals quoted on the stock exchange were found to charge higher prices even 
once differences in quality of care were taken into account, and consequently made higher profits. 
Non-profit hospitals did not appear to charge significantly more or less than other private hospitals 
once quality differences were accounted for. However this latter result may be due partly to the 
fact that the price data came principally from middle class insured patients and non-profit 
hospitals may be employing differential charging strategies so that they can cross-subsidize from 
wealthier to poorer patients.
The impact which public hospitals have on the form and intensity of competition was briefly 
explored; the presence of public hospitals did not seem to make a major difference to the form 
of competition. Specifically there was no evidence to suggest that public hospitals, which tend to 
charge less than private hospitals, stimulated price competition in the market.
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS
9.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the results presented in the three previous chapters are drawn together and 
inteipreted. In particular the original study hypotheses and objectives are considered. The chapter 
is structured around the research objectives addressing first the issue of asymmetric information 
and product differentiation, second the issue of consumer behaviour and search activity and third 
the nature of hospital competition. The final section of the chapter reviews the research methods 
used and their strengths and weaknesses.
9.1 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
9.1.1 Product differentiation
The study hypothesized that in developing countiy hospital markets there was a substantial degree 
of product differentiation which would both segment the market and contribute to problems of 
asymmetric information between consumer and provider, in turn giving rise to monopolistic 
competition.
There were substantial differences in characteristics between the hospitals investigated. The 
analysis of hospital characteristics in Chapter 6 suggested that both horizontal and vertical 
differentiation were present in the market. At the 'top end' of the market, hospitals were primarily 
distinguished from one another by having more or less of the whole range of characteristics, but 
at the lower end of the market there was considerable horizontal product differentiation.
The nature of the analysis undertaken in the study, focusing on characteristics such as hotel 
aspects of care, nursing, hospital facilities, doctors' skills, precluded the consideration of certain 
alternative types of product differentiation which may play a key role in the hospital market. The 
consumer survey found that hospital advertising often focused upon one particular service such 
as geriatric care or maternity care. If hospitals aimed to segment the market in order to protect 
market power, then differentiating themselves on the basis of specialties offered is probably a 
more effective strategy than differentiating on the basis of characteristics. Consumers are rather 
more likely to be able to associate a particular hospital with a particular type of service, rather 
than with a particular pattern of characteristics. Responses to the consumer survey indicated that
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the same consumer was likely to use different hospitals according to the complaint with which 
he or she was presenting. In some respects this reflects the vertical product differentiation in the 
market; consumers turned to increasingly sophisticated, well equipped and well staffed hospitals 
as their condition became more severe, but this pattern also suggests differentiation by specialty.
The establishment and advertisement of specialist facilities within general hospitals in Thailand 
appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon. It may be that as the hospital bed to population 
ratio in Bangkok has now reached quite a high level, hospital competition strategies are 
increasingly turning towards horizontal differentiation and further market segmentation.
The characteristics approach to product differentiation is conceptually useful in the health care 
sector but may be of limited value in the analysis of competitive strategies. Product differentiation 
in health care is equally likely to be rooted in the multi-product nature of the hospital firm and 
differences in the combination of services produced, as in different bundles of characteristics.
9.1.2 Characteristics valued by consumers
There was a considerable degree of concurrence between the consumer survey and the hedonic 
price analysis on which aspects of care were highly valued by consumers. Both pointed to the 
importance of physician inputs and skills. The consumer survey also highlighted the central role 
of geographical accessibility in utilization patterns in Bangkok. Equipment was found to be 
important, by both the consumer survey and the hedonic price analysis, but in the consumer 
survey at least, it was found to be a secondary level factor. The characteristics to which 
consumers gave high priority were similar regardless of whether they chose to use a public or 
private hospital, the only difference being the level of priority which they accorded to seeking 
care at a reasonable price.
The analysis suggested that consumers were concerned with the characteristics of services which 
are likely to influence the clinical quality of care provided, rather than the more self-evident hotel 
aspects of care which have little impact on clinical quality. This is contrary to what has sometimes 
been asserted about the nature of competition between hospitals.
The hedonic price analysis focused attention on the issue of'prestige' or 'reputation'. Although the
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variable initially used to represent reputation (AGE) was not found to be significant, the 
PRESTIGE variable reflecting proximity to university teaching hospitals was highly significant. 
The analysis however left unclear quite how this prestige effect occurred. It could be that certain 
areas of Bangkok are known for health care (the Harley Street' effect). Certainly there is a 
tendency in Bangkok for similar service providers or retailers to group together in one place. In 
addition, some private hospitals may reap benefits from the fact that they are known to be 
associated with a particular public teaching hospital and probably draw many of their part time 
medical staff from this hospital. Often these associations are well known amongst the local 
population.
The hedonic price analysis and the consumer survey both suggested that consumers paid little 
attention to the quality and availability of nursing staff. At the same time the multivariate analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 6 indicated that this was an area where some hospitals may compromise 
quality in order to save costs. Discussions with hospital directors further revealed that attracting 
and retaining good nursing staff has become increasingly difficult during the past three to four 
years as expansion of the private sector has bid up nursing salaries. The lack of consumer 
.vigilance in this area combined with hospital incentives to compromise nursing standards, suggests 
that government regulation and enforcement of minimum nursing standards may be an important 
measure to ensure clinical quality in the private sector
The consumer survey showed that the reasons for selecting a hospital and choice of hospital 
varied with the condition a patient was presenting with. This was supported by the hedonic price 
analysis which found different characteristics to be highly valued for different conditions. This 
pattern suggests a considerable degree of consumer sophistication.
9.2 CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR AND SEARCH ACTIVITY
Consumers appeared to be relatively well informed about the hospital care market. There are 
limited international data with which to compare the information collected here, however the 
consumer survey suggested that at least at the top end of the market many consumers were aware 
of differences in prices, equipment, skills and comfort between hospitals. Moreover consumers 
appeared willing to add to their stock of knowledge through search behaviour when necessary. 
The most common example of this found in the consumer survey was seeking advice from friends
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and relatives, but consumers also recalled advertisements and consulted physicians for advice. 
Consumers were generally willing to seek independent advice from another health care provider. 
The practice of seeking a second opinion appeared to be far more prevalent in Bangkok than it 
is in the West and may reflect both traditional patterns of multiple resort and the more 
consumerist behaviour of patients seeking care in a private for-profit dominated health care sector.
In other respects however consumerist behaviour was less evident. Price appeared to play only 
a minor role in determining choice of provider. Respondents were, on the whole, reluctant to 
switch from a 'regular* provider despite increases in price or personnel changes. Few respondents 
were willing to complain even if they were seriously dissatisfied with the care received. Nearly 
half of those who had been seriously dissatisfied at a particular facility in the past, had since 
returned to that facility. There appeared to be an especially strong reluctance to confront 
personally a health care provider, thus the main consumerist activity took place before seeking 
care (for example searching for information) or after (for example obtaining a second opinion), 
rather than during a consultation. This tendency is partially culturally driven; in Thai culture direct 
conflict is rare and there is considerable fear of tat naa' or 'cutting face', that is offending 
someone or damaging their reputation. People are probably particularly reluctant to 'tat naa' with 
doctors who are held in high respect.
The differences in consumerist behaviour between respondents covered by different types of 
insurance were not as clear cut as initially anticipated. However this is not necessarily because 
insurance status does not influence consumer behaviour. Indeed the way in which public sector 
employees switched to public sector hospitals as the expected price of care rose suggests that 
insurance status does affect health care seeking behaviour. What was not anticipated was the 
complexity of insurance coverage amongst middle class groups, particularly those working in the 
private sector. Many private sector employees had private insurance or employer paid health 
insurance on top of their social security coverage, which considerably complicated the analysis. 
In particular, employer based schemes were of far greater significance than had been anticipated 
at the outset of die study. There are clearly issues here which require further research to help 
policy development in Thailand. Although a recent study has examined employer medical schemes 
for bank workers in Bangkok (Panichpathompong 1994) little is known still about the total 
population coverage and benefits offered by employer schemes. In addition a clearer
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understanding of how individuals with multiple insurance coverage use this coverage would be 
helpful for policy formulation on health insurance.
Very different degrees of consumerist behaviour were observed in public and private sectors. This 
was especially clear with respect to allegiance to a particular hospital, but it was also apparent 
in consumers' complaints. Consumers in the private sector appeared far more likely to switch from 
their regular hospital if certain aspects of the service changed, or to complain if they were 
dissatisfied with the care received. This implies that in more commercially oriented health care 
systems patients are inclined to be more active consumers.
The observed patterns of consumerist behaviour have implications for the form of competition in 
the hospital market. The low price sensitivity amongst consumers suggests that there is little 
pressure for price competition. Knowledgeability about and willingness to seek information on 
alternative providers may help stimulate quality competition. It was hypothesized in Chapter 4 that 
the weak institutional controls upon health care providers in many developing countries may mean 
that consumers are the key factor constraining inappropriate provider behaviour. Consumers' 
willingness to carry out search activity and to seek second opinions suggests that they may be 
partially effective in this role. However a reluctance to question health care providers during a 
consultation, means that consumers are in a particularly weak position where they perceive that 
they require immediate attention. This would suggest that the market for elective services where 
consumers have time to shop around or seek second opinions, is likely to work considerably better 
than that for emergency services.
9.3 COMPETITION
Analysis of competition in the market place found that hospitals facing higher levels of 
competition were more profitable and possibly charged higher prices. However it was difficult 
to disentangle fully the reasons underlying this.
To some degree the phenomenon may be explained by quality competition, certainly higher levels 
of expenditure and assets per bed were found in the more competitive parts of the market. It was 
initially supposed that quality competition was unlikely to be very prevalent in Bangkok because 
of the absence of certain institutional conditions such as non-profit ownership and high health
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insurance coverage. The fact that quality competition does appear to be prevalent in the market, 
may be partially attributable to higher levels of health insurance than was initially anticipated. In 
addition, it also points to the importance of quality signalling in the market. In Bangkok, there 
are few alternative sources of information on quality of care to the hospitals themselves. Thus 
signalling quality, through for example procurement of high technology equipment, may be a good 
investment for hospitals.
However even when quality differences between hospitals were explicitly taken into account, it 
was still found that hospitals in more competitive markets charged higher 'quality adjusted' prices 
and made higher profits than those in less competitive markets. The two possible explanations for 
this are supplier induced demand and the presence of rising search costs leading to increasing 
monopoly power for providers. The data suggested that supplier induced demand may be 
occurring in the Bangkok hospital market; those hospitals facing high levels of competition also 
had significantly higher admission rates than other hospitals. However it is difficult to assert with 
certainty that supplier induced demand was present because of a variety of other causal 
relationships which may explain the observed association. For example there was a strong positive 
association between the competition measures used and location in the centre of the city. Results 
of the consumer survey showed that those hospitals in the city centre tend to be accessed for more 
complex cases whereas hospitals on the outskirts of the city provided care for more simple cases. 
Higher admission rates and lengths of stay at centrally located hospitals may therefore be 
attributable to a more complex case load rather than supplier induced demand.
The interpretation of the correlation between intensity of competition, and admission rates is 
important. If this relationship is due to primarily to the provision of unnecessary services in order 
to increase revenues then it is clearly a matter for concern. However it appears likely that the 
explanation is more complicated; location in the city centre implies not only a greater level of 
competition but may also confer some kind of 'reputation' for more sophisticated or higher 
quality service. Such hospitals will therefore attract more complex cases, and it is still a relatively 
open question as to whether they over-pro vide services.
Ownership affected hospital conduct in the face of competition. A clear difference emerged 
between the conduct of stock exchange owned hospitals and other hospitals. Hospitals quoted on
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the stock exchange offered care of a higher quality and higher price than other hospitals, and at 
the same time made higher profits. This suggests that the superior access to finance which stock 
exchange ownership offers, gives hospitals a competitive advantage. There are a number of 
mechanisms through which this effect may occur. Competitive advantage could be gained through 
industry leadership in investment in high technology equipment. There are substantial advantages 
to being the first entrant into high technology equipment services, but also substantial risks. In 
the US it was estimated that high-technology equipment may take five years to make a profit 
(Cleverly 1992), therefore it requires commitment and financial strength to be a forerunner in 
these sorts of investments. It is clear from the data available on high technology equipment in 
Bangkok that stock exchange owned facilities have always been amongst the first to invest. Such 
investments may form part of a 'virtuous circle'. Cleverly (op cit) suggests that in the US, 
hospitals which had better reputations or gave the impression of higher quality could 'premium 
price' ie. charge prices higher than their quality advantage warranted. This is the same 
phenomenon as observed in Bangkok. Successful early investment in high technology equipment 
or new clinical techniques may bear benefits for the whole business. Cleverly further suggests that 
once hospitals have achieved this type of reputation, premium pricing may itself be taken as a 
signal of higher quality.
Little difference was found between the group of non-profit hospitals and private for-profit 
hospitals. In particular no difference in pricing policy between non-profit and for-profit hospitals 
was discernible once quality differences were taken into account. This may partially be an artifact 
of the price data used. Price information was collected principally from insured patients under the 
Civil Servant's Medical Benefit Scheme; it is possible that non-profit hospitals price differentiate, 
charging insured patients more than they charge others. It is certainly the case that non-profit 
hospitals (unlike for-profit ones) have a formal exemption policy for the indigent. However 
discussion with non-profit hospital directors suggest that only a small minority of patients are 
exempted. This leads to the conclusion that non-profit hospitals in Bangkok generally do not 
operate on a substantially different financial basis to for-profit ones. This mirrors evidence from 
the US which shows that non-profit hospitals have traditionally been operated along business lines 
and often make substantial surplus (Stevens 1989) On a provisory note, the cluster analysis in 
Chapter 6 suggested that there may be two types of non-profit hospitals; the old type such as 
Kwong Sui and Chongchin which had poor staff to bed ratios and very long lengths of stay, and
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the 'newer' type such as Mission and St Louis. The older type of hospitals were not included in 
the price analysis as there were insufficient price observations for them, but it is possible that they 
have stronger charitable element in their operations.
Even once factors such as quality of care, competition and ownership are taken into account there 
appears to be considerable unexplained variation in the price of hospital care in Bangkok. This 
is probably partly due to 'noise' in the data, but it may also reflect the fact that the market is 
simply not working well. The models of monopolistic competition described in Chapter 2 
suggested that when both product diversity and asymmetric information are present in the market, 
sellers may have market power, despite the presence of competitors. This is broadly the 
hypothesis of the increasing monopoly model. As both asymmetric information and product 
diversity are present in the Bangkok hospital market it is not surprising to find unexplained 
variations in price.
In the analysis in Chapter 8 it was found that the COMP and HHI indicators of competition 
produced more significant results than the BEDCOMP indicator, and that the COMP variable was 
generally stronger than the HHI variable. This pattern is of interest. The HHI indicator captures 
both the number of firms in the market and the degree of inequality in size of firms in the market. 
In traditional oligopoly theory these two factors together are likely to affect market power 
(Waterson 1983). However it would appear that in the hospital market in Bangkok the degree of 
inequality in size is not nearly as important as the number of firms in the market; this implies that 
market power is not derived in the manner that traditional theory predicts ie. through monopoly 
power, but through informational asymmetries relating to the number of hospitals in the market.
Pricing for normal deliveries was found to be far more predictable than that for acute appendicitis. 
This may be due to the fact that a normal deliveiy is an elective procedure and the prospective 
patient has sufficient time to compare potential care providers and make a rational choice between 
providers. Moreover there may be a strong 'reputation' effect; women giving birth probably have 
friends and relatives who have had a similar experience and from whom they can seek advice. 
Thus for normal deliveries problems of asymmetric information in the choice of a hospital may 
not be particularly acute. In contrast, patients are likely to have little time to plan an admission 
for an acute appendicitis operation and it is likely that advice from informed friends and relatives
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will be rather harder to secure than in the case of a normal delivery. The greater significance of 
asymmetric information problems for acute appendicitis operations is likely to make the market 
function more imperfectly; leading to a larger degree of unexplained price variation in acute 
appendectomies.
9.4 METHODS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
A variety of different methods for data collection and analysis were used in the study and it is 
not possible to consider all of them here. This section focuses upon the more innovative aspects 
of the study, and also identifies the main shortcomings in the analysis. The exploratory nature of 
this study needs to be emphasized. Virtually no previous studies of the nature of hospital or even 
health care competition in developing countries have been undertaken. There were no obvious 
methodological approaches to adopt and very little evidence about the types of competition in 
developing country health care markets, hence making it difficult to develop tight hypotheses 
about their operations. Furthermore the methods used in this study were constrained by the data 
available and the problems in accessing the records held by private providers themselves.
9.4.1 Data collection and processing
With respect to the survey methods used, the consumer survey which was implemented through 
employers worked well. Both public and private sector employers were extremely cooperative. 
Undoubtedly this was partly because the survey was implemented through the Ministry of Public 
Health; most independent researchers would not have received the same level of cooperation. 
Where stratification of a sample by employer or insurance group is desired then working through 
employers appears a very satisfactory way of proceeding. On the other hand the survey of private 
hospitals was less successful, the response rate was poor and the throughput data in particular 
were patchy. The low response was attributable to the break down of the registration process as 
a sanctioning mechanism. It would appear that either some form of sanctions or very strong 
incentives are required in Bangkok to induce private providers to give basic data to the Ministry 
of Public Health. However without the political will to implement either of these approaches the 
problems associated with planning and policy formulation based upon very poor data from the 
private sector are likely to persist. In addition there may be problems with the quality of some 
hospitals' aggregate patient data due to weak information systems. Although some private hospitals 
in Bangkok have state of the art information systems others have very primitive ones (Prokosch
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and Bunge 1995).
The collection of price data on private providers from the various government sponsored health 
insurance schemes was largely successful. The only drawback to this approach was that it was 
quite a time consuming one; a team of eight students was employed for several weeks to find and 
painstakingly go through large and often rather disorganized files at different government 
ministries and departments. Even then the number of cases on which price data were collected 
was rather small for the purposes it was used here. Future analysis of insurance records would 
benefit immensely from the computerization of existing administrative procedures. This would 
make it possible to carry out simple analysis, examining for example charges for different 
diagnoses at different hospitals or average lengths of stay by hospital, on a routine basis.
In the Bangkok context the data required to compute concentration ratios or the Hirschman- 
Herfindahl index based on patient flows were not available. This is likely to be the case in most 
developing countries. The measures of market concentration used in this study were rather 
simpler, based upon (i) the number of competing hospitals within a given market radius (ii) the 
share a particular hospital had of all beds in the market area and (iii) the Hirschman-Herfmdahl 
index based on bed number. The relative advantages and disadvantages of the different types of 
measures probably depends partly on the forms of competition prevalent in the market. However 
the measures are also extremely sensitive to how market area is defined. This study opted for an 
extremely simple definition of market area. Other studies have used more complex definitions 
based upon actual patient flows (eg. Robinson et al 1991) or alternative simple measures based 
upon administrative boundaries (eg. Noether 1988). Given the dramatic effect of definition of 
market area on competition indicators the relative advantages and disadvantages of different ways 
of defining markets requires more investigation.
This study used data from a variety of different secondary data sources as well as implementing 
two separate primary data surveys. There is clearly a question concerning the reliability and 
consistency of data taken from a variety of different sources. Frequently in the analysis the sample 
size changed as data on some variables were available for some hospitals and not for others. On 
the whole the data concerning private hospitals which was taken from secondary sources (such 
as the price data and the profitability data) appear more reliable than the information given by
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hospitals under the private hospital survey. Hospitals are obviously compelled by law and/or by 
their own financial interests to provide reasonably accurate data to the Ministry of Commerce and 
insurance funds. It is only through efforts, such as the one made during this study, to link the 
various sources of information that greater insight can be gained into what are valid and reliable 
data and what are not.
9.4.2 Data analysis
Multivariate analysis was used in Chapter 6 in order to examine the nature of product 
differentiation and to identify different clusters of hospitals. Whilst this analysis provided some 
insights into the nature of product differentiation and hence competition it is clear that the results 
were not clear cut and require careful interpretation. This is a well known problem of multivariate 
analysis, but does not prevent it from being useful for exploratory purposes. A further shortcoming 
of this analysis which was discussed earlier, was its failure investigate hospital product 
differentiation rooted in different product-mix or specialties.
A key problem with the analysis of the form of competition related to the fact that the 
concentration measures used were unable to distinguish between locational factors, which would 
appear very important in the Bangkok context, and market concentration. The confounding factor 
of location made it very difficult to determine the form/s of competition prevailing. However the 
problem lies not so much with the simplicity of the competition measures but with the way in 
which they were used. Even if more sophisticated measures competition measures were used, the 
same problems would have been encountered.
There are at least two approaches to resolving this problem. Firstly this study focused on the 
cross-sectional analysis of competition, comparing hospitals in the market who at the same point 
in time faced higher or lower degrees of competition. A longitudinal study may be able to 
determine better how a hospital, located either in the centre or on the periphery, responds to 
increasing levels of competition over time. However a longitudinal approach might also suffer 
from problems of confounding variables, for example changes in government policy, such as 
cessation of BOI support to capital investment, may make results difficult to interpret.
Secondly part of the problem relates to a limited understanding of how competition might affect
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the key variables (price, profitability, quality and service intensity) and in particular what 
functional form the relationship between these variables might take. This study used simple 
correlation analysis and scatter plots to examine the relationship between the variables but if there 
was a stronger notion of the underlying functional forms then more complex analyses might have 
been undertaken. For example it is possible that supplier induced demand or quality competition 
only become significant once a certain level of hospital market saturation is reached. This would 
suggest a non-linear relationship between the variables. Stronger behavioural foundations for the 
competition models are required in order to improve the means used to test them.
9.5 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION
The combination of approaches used in this study sheds light on the nature of hospital markets 
in Bangkok and in particular the three central hypotheses concerning the extent and nature of 
product differentiation, consumer search behaviour and the form of hospital competition.
A simple overview of hospital characteristics revealed a substantial degree of differentiation 
between hospitals, including both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Considerable 
concurrence was found between the consumer survey and the hedonic price analysis as to which 
hospital characteristics people thought to be important. On the whole people focus on those types 
of characteristics (ie. those related to the clinical quality of care) which health professionals would 
consider to be important.
In certain respects a high degree of consumerist activity was observed. This supports one of the 
initial hypotheses postulating that because of the institutional features of hospitals markets in 
developing countries, particularly the lack of a strong regulatory authority and the prevalence of 
the profit-motive amongst providers, patients would undertake a high level of search activities and 
consumerist behaviour. However in other respects, particularly in terms of price sensitivity, 
consumerism appears limited. It is not surprising therefore that no evidence of price competition 
between hospitals was found. There is evidence of quality competition, and it is also likely that 
models of supplier induced demand and increasing monopoly help explain hospital competitive 
behaviour in Bangkok.
Differences in behaviour between the stock exchange hospitals and the other hospitals in the
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sample was evident. Stock exchange hospitals tend to have higher prices and profitability than 
other hospitals even once their quality advantage is taken into account. The hedonic price analysis 
raised a question about reputation or prestige and it would appear that certain hospitals including 
many of the facilities quoted on the stock exchange benefited from a good reputation. Despite 
extensive discussion of reputation in the theoretical literature and its apparent importance in this 
study there is very little work examining how reputation is formed.
The study collected a substantial amount of data about private hospitals in Bangkok from 
secondary sources. For data collection from private hospitals these appeared to be more reliable 
than primary sources, however such data collection is problematic as the different sources of 
information need to be reconciled. The competition measures constructed for the study appear 
useful even though they are rather simpler than the measures often used. In future studies of this 
nature, a more careful consideration of hospital specialties (ie. product differentiation through 
variation in product mix), the formation and nature of hospitals' reputations, and the dynamics of 
competition would be useful.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
10.0 INTRODUCTION
This final chapter returns to the three hypotheses presented in Chapter 5 and questions whether 
they have been proven or not and, where appropriate, what extra information would be required 
in order to test them properly. Section 10.2 builds upon the discussion in the previous chapter of 
methodological strengths and weaknesses by more critically addressing problems with the data 
and non-availability of data. Alternative strategies for future research in this area are discussed 
in section 10.3 Section 10.4 considers the implications of the analysis for health policy in 
Bangkok and in 10.5 the political economy of reform in Thailand and potential obstacles to the 
recommendations are set out.
10.1 HYPOTHESES TESTED
10.1.1 Hypothesis 1
A high level of product differentiation in the hospital market in Bangkok contributes to problems 
associated with asymmetric information and also market segmentation.
The analysis suggested that there were substantial differences in the characteristics of hospitals 
in Bangkok. However it was not possible to trace directly the impact of this product 
differentiation upon the nature of competition. Our conclusions therefore are based primarily 
upon inference.
With respect to product differentiation we were interested in establishing whether, as often 
predicted, private hospitals had higher quality hotel aspects (such as promptness of service, 
luxury of surroundings etc.), whilst public hospitals offered higher quality clinical care. If this 
were the case then it would imply market segmentation with private hospitals being used for less 
severe conditions and public hospitals for more severe ones.
The multivariate analysis suggested that there were significant differences within the private 
sector; whilst some hospitals had veiy high quality characteristics in all dimensions others were 
poor in many dimensions. A small group of private hospitals were identified which seemed to 
perform well in terms of hotel aspects of care but poorly in terms of staffing. However this was
not a general pattern across the group, suggesting that the form of market segmentation 
frequently supposed was not present in the market.
This was supported by the findings from the consumer survey. For those respondents whose 
insurance coverage did not give them explicit incentives to move away from the private sector 
as care became more expensive, there was no observed tendency to seek public sector care for 
more severe conditions. This obvious form of market segmentation between public and private 
sectors was therefore not present.
Market segmentation in Bangkok takes more sophisticated forms. The consumer survey 
suggested that some hospitals were used predominantly for simple conditions and were hardly 
selected at all for more complex or severe conditions. At other hospitals utilization tended to 
increase with severity of the complaint. This pattern was observed within both the public 
hospital sector and the private hospital sector. The picture which emerges is not one of clearly 
segmented markets along lines of ownership, but rather of a gradation of characteristics between 
hospitals which is relatively independent of ownership.
With regard to the impact of product differentiation on asymmetric information and hence 
monopolistic competition the study is inconclusive. Product differentiation exists, but consumers 
were remarkably well (although not perfectly) informed about the differences between hospitals. 
Methodological difficulties encountered in establishing a link between asymmetric information 
and alternative models of competition are discussed in section 10.3.
10.1.2 Hypothesis 2
Market failure in health care is rooted in problems o f asymmetric information. Consumers in 
Bangkok will undertake a high level o f search activities and consumerist behaviour. Such 
behaviour will limit the scope for perverse forms o f competition such as supplier induced 
demand.
The literature review and chapter 8 demonstrated there were a number of different dimensions 
to consumerism and aspects of asymmetric information. As discussed in the previous chapter 
consumers in Bangkok were very 'consumerist’ in some senses and less so in others.
Although consumers were well informed about the facilities at different hospitals, willing to 
search out more information and seek second opinions, there were a number of dimensions in
which they did not act in a consumerist manner and this would allow scope for 'market failure'. 
Most notably: -
consumers were not strong during consultations: they were unwilling to complain if 
they thought they received inadequate care. Potentially this allows providers to offer 
unnecessary services during a consultation or to skimp on care provided  ^
consumers seek out information about hospitals but do so for only certain dimensions 
of care such as physicians and equipment. Potentially this would allow providers to cut 
comers on certain aspects of care such as nursing care;
consumers were not found to be price sensitive, this may partly be a product of high 
insurance coverage amongst respondents but even where consumers had only very 
partial coverage they were still unwilling to ask providers about price. Potentially this 
would allow providers to charge higher mark-ups on their products.
10.1.3 Hypothesis 3
Price competition is not the dominant form o f competition in the market. Price competition may 
exist in the market but so too will quality competition and/or supplier induced demand.
Results presented in chapter 8 and the discussion in chapter 9 suggested that price competition 
was unlikely to be present in the market place. Here we address whether the data found really 
prove this result.
In chapter 4 it was stated that price is based upon the average cost of a service plus a mark-up, 
and that the most direct test of price competition would be whether higher levels of competition 
eroded the mark-up. Thus it is possible that the higher prices observed in more competitive 
markets were due not to higher mark-ups but to higher costs, possibly associated with higher 
quality. There is indeed some evidence to support this perspective: both assets per bed and 
expenditure per bed seemed higher in more competitive markets.
Profitability was also found to be higher in more competitive markets, and it was suggested that 
this may be further evidence to refute the existence of price competition. However as equation 
(4) in Chapter 4 suggests, profits will also be affected by output. So a story consistent with the 
data, could be that higher competition leads to investment in quality, raising both costs (and 
hence prices) and throughput (and hence profits).
The price-index used in the analysis abstracts from issues of case-mix by focusing on prices for
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a basket of defined diagnoses. However case-mix may affect the findings on profitability. 
Investment in quality may enable a facility to provide more complex services than previously 
offered. If mark-up on more complex services is generally higher than on less complex ones, 
then a change in case-mix towards a more complex case-load, may result in higher profitability, 
whilst being consistent with generally lower mark-ups overall, and no change in total 
throughput. Again this scenario is consistent with the data: hospitals in the centre of the city 
faced higher competition and according to the consumer survey also tended to be used more for 
more complex conditions.
The investigation of die impact on the difference between actual price and quality adjusted price 
(price predicted by hospital attributes) was undertaken in order to tiy to assess whether higher 
prices in some hospitals in more competitive markets was due simply to higher quality. It was 
found that in more competitive markets, prices actually charged were higher than the prices 
which would be predicted given the quality configuration at the hospital. This led us to infer that 
even after quality factors are taken into account, prices are higher in hospitals that face greater 
competition. However as pointed out previously, prices are affected not only by mark-up but 
also by costs. The quality adjusted prices were based on an estimate of what people would be 
willing to pay for incremental quality: they do not necessarily reflect the cost of providing extra 
quality. Hence the results do not rule out the possibility that higher costs associated with higher 
competition force hospitals to lower mark-up, implying that quality and price competition co­
exist.
In conclusion, the results do rule out the possibility that price competition is the only form of 
competition in the market-place. However the results could be consistent with price competition 
and quality competition existing side-by-side, or alternatively there could be no price 
competition and purely quality competition in the market.
For the other forms of competition (supplier induced demand and increasing monopoly), the 
evidence, as discussed in Chapter 9, is unclear. The results on prices and profitability are 
consistent with supplier induced demand, although few advocates of the supplier induced 
demand model would argue that providers can actually increase profits in response to greater 
competition. The direct evidence on supplier induced demand is weak: neither measure of 
intensity of investigation increased in response to competition, and the finding of higher assets 
and expenditure per bed in more competitive markets is probably more likely to indicate quality 
competition than induced demand.
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10.2 BIAS AND DATA AVAILABILITY
Some methodological and data issues relating to the survey design, implementation and analysis 
of the various components of this study were discussed in section 9.4. This section extends that 
discussion.
Data availability
The most critical variable on which data were not available in Bangkok were hospital costs. 
Ideally, in order to test the existence of price competition we required data on hospital mark-ups 
over average variable cost by condition. Data on mark-up have not been commonly available in 
UK and US studies. Propper et al (1997) compute mark-up over average cost, based on data on 
the average cost by specialty by hospital and adjusting for case-mix. Gruber (1994) relied on net 
income as a proxy for mark-up. However, as discussed earlier, there are substantial problems 
with this proxy as it is also dependent upon costs and output.
The problem of lack of data on mark-up, and costs more generally in Bangkok is exacerbated by 
lack of data on patient throughput and case-mix. Without cost data, data on these variables is 
critical to a clearer understanding of how hospitals respond to competition. For example, data on 
hospital annual expenditure were available in Bangkok but without data on number of patients 
we were unable to establish whether changes in profitability could be attributed to changes in 
efficiency, or changes in patient flow. Even if data on patient throughput were available, lack of 
information on case-mix at particular facilities would be a critical barrier to reaching final 
conclusions about the impact of competition on hospital behaviour.
Use ofstated preferences in Consumer survey
The consumer survey presented respondents with a mixture of both hypothetical questions and 
questions about their actual choices. The use of hypothetical questions was necessary to get 
sufficient variation in the sample whilst operating within a limited budget. There are a however 
a number of well recognized problems with the use of data on stated (as opposed to revealed) 
preferences. People may not actually do what they say they will do in response to hypothetical 
questions (and there is no way of knowing whether they would) and there is also an observed 
tendency to over-state responses under experimental conditions (Adamowicz et al 1994, Kroes 
and Sheldon 1988). To what extent do these problems affect the reliability of the results?
There is no way of knowing whether respondents would actually do as they said but a number
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of factors suggest that the findings coming out of the survey are fairly reliable. First the survey 
used a mix of hypothetical and actual experience questions: for the section on extent of 
consumerist behaviour it is possible to compare responses to these two types of questions to 
check validity. For both types of questions, respondents consistently demonstrate quite a high 
degree of consumerism although this may be somewhat over-stated in the hypothetical 
questions. For example nearly 40% of the sample said that they had on a previous occasion 
sought a second opinion. In response to the hypothetical question on this issue, approximately 
77% of respondents answered that they would advise someone being diagnosed with cancer to 
seek a second opinion and 50% advised a second opinion for a Caesarian Section.
Second the questions asked in the survey were relatively straightforward, not requiring 
respondents to compare highly complex scenarios, and they referred to situations which 
respondents would have been familiar with. 8.4% of the sample had been admitted to hospital 
during the previous year and each respondent had on average 3-4 outpatient visits during the 
previous year, hence the decision making process which they were asked to reveal in response 
to the hypothetical questions was a familiar one. The relevance and familiarity of the context to 
respondents is likely to contribute to the reliability of responses (Vatn and Bromley 1994)
Consumer survey bias
A second major consideration in interpreting the results of the consumer survey is the bias of the 
sample to upper middle-class residents of Bangkok, and a bias towards those with insurance 
coverage. As discussed previously it appears that the principal users of private hospitals in 
Bangkok, particularly for inpatient care are the upper middle class. The sample selected for the 
consumer survey was therefore purposively biased towards this group. The level of knowledge 
among this group is probably more relevant to the question of the nature of competition between 
private hospitals, than the level of knowledge among the Bangkok population as a whole.
The high level of insurance coverage amongst the respondents is more perplexing. At the outset 
of the research it was thought that a significant proportion of the middle class in Bangkok would 
be uninsured, covered by neither the Social Security Scheme (if they worked in small 
enterprises) nor the Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme (if they worked in the private 
sector). As private health insurance coverage in Thailand is very limited they would not be 
covered by this either. However the high level of insurance found amongst respondents is a 
finding in itself. More consumers than anticipated do have an agent representing them in the 
health care market - though the effectiveness of this agent as a purchaser is doubtful.
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Reliability o f price data
This was discussed to some extent in section 9.4. Information on prices was gleaned from 
records held by insurance organizations (principally the Civil Servants’ Medical Benefit 
Scheme). Besides the relatively small sample size for each diagnosis examined there may also 
be concerns that prices charged to insured persons are not representative of prices charged to the 
uninsured. As argued in Chapter 5 this should not be a substantial problem as in most cases the 
private hospital is unlikely to know whether the person seeking care is insured or not. The 
person claims reimbursement through his or her employer and thus the only reason to anticipate 
bias in terms of prices charged to the uninsured is if providers explicitly ask a patient about 
payment status. The small sample size for computing the price index would not be problematic 
if each of the diagnoses examined were clearly defined and exhibited only limited variation in 
complexity. This is the case for some diagnoses (ie acute appendicitis and normal delivery), but 
for other cases included in the basket, part of the variance in price may be attributable to 
variance in severity. It is difficult to predict, what if any bias this would impart to the data.
10.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH
Linking consumer information and market competition
At the outset of the study we wished to make a link between the form of asymmetric information 
in the market and the prevailing form of competition. Whilst the study included separate 
components looking at each of these facets it was difficult to make the link between the twoie. 
to explore exactly how asymmetric information affected market functioning. Instead, results 
from the consumer survey study were used more broadly to cross-check findings from the 
market analysis to see if the two were consistent.
One approach to making a clearer link between asymmetric information and market competition 
would be to explore more narrowly defined markets (such as markets for particular specialties) 
where asymmetric information problems are different, but market institutions broadly the same. 
For example the cost of information on maternity care is lower than for other elective, but less 
commonly occurring conditions. A comparison of hospital behaviour in the maternity market 
versus another elective care market might therefore be illuminating.
Role o f physicians in affecting competition
Perhaps one of the most critical features of hospital markets which deserved closer attention in
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this study is the way in which markets for physicians and the manner in which physicians are 
paid interact with hospital competition. There are two angles to this issue. First whilst hospital 
managers have control over broad hospital policy on resource use, physicians make day to day 
decisions about resources. The degree of physician independence in decision making will affect 
the competitive strategies available to the hospital. For example, for physicians to induce 
demand there must be an incentive for them to do so, which implies that their fee or salary is 
linked to revenue collected by the hospital.
Based on how physicians in Bangkok hospitals are usually paid, it was suggested that in general 
only limited incentives exist for physicians to induce demand. Most physicians receive a salary 
and/or a fixed percentage of the physician fee, thus there is unlikely to be any incentive for 
physicians to order unnecessary medical investigations (although there would be incentives for 
physicians to advise medical intervention, such as surgery). More recent discussions with 
hospital directors in Bangkok suggest that the mode of payment for physicians may be altering, 
for example some private hospitals with Social Security patients now offer physicians incentives 
to contain costs. Even at the time of the study however, a certain group of physicians, namely 
those who own and operate small private hospitals, faced considerable incentives to induce 
demand. An interesting study might therefore compare service intensity between physician 
owned and operated hospitals, and investor owned hospitals.
The results of this study indicate that whilst consumers seek out information about certain 
provider characteristics such as physicians and equipment, when choosing between hospitals, 
they neither value highly, nor attempt to measure, dimensions such as nursing profile. This 
would suggest that for private hospitals wishing to reduce costs whilst not losing custom it 
would be possible to skimp on nursing. Chapter 7 however indicated that although this is the 
case for a handful of hospitals it is not the rule. Why might this be so?
Hospitals depend critically upon physicians in order to attract patients. As the research 
demonstrates physician reputation is an important factor in choice of hospital. Physicians with 
good standing may be unwilling to work in hospitals with poor nursing profiles, for fear perhaps 
of bad nursing practice leading to mishaps which may be attributed by patients to them. In this 
case the market for physicians exerts a beneficial influence upon the hospital market which 
consumers are unable to do. Only physicians who have no (or poor) reputations, or who own the 
facility, might be willing to work in hospitals with low nursing ratios.
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Further research on factors that physicians take into account when choosing where to do private 
practice, and how this differs by age, experience, and specialty would contribute to our 
understanding of hospital markets in Bangkok.
Price setting in hospitals
This study hypothesized that prices in hospitals would be set based on average cost with some 
mark-up, and that the mark-up would vary according to the level of competition in the market. 
However virtually nothing is know about how hospitals in Bangkok actually set prices. Hospital 
directors are clearly sensitive to competition to some extent as they talk about an ‘acute 
appendicitis price index’ suggesting that hospitals are well aware of what their competitors 
charge for this particular intervention. Micro-level studies exploring in detail the relationship 
between prices and costs in particular hospitals and how this varies by condition would be 
helpful to further attempts to explore hospital competition. Unfortunately gaining access to 
private hospitals in order to carry out such a study would be very difficult.
10.4 RELEVANCE OF RESULTS TO HEALTH POLICY IN BANGKOK
10.4.1 Expanding and strengthening purchasing agencies
In Thailand the Social Security Scheme (SSS) has been given high priority by the government. 
However perhaps inadequate attention has been paid to the informational aspects of the Scheme 
so that although a potentially effective agent for consumers exists, the possible powers of this 
agent have not been exercised to the full.
In 1994 the information system under the SSS was still not fully functional, although the 
Scheme itself had been running for three years. No attempts had been made to implement 
systems of peer review or ensure the quality of care in individual cases. Whilst guidelines exist 
about which facilities are able to be main contractors under the Scheme, the guidelines cover 
structural facilities only (eg. the number of beds must be at least 100), they do not cover aspects 
of staffing. Networks of health care facilities are becoming increasingly important under die 
SSS, particularly in Bangkok (Siriwanarangsun 1996). Only the main contractor must provide 
information to the SSS to show that it meets standards, associated facilities in a network are very 
weakly regulated.
In other countries in the South-east/East Asia region there seems to have been similar problems. 
Both Korea and the Philippines have well established social health insurance schemes with a
relatively wide population coverage, but offer inappropriate incentives to health care providers. 
For example in Korea most care is paid for on a regulated fee-for-service basis but fees for high- 
technology equipment are unregulated, this has led to an explosion in high-technology 
equipment (Yang 1993). In the Philippines reimbursement rates under the health insurance 
scheme (Medicare) favour small hospitals leading to rapid growth in this sector of the industry 
(Griffin et al 1994). Careful structuring of payment mechanisms under health insurance schemes 
is essential to generate appropriate incentives. Attention to the informational roles of purchasers 
has also been weak.
During the early 1990s health insurance in Thailand was viewed by policy makers almost solely 
as a mechanism for risk pooling, rather than as the development of a strong, informed, 
purchasing agent. Slowly this perception is changing, but the capacity building necessary to 
create a strong purchasing role is likely to be a slow process. Government institutions and 
officers in Thailand had no prior experience of collecting or processing the type of data required 
by the Social Security Scheme. Although public health care facilities provide summary 
information on the number of cases, diagnoses, surgical and non-surgical cases, and channel this 
to the MOPH, no data have previously been produced on a case-by-case basis, nor data on 
procedures performed, or costs per case. Concepts of peer review and managed care are only 
gradually reaching the Thai health care sector.
Social health insurance schemes may exert power as a payer and an agent for insured persons. 
The power of health insurance schemes can be exerted along two important dimensions: by 
changing incentives facing providers and by alleviating problems of asymmetric information.
Payment mechanisms define the incentives which providers face. The current use of fee-for- 
service payment under all schemes in Thailand except the SSS encourages providers to over­
provide services, and there is no incentive for providers to offer cost-effective, efficient care. By 
shifting the form of payment away from fee-for-service, providers can be encouraged to reduce 
costs of care, and provide quality care more efficiently.
Recommendation 1: Under all state sponsored health insurance schemes in Thailand the 
insurance organization should move from simple fee-for-service reimbursement o f providers to 
schemes which through their mode ofpayment create stronger incentives for efficient, and cost- 
effective care (such as case-based payment and capitation based payment).
Purchasers of health care possess a number of different tools which can be used to help prevent
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the problems which arise due to asymmetric information, these include-
- limiting the providers eligible to provide care under the scheme and thus restricting patient 
choice. Such preferred provider-type initiatives can be used to channel patients to those 
providers who are most efficient. Having a limited list of providers and specific 
requirements for being eligible to join the list means that purchasing organizations can 
encourage appropriate management practices such as regular attendance at continuous 
education training for physicians, adoption of internal quality control procedures etc.
- providing information about the characteristics of alternative providers to help consumers 
make more informed choices about providers. This may be achieved through simply 
publishing indicators of quality (such as staffing inputs, waiting times, rates of hospital 
acquired infection etc) or alternatively through developing accreditation schemes.
- reviewing the quality of care provided by different hospitals. Health insurance 
organizations have privileged access to detailed information on the process of care which 
puts them at a unique advantage in terms of conducting peer review, or the routine analysis 
of investigation rates, surgery rates etc by hospital. Such review allows the purchaser to 
identify facilities or even specific physicians who are engaging in inappropriate practices.
Recommendation 2: The Thai government should actively encourage and support insurance 
organizations in Thailand to become more active purchasers o f care, engaging in the type of 
practices outlined above.
Traditional forms of regulation which focus upon monitoring adherence to rules are difficult to 
implement in the health care sector as they rely upon access to information which is difficult to 
gather. Purchasers of health care face fewer problems in accessing information as they can link 
the provision of this information to financial payment. Placing much of the responsibility for 
regulation upon active purchasing organizations is therefore a desirable strategy.
Recommendation 3: Those who are currently not covered by a health insurance scheme have no 
effective purchaser for them. The Thai government should try to bind such individuals into 
purchasing schemes. Although one approach would be to expand existing health insurance 
schemes to cover this group, this may not be necessary. By restructuring how government funds 
are spent, existing funds may perhaps be used to bring about more effective purchasing.
Whilst the Social Security Organization in Thailand has received extensive external technical 
assistance to develop capacity in information collection and processing it is entirely dependant 
upon contractor hospitals being able to provide it with this information. Hospital information 
systems in private hospitals vary considerably but are commonly very weak indeed. Much of the
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data needed by the purchasing agent, and indeed much of the data desirable for this study, are 
not available at the hospital level. Where management has put information systems in place 
within hospitals, these rarely provide incentives for physicians to give accurate information.
Recommendation 4: Greater attention needs to be paid to building accurate information systems 
within public and private hospitals, which offer benefits to hospital management, staff and 
purchasing authorities.
10.4.2 Strengthening the Regulatory Process
In Thailand the Ministry of Public Health should ensure structural quality through the 
registration process and facility inspection, and the Medical Council should police procedural 
aspects of quality through its complaints mechanisms. However a number of weaknesses are 
evident in this system. First the Medical Licence Division grants registration to private facilities 
on the basis of very little information, and inspection criteria are similarly crude, focusing on 
factors such as the space per bed and adequate toilet facilities. These are the very factors which 
consumers can easily judge for themselves. Other factors far more important for the quality of 
clinical care and much harder for the consumer to judge, such as nurse staffing ratios are not 
considered. The annual Health Resource Survey asks hospitals for much of the information 
required to examine relevant aspects of quality of care. However in the past the survey has been 
accorded low priority, follow-up has been poor and response rates very low. The information 
collected in the survey is necessary not only as part of monitoring by the MOPH but also 
potentially to pass on to consumers to help them make more informed choices.
Recommendation 5: Completion of the Health Resource Survey should be linked to re­
registration o f facilities. Only thosefacilities which complete and provide accurate information 
on the health resource survey should be allowed to re-register.
The consumer survey completed as part of this study showed a fairly high rate of dissatisfaction 
with both public and private hospitals. Much of this dissatisfaction was with factors such as 
waiting time and the politeness of staff; issues which do not require Medical Council attention, 
however several respondents, in this small scale survey, also alleged improper medical practice 
(including incorrect diagnoses and the provision of unnecessary services), yet the number of 
complaints which come before the Medical Council each year is minuscule. It is the 
responsibility of the MOPH to ensure that the Medical Council does fulfil its mandate and 
makes available to the public an effective complaints mechanism.
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Recommendation 6: The MOPH in Thailand should more actively monitor the Medical Council 
and ensure that it provides an effective and accessible mechanism for complaints to be heard 
and wrongs redressed.
The consumer survey also indicated that many patients felt reluctant to ask the price of care. 
Thai regulation states that in all hospitals (both public and private) an up-to-date price list should 
be displayed. Despite the fact that this is the type of regulation which could be relatively easily 
enforced it is widely flouted.
Recommendation 7: The Medical Registration Division in Thailand should ensure that all 
hospitals do display a price list as set out in existing regulations.
10.4.3 Market structure
Recent literature on competition in hospital markets (Zwanziger et al 1994) emphasizes that in 
order for a strategy of purchaser-led competition between providers to be successful two 
conditions must prevail, (i) there should be alternative providers from which purchasers can buy 
care and (ii) these alternative providers should have excess capacity. The hospital market in 
Bangkok more than fulfils both of these conditions and thus organized purchasers should be 
able to bring about substantial efficiency improvements in the provision of health care.
Without active purchasers, the presence of multiple competing providers, operating at low 
capacity can be problematic. Health policy in Thailand, and in many developing countries 
implicitly acknowledges this. Countries often have target ratios for hospital beds per head of the 
population, suggesting that once this target has been met there are limited benefits to further 
hospital bed provision. Hospital concentration may also have a direct impact on quality of care; 
if hospitals are operating at low capacity then they are unable to move down the learning curve 
as there is likely to be low utilization of specialist services, this in turn may give rise to poor 
clinical outcomes.
US experience warns of the problems in trying to limit investment in health care though 
regulatory approaches (Joskow 1980), but in Thailand government has not only neglected the 
issue of potential over-supply but has actively encouraged further supply of services. In 
Bangkok the Board of Investment (BOI) has played a critical role in the development of the 
private hospital sector. BOI support provided corporate tax holidays for periods of up to five 
years, waivers for import taxes and various other fiscal advantages. Such support has been 
extended to new hospitals and to hospitals expanding their facilities. BOI activities were
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undertaken with very limited reference to the MOPH, and the BOI is at least partially 
responsible for the current over-supply of hospital beds in Bangkok. In addition close links 
between government and some private sector hospital investors has resulted in tax waivers on 
certain types of high technology medical equipment (such as CT scanners) whilst import taxes 
must be paid on regular medical supplies.
Recommendation 8: The Thai government should not subsidize new private providers (either 
through the BOI or blanket schemes providing tax relief on imports of medical equipment) in 
areas where the target bed to population ratio has already been surpassed.
Most of the data collected for this study relate to 1992. Since then there has been considerable 
further expansion in hospital beds. More recent discussions with hospital directors found that 
many felt they were now facing considerable competition. Moreover a new range of competitive 
strategies were becoming evident. Increasingly hospitals were attempting to differentiate their 
product from others by emphasizing a particular sort of service such as a cardiac centre or an 
alternative birthing centre. Under the Social Security Scheme there is now extensive 
'networking' of facilities. Hospitals and clinics of different sizes are linking to provider networks 
so that insured patients registered at one hospital can seek care throughout the network. This 
enhances accessibility but may also restrict competition between providers in the manner of a 
merger or acquisition. Some large hospitals were establishing satellite centres which would 
channel patients from outside of Bangkok to the parent facility. Such strategies are a form of 
vertical integration and as such may be anti-competitive. Market structure seems still to be 
evolving and confronting the Thai MOPH with new regulatory challenges.
One notable feature of the health care market structure in Thailand is the lack of clearly defined 
referral mechanism from primary to secondary care services. Whilst active purchasers may help 
relieve the effects of asymmetric information it is unlikely that they can do this fully: 
appropriately motivated primary care gatekeepers may be an additional strategy which Thai 
policy makers and health insurance schemes should pilot. Under certain schemes (such as the 
Civil Servants Medical Benefit Scheme) pilots tests could encourage beneficiaries to register 
with primary care providers who would then advise as to when it was appropriate to seek 
secondary level care, assist the insured person to choose between alternative hospital providers, 
and help monitor the appropriateness of hospital care provided.
Recommendation 9: Thai policy makers and health insurers should pilot schemes using primary 
care gatekeepers to help guide insured persons choice of hospital and ensure that care received
at the hospital facility is appropriate.
10.4.4 Consumer Information
The smaller proportion of non-profit facilities and less extensive health insurance coverage in 
Thailand would suggest that quality competition would be of less significance in Thailand than 
in the US. However the analysis here suggested that quality competition is important. More 
extensive health insurance coverage than initially anticipated is part of the reason for this, but it 
is also probable that investing in quality, particularly highly visible quality, is important as a 
signalling device. To the extent that quality investment brings about real improvements in 
service quality then it will enhance welfare, but there is likely to be an exogenously costly 
element to the signal. For example Bangkok is already extremely well supplied with high 
technology equipment compared to countries and cities of much higher income levels 
(Nittayaramphong and Tangcharoensathien 1994) and it seems unlikely that further investment 
in high technology equipment benefits anyone other than the investing hospital.
Educating consumers may change how they make judgements about different health care 
facilities and thus what sort of signals providers are inclined to make. The consumer survey in 
Bangkok found that on the whole people were active consumers, seeking out information and 
giving importance to appropriate variables such as the skills of doctors. However presumably 
signalling through equipment and facilities remain important because of the difficulty in judging 
more valued variables. The government may be able to facilitate the exchange process by 
publishing information on, for example, doctor qualifications, doctor to bed and nurse to bed 
ratios by hospital. An alternative approach is to encourage the development of accreditation 
schemes. These have an advantage in that hospitals wish to be accredited and thus have an 
incentive to disclose information.
Recommendation 10: The government should publish indicators o f quality at all public and 
private hospitals to help consumers make more informed choices between providers. Initially 
this list o f indicators should be a very simple one building upon the data submitted under the 
Health Resources Survey.
Recommendation 11: The government should give priority to developing hospital accreditation 
schemes in Thailand as this also allow consumers (and purchasers) to make more informed 
choices between providers.
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10.5 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN THAILAND
The foregoing discussion suggests a program of reform in Thailand to strengthen the hand of 
purchasers and empower consumers further so as to move the market towards a more efficient 
outcome. There are a number of political economy obstacles to these reforms.
The likely political problems in strengthening the regulatory process should not be 
underestimated. The data collection methods used in this study attempted to link annual re­
registration of private facilities with the collection of detailed information about hospital 
structural quality, with only limited success. Staff at the Medical Registration Division did not in 
general feel that they had sufficient power vis a vis private hospital directors and owners to 
prevent them from re-registering their facility if they had not completed the survey form. This 
‘capture’ of regulatory agencies by the organizations which they are trying to regulate is a 
relatively commonly observed phenomenon, however in Thailand it is made more complex by 
the close linkages between public and private health care sectors. The most notable form of this 
is the fact that many public sector physicians and health policy makers also hold posts, or own, 
or have financial interests in private hospitals.
Most of the non-stock exchange owned (and some of the publicly quoted) hospitals in Thailand 
have some physician ownership. It is traditional for government doctors to work during the 
evening in a private clinic or hospital. The most influential doctors, with high reputations are 
able to make the most substantial amount from private sector practice. Thus in considering 
reforms relating to private health care providers in Thailand, the Ministry of Public Health is 
constantly aware of the reaction which will come from its own staff. Opposition to private sector 
reforms may result in public sector unrest. Even at very senior levels in the MOPH this overlap 
between public and private sectors persist; Ministers of Health, and senior policy makers have 
all maintained significant financial interests in private sector health care whilst occupying posts 
which required them to formulate policy about the private sector.
Recommendation 12: The Ministry of Public Health should adopt a policy whereby senior 
policy makers in the Ministry must resign from any posts held in the private health care sector 
or sell any financial interests they have in the sector when taking up their post.
A further barrier to the implementation of reforms is the tiered nature of health insurance 
coverage in Thailand. Only the most affluent (or unhealthy) are likely to have private health 
insurance coverage, but civil servants and parastatal employees have full coverage of expenses
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in public hospitals and significant benefits in private hospitals. Whilst the capitation payment 
under the Social Security Scheme may imply 'fewer frills' in the care provided to those under the 
Scheme, one hundred percent of costs are covered by the Scheme so long as the insured person 
uses the facility (be it public or private) with which they are registered. People working in the 
informal or agricultural sectors, which still constitute the large majority of the population, tend 
to have lower incomes, less political voice and poorer access to health care.
Reform of the system of health financing in Thailand so as to provide more effective purchasing 
agents for insured persons may seem to imply a levelling of the different schemes and/or a 
constraint upon consumer choice. For example provider payment reform of the Civil Servants 
Medical Benefit scheme is currently under discussion and it would seem to be beneficial to shift 
the payment arrangements for this scheme on to a basis similar to that for the SSS so as to 
remove incentives for the excess provision of services. However to the extent that civil servants 
are perceived to have better benefits than private sector workers covered by social security they 
would resist such a reform. Similarly the development of procedures for utilization review, or 
the requirement that second opinions are sought for expensive treatments would most likely 
seem an unnecessary imposition to most government workers. Opposition to the reforms from 
these, more privileged groups, therefore seems likely.
Despite the surprisingly high level of insurance identified in the consumer survey, many of the 
Thai population are currently not covered by any form of health insurance. Extending health 
insurance coverage to these groups, and thus providing them with an effective purchasing agent, 
provides even greater challenges as this exercise would be costly and might also imply some 
kind of levelling between health insurance schemes.
Consumer education may help lower the opposition to reform, although it is unlikely to remove 
it altogether. As in many developing countries more medicine is often viewed by the consumer 
as better medicine, and name-branded products as better products than generic ones. Given the 
likely physician opposition to reform it seems necessary to at least create allies of consumers so 
that they appreciate that establishing strong purchasing agents is entirely in their interest.
Recommendation 13: Consumer education campaigns advising consumers o f the potential 
problems associated with over-consumption o f certain health care services (ie X-rays and 
drugs), scope for the provision o f unnecessary services, and the advantages o f generic drugs 
should be run, as the government ties to strengthen the purchasing role o f insurance schemes.
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Appendix 1
Description of Main Insurance and Medical Benefit Schemes in Thailand
In Thailand there are a number of medical benefit schemes providing free health care services to 
priority or vulnerable groups within the population, such as the young, the old and the indigent, 
however these schemes only provide access to public sector providers and have quite restrictive 
conditions associated with them. They are not discussed here. Instead the focus is upon health 
insurance schemes. Five types of schemes are identified and discussed.
i. The Civil Servants' Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS)
This scheme caters only for government employees (both current and retired) and their dependants 
(spouse, parents and up to three children). The number of dependants actually covered by the 
Scheme is unknown and hence the estimate of the total number of people covered under the 
Scheme (6.4m in 1992) is a fairly conservative estimate based upon the number of current and 
retired civil servants. In terms of population coverage the CSMBS is the largest of the health 
insurance schemes.
Payment is made on a fee-for-service basis. For care received in public hospitals by civil servants 
and their dependants the scheme is billed directly. For care received in private hospitals the civil 
servant must request reimbursement from the Scheme based upon the hospital invoice. Differential 
rates of reimbursement are accorded to public and private sectors encouraging people to use 
public providers. However there is extensive private sector use under the Scheme which is 
normally associated with significant co-payment. The routine records for the Scheme, contain 
information on charge by different categories of fee, diagnosis, length of stay, hospital and patient 
characteristics (ie. sex, department where the civil servant is employed, and whether the patient 
was the employee him or herself, or a dependant). There is no reimbursement under the Scheme 
for outpatient care sought in the private sector.
The CSMBS is operated from the Ministiy of Finance (MOF). Until recently the MOF has been 
a very passive purchaser of care. Claims are not computerized and hardly analysed. However the 
spiralling costs of care under the CSMBS are beginning to become a matter of concern and during 
the past couple of years discussions between the MOF and MOPH have taken place about the 
future of the Scheme.
ii. The Social Security Scheme (SSS)
The Social Security Scheme established in 1991 provides a number of benefits including medical 
care to formal sector workers in Thailand. It covers the employee him or herself only and does 
not cover dependants. During the first three years of the Scheme all employers with twenty or 
more employees were covered. It is planned to extend this to all formal sector employees. In 
1993, about 3 million workers were covered by the Scheme.
Premiums are shared between insured persons, their employers and the government with each 
contributing 1.5% of the insured person's salary. For the bulk of medical care, payment is made 
on a capitation basis to the insured person's main contractor hospital. Since the start of the 
Scheme the annual capitation payment has remained at 700Baht. The main contractor hospital 
should have at least 100 beds and meet certain other requirements laid down by the SSS. This 
hospital may then sub-contract certain services to a lower level facility and/or supra-contract
249
services to a more sophisticated hospital. Increasingly networks of providers are forming. In 
addition to services paid for under capitation there are separate funds to cover maternity care and 
emergency services.
The Maternity fund under the Social Security Scheme
The maternity benefit under SSS is the only benefit which covers dependants (spouses) as well 
as the employees. As it covers persons who are otherwise uninsured and may actually be resident 
in different areas from their spouses it was decided not to pay for this benefit through the 
capitation scheme. Instead a lump sum payment of Baht 2500 is paid to each woman for the 
delivery of her first and second child. The woman claims this amount from the Social Security 
office. It is not necessary for the woman to present proof of payment in order to claim this 
amount, but nonetheless many do.
The Emergency fund under the Social Security Act
This is designed to cover emergency cases where insured persons are unable to reach their main 
contractor hospital. Under this circumstance they may seek care from any provider but are 
subsequently reimbursed up to a limited ceiling. There is extensive co-payment for most 
emergency care sought. The fund does not differentiate between public and private providers.
iii. The Workmen's Compensation Fund (WCF)
The WCF covers the cost of care for illnesses and injuries incurred as a result of employment. 
Only formal sector employees are covered. Patients may seek either public sector or private sector 
care and are fully reimbursed up to a ceiling of B30,000 (approximately £670). Only a minority 
of cases cost more than this. Routine records contain essentially the same information as those 
under the CSMBS.
iv. Private Health Insurance
Private health insurance has expanded considerably during the past 5-7 years but still remains a 
relatively minor source of health care finance. At present it seems largely to serve as 
supplementaiy insurance for people already covered by social security, or as a means of cover for 
those who do not fall under the Social Security Scheme. Health insurance is offered in association 
with life insurance by a number of companies and six local companies specialize in health 
insurance alone. Companies normally offer a range of packages including different benefits. The 
mean premium per insured person under a health insurance company in 1988 was Baht 1,379 and 
the average reimbursement was B588.
v. Employer based health insurance schemes
When this research was initiated very little was known about employer based schemes. Although 
it was known that such schemes existed amongst certain white collar workers (such as bank 
workers) the extent of coverage was unknown and no studies had explicitly addressed the 
phenomenon. Moreover it was assumed that with the establishment of the Social Security Scheme, 
employer based schemes would gradually die out. In fact as this research and other more recent 
research suggests this is not the case (Panichpathompong 1994). In order to attract and retain 
white (and sometimes blue) collar employees many firms have now established their own 
employer based health insurance scheme in addition to the SSS.
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Appendix 2
1993 Private Hospital Survey
1. Objectives
In this survey the researchers ask for information about hospital beds, human resources and 
throughput. This information is requested in order to help formulate policy on private hospitals 
and improve coordination between public and private sectors. There are five categories of 
information requested.
1. Personnel, both full time and part time
2. The number of beds over the years 1990, 1991, 1992
3. Hospital throughput over the years 1990, 1991, 1992
4. Supply of preventive services
5. Fee exemption policy
2. The respondent
The respondent should be the director of the hospital
3. Time frame
Information is requested for calendar years 1990, 1991 and 1992.
4. Agencies responsible
This survey is a collaborative piece of work between the Medical Licence Division, the Health 
Statistics Division and the Health Planning Division, of the Ministiy of Public Health.
5. Content of the form
The form has 5 parts:
Part 1 - Basic information 
Part 2 - Human resources 
Part 3 - Hospital beds 
Part 4 - Throughput 
Part 5 - Exemption policy
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Part 1 - Basic Information
This part of the form duplicated the form usually filled out by the private hospitals when 
registering at the Medical Licence Division. The objective of including this (where information 
was already available) was to add weight to the form and encourage private hospitals to take 
it seriously.
1. Personnel employed during the year 1992
A full time employee is anyone who works a minimum of 40 hours per week in your 
establishment (including lunch breaks etc). A part time employee is anyone who works less 
than 40 hours per week.
1. Doctors
2. Dentists
3. Dental assistant
4. Dental nurse
5. Pharmacist
6. Pharmacist assistant
7. Registered nurse
8. Technical nurse
9. Practical nurse
10. Midwife
11. Nutritionist
12. Medical technician
13. Asst medical technician
14. X-ray technician
15. X-ray assistant
16. Physical therapist
17. Occupational therapist
18. Health educationist
19. Medical statistician
20. Social worker
21. Nurse assistant1
22. Laboratory technician1
23. Other
1 Although there is an official MOPH training for these cadres it is most common for 
private hospitals to train their own staff to do these jobs. However it was decided against 
asking explicitly 'number of self trained nurse assistants' etc, because strictly speaking such 
self-training is illegal and therefore hospitals may underreport (or not report at all) the number 
of such staff.
Part 2 - Human resources
Type of personnel Number of Full 
time
Number of Part 
time
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2. Number of doctors by specialty, employed during the year 1992. 
Specialty Part time Full time
1. General practitioner
2. Pathologist
3. Anatomical pathologist
4. Clinical pathologist
5. Internal medicine
6. Haematologist
7. Gastroentorologist
8. Cardiologist
9. Chest medicine
10. Neurology
11. Dermatology
12. Psychiatrist
13. General surgeon
14. Orthopaedic surgeon
15. Neuro surgeon
16. Urologist
17. Plastic surgeon
18. Paediatric surgeon
19. Anal-rectal surgeon
20. Thoracic surgeon
21. OB/GYN
22. Paediatrics
23. Radiologist
24. Diagnostic radiologist
25. Radiology therapist
26. Nuclear medicine
27. Anaethatology
28. Opthamology
29. ENT
30. Forensic
31. Physiatrist
32. Public health specialist
33. Other
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3. Staff summary over the years 1990 - 1992
1990 1991 1992
full part full part full part
time time time time time time
1. Doctors
2. Professional 
registered nurse
3. Technical nurse
4. Pharmacist
5. Dentist
Part 3 - Hospital Beds
4. Beds available over the years 1990 - 1992
1990 1991 1992
1. General beds
2. Observation beds
3. Private beds
4. ICU beds
5. Operating theatre beds
6. Delivery beds
Part 5. Private and semi-private beds: charge per night in 1992
Type of bed No. of rooms Baht per bed per night2
1. Semi-pnvate beds
 beds per room
 beds per room
 beds per room
2. Private single rooms3
Type of room______
Type of room______
Type of room______
2 Excluding food
3 Private hospitals will frequently have different categories of single bedded rooms: superior, 
deluxe, VIP etc.
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Part 4 - Hospital Throughput
6. Patient statistics 1990-1992
1990 1991 1992
1. Number of outpatient visits
2. Number of inpatient admissions
3. Number of hospital days
4. Number of ICU cases
5. Number of surgical cases
6. Number of deliveries
7. Number of Caesarian sections
7. Preventive care provided during 1992
1992
1. Number of BCG immunizations
2. Number of Polio virus immunizations
3. Number of ANC visits
4. Number of Family Planning visits
5. Number of dental check-ups
Part 5 - Exemption Policy
8. Does your hospital have any policy to exempt, either partially or fully, those with a low 
income?
[]Yes  
[ ] No
If yes, how many % of your total patients were exempted during 1992?
Outpatient Inpatient
1. Totally exempted
2. Partially exempted
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Appendix 3
Data Sheet used for collection of price data from CSMBS
Data enterers name:. 
Govt Dept:____
Pg No:
Clai 
m ID
Case
No.
Hospi
tal
Claimant Patient Sex Dx LOS Drugs IV
Fluid
Blood Invest­
igation
Spec­
ial
Invest­
igation
Medi­
cal
Appl­
iances
Operat
ion
Anaest
hetic
Room
ft
food
Doctor
Fee
Other
s
Curr
-ent
Pens
ioner
Cuir
ent
Pens
ioner
Pare
nts
Spou
se
Chil
d
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Appendix 4
CtaMtraflni of IP prte  tadea be»ed i» — li t in  ml i  «■ |« h <
Mxtrix 1 • Trimmed mean price bjrhoaptal by Obgmu
Cattail
Appaxldtis N Ncnml deliver N Gnlritix N Thariborie
KLUAY NAM THAI 13 US 1 12345.30 3.00
KARUNA PTTAK 12400 I
BANGBORN HOSPITAL
VKHAYUDHT 22722 1 24457.50 4.00 15090.23
BANOJARK POLYCLINIC 2*99.00 1.00
PCTCHKA3EM BANOKAE
PAT ANAVEJ 1767.00 1.00
BANOMOD 0750.00 2.00
BANONA 6505.00 1.00
SOOKSAWAT POLYCUN1C
RATBURANA 3219.00 1
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC
MAYO HOSPITAL 17099.25 12.00 4535.71 7 10211.67
BANGKOK CHRISTIAN *667 1 11159.25 4.00
SRIWICHAI 25410.00 1.00 1990.00 4 0405.00
SRIW1CHAI2 7700.00
PASJCHAAOEN
PAOLO MEMORIAL 17200 2 9991.33 3.00 3663.22 9 0350.10
BANGPAI HOSPITAL 10771.50 2.00 3932.50 2 4017.00
BANOPAKOK HOSPITAL
PETCHARAVEJ 1SS21 1 30000.00 1.00 5054.00 1 5513.00
KRUNOTHON 1S404 3 227SI.33 3.00 246S.OO
PA1PANYA
KASEMRAJ 10390 1 9335.00 6.00
VIBAWADI 2006*67 3 22*32.67 3.00 7440.00 2 127*3.50
ST LOUISE 14044 4 21209.33 6.00 7701.00 2 12937.00
BAMROONORAJ 24523 1 2505* 50 0.00 19190.00
CAMDXIAN 12713.00 2.00 2*50.00 1 1(2*4.00
BANOKUNTD5N
LADKABANO 3004.00 5.00 1330.00 1
RAMA SOOKSAWAT 10710 1
BANOPHO HOSPITAL 63*2.00 3 14727.25
PHYATHAII 2215S.4 5 22325.43 23.00 3235.00 2 104*5.00
PHYATHAI2 19095 5 1*7*2.33 12.00 22104.00 2 45*05.00
MISSION 4010.90 10.00 *453.50
BANGKOK HOSPITAL 1277.06 3 200*0.07 27.00 13522.50
YAOWARAK 17000.00 1.00 2930.67
SIAM HOSPITAL 15230 4 21675.00
DECHA
SUKHUMVTT I3349.S 2 10524JO 4.00 5219.00
ANANT PATANA
HUAACHEW 10703.10 7 *000.23 34.00
RAMKAMHAENO 15715.0 5 15301.00 0.00 3*22.50 2
THONBURI 18S94.S 5 10940.00 5.00 3109.00 1 225*4.50
PROMIT 32631.00 1.00 9*07.00
MAHESAK 20009 1
MITAPAAP
YANHOPC 2610.00 1
SAMmVEI 29S11.00 1 5*333.00 2.00 7977.00 1
CHONOCHIN
BANOPAKOK POLYCLINIC *900.00 1 5000.00 1 2210.00
SAENAVBCHAKAN
HUAYKWANO 993.33 3
WICHANYUDHT
KLONGTON
DOWKHANONO
CHAOPMIYA 15472.00 1 3400.00
NAN-AR *000.00 1.00
YOTSAE
MITAPAP
TOTAL 400450.49 510071.0* 192.00 9700( 20 40.00 2*7901.04
MEAN IN (ROUP 106S5.44 10145.97 5105.70 11995.90
N
4
3
21
51
11
21
21
4
2
1
2
2
31
1
10
1
1
1
53.00
Peptic
Piulum N Hypcrtcadon N Ulcer N Diaxhon N Brcodttx N Dixbete* N R x m a j i N
*576.55 11 7555.50 2 *71*00 2
1731.00 1
1153.33 6
3077.00 2 1564*00 1 1244.00 1
550.00 1 2(00 1 027.00 1 0214.00 2 5470.00 1
620.00 1
2932.50 2 2970 1
02*0 1 54*2.00 1 29*6.00 1 4150 1
2600.67 3 2609 I 9333.5 2
030 1 o r  .50 2 (160.00 1
3197.10 5 03(7 t 5449.00 3 3720.12 33 4900.04 14 659*50 4 0062 3
1077.00 1 0474.00 1 29S4.S3 0 494* 1 1613*07 3 5299 1
2000.17 0 1910 4 2140.67 3 204*00 10 2200 2 2210.00 1
2250.00 1 19*2.50 2 3590.00 1
7220 2 3731.00 1 (220 1
4*00.00 1 *173.06 6 0375.57 S 0400.30 11 901* 7 1234*10 10 13140.5 4
45*2.00 1 4045 2 2057.25 * 14790.00 1 5074.4 5
1720.00 1
5037.00 1 *013 1 5929.40 5 7021 2 47(00.00 1 11474.75 4
3574.07 3 10441.00 2 5319 4 9902.00 4 12120.07 3
3034 2 3*17.00 1
2405,00 2 2093.33 3 5311.67 6 26*1*4 19 4739 3 10332.00 2 175* 1
3199 1 12407.00 3 4519.33 12 003*67 3 15471.40 5 24*02 2
711*00 1 4229.00 1 r 2 9 1 *0*1.67 3 5592.75 4
150*3.00 1 25254.00 3 22392.5 2 50082 1
17*0.00 1 1070 1 9707.00 2 3596.67 3 11443.50 2
6000.00 1
4212.5 2 3370.00 1
0016.75 4 299*00 6 *630.67 3
4017.50 2 12(72.25 4 105*1.75 4 6962.59 17 10779.17 6 17940.42 12 15997.67 0
9922.50 4 141*2* 5 4000.00 1 7140.94 1* 5537.5 2 25721.47 15 7163.33 3
3712 2 3486.00 1 7219.40 5 0*70.33 3 0841.00 2 3(470 1
6*10.00 1 5251.S0 5 20202 3 21941.00 4 197*1 2
2150.00 2 2274.67 3 3955.00 5 2900 1 11025.00 2 2940 1
3*73.00 2 7205.5 2 10020.00 I 4279.25 4 1*015.00 2 1
22*04 1 5764.00 2 1243*00 2 1(S35 1
3522.50 4 3511 1 4744.75 4
1312.00 2 12712 1 4429.00 1 1793JO 2
2203.75 4 4162 2 4504.25 4 1001 1
5112.60 5 6739 4 2422.00 1 5003.00 11 7*19 1 125r.OO 5 9706.67 3
5164.B ( 111*3.07 0 9447.00 2 9140.6* 22 5201J7 7 15026.56 16 US20J *
0377.00 1 9*10 1
0449 1 *91.00 1 11000.40 5
1733.33 3 22*0.00 2 5550.00 1
3992.5 0 •045.00 1 1930.00 5
11100 1 *599.00 1 5*47.50 2 41029.25 4 28244.33 3
1520 1
1196.67 3 9301.07 3 1553.33 6 1095.00 2 2320 1
*70 1 1070.00 1 2*50 1 7*0 1
1*00 2 950.00 2 1450 1
710.00 1
1794 1
1750 3 430.00 1
5240.00 1
2170.00 1
03*0.00 1
3(90.00 1
(*305.04 02.00 1936*2.10 90.00 104410.99 50.00 232154.29 275.00 16*990.3* 72.00 389997.S6 120.00 3235(5.07 05.00
3*39.35 6247.(1 6*50.46 4464 J I 0759.*0 12580.5* 12445.5*
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Appcndh 4 - coBttnied
Mmfe 2 - ratio a fb oq iu l m aii prict to group mM npria, «id ip pricaindm
Cm bni Paptic
AppauUdtii Normal dattvrr Oatriia Thrombotii firrinMi HypMcnfloii Ulcer
KLUAY NAM THAI 79 76 137
KAHUNA PIT AK 74
BANOBORN HOSPITAL
VICHAYUDHT 134 131 126 SO 228
BANOJARK POLYCLINIC 16
PETCHKASEMBANOKAE 14 43 9
PATANAVH 11 9
BANOMOD 42
BANONA 41 101
SOOKSAWAT POLYCLINIC
RATBURANA 63
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC 10
MAYO HOSPITAL 110 89 83 83 102 80
BANGKOK CHRISTIAN 52 69 28 93
SRIWICHAI 157 39 54 69 31 31
SRIWICHAI2 64 33
PAS1CHAROEN
PAOLO MEMORIAL 103 62 72 S3 123 131 93
BANOPA] HOSPITAL 47 77 33 119 65
BANOPAKOK HOSPITAL 45
PETCHARAVEI 111 186 99 46 131 128
KRUNOTHON 110 141 21 93
PATPANYA 38
KASEMRAJ 62 38 63 34 78
VIBAWAOI 120 141 146 107 51 182
ST LOUISE M 132 152 108 104
BAMROONORAJ 147 139 160 220
CAMILLIAN 79 56 132 46 17 142
BANQKUNTIEN
LADKABANO 19 26
RAMA SOOKSAWAT 100 67
BANOPHO HOSPITAL 123 123 157
PHYATHAI1 133 138 63 137 120 206 242
PHYATHAI2 114 116 433 382 258 227 58
MISSION 29 70 39 SI
BANGKOK HOSPITAL 30 124 113 177
YAOWARAK 103 24 56 36
SIAM HOSPITAL 91 181 153 114 133
DBCHA 366 84
suKHUMvrr •0 102 44 144 36
ANANT PAT ANA 36 203 65
HUAACHIEW 64 34
RAMKAMHAENO 94 93 75 133 108 35
THONBURI 113 105 61 188 133 179 138
PROMIT 202 82
MAHESAK 136 103
MITAPAAP 25
YANHII PC 51 64 117
SAMTnVEI 179 361 136 178 126
CHONOCHIN
BANOPAKOK POLYCLINIC 33 98 18 31 150
SAENAVBCHAKAN 14
HUAYKWANO 19 29
W1CHANYUDHT
KLONOTON .
DOWKHANONO 28
CHAOPHRYA 93 28
NAN-AR 30
YOTSAE
MTTAPAP
NoU: HcMpial for which thtre w tn  obMivatkmf on lea  thai four dugnoaaa wen txdudad from Iht autyiit
Numbarc
DUnhoM Bronctiitii Diabctea Pruumoiua IPindtx diagnoM
169 69 106.18 5
39 36.34 2
26 12.92 1
28 124.98 6
17.93 1
139 43 30.19 3
10.00 2
66 44 30.48 3
123 24 33 64.23 3
ERR 0
38 39 75 38.94 4
IS 65 30.11 3
83 73 32 49 00.66 10
67 73 128 43 69.32 8
46 33 IS 53.06 9
44 29 42.49 4
107 30 66 67.50 3
143 142 98 106 102.38 11
60 118 46 73.00 8
44.80 1
133 104 380 92 141.03 10
234 79 79 103 107.42 8
S3 71.83 2
60 70 82 14 57.80 9
101 98 123 200 126.93 10
95 129 64 43 101.41 9
366 331 431 290.32 7
81 91 82.96 8
134 134.39 1
22.31 2
73 SL02 3
67 69 108.05 3
156 159 143 129 147.90 11
160 82 204 58 190.30 11
162 102 34 309 104.32 8
US 300 174 159 151.85 8
89 44 88 24 38.23 8
96 143 133.62 7
279 151 220.01 4
106 88.70 6
40 86.07 4
49 62 36 13 46.32 6
113 116 100 78 94.91 10
205 77 124 95 129.06 11
143 145 143.08 4
20 87 91.66 4
31 44 40.16 3
43 68.96 4
131 326 227 210.44 8
22 22.49 1
35 13 19 52.20 8
24 42 6 21.38 4
21 12 20.30 4
16 15.90 1
27 26.34 1
10 18.87 2
117 79.48 3
49 49.08 2
143 142.90 1
87 87.13 1
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Q'NAIR NUMBER
SURVEY OF
CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS 
OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN BANGKOK, 
AND HEALTH CARE SEEKING BEHAVIOUR.
INTRODUCTION FOR RESPONDENT
We are doing a study exploring people's health care seeking behaviour and their preferences 
over different types of health care, particularly hospital care. The information from this study 
will be used to help inform the policy of the Ministry of Public Health and thus improve the 
provision of health care services in Bangkok.
We would like to ask you a few questions about the factors you consider when seeking health 
care, and what you think of hospitals in Bangkok. It will take about 30 minutes to complete 
the questionnaire and any answers you give will, of course, be strictly confidential.
This is a collaborative piece of work between 
the Health Services Research Institute, 
the Health Policy Bureau 
and
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
P l e a s e  r e t u r n  t h i s  
q u e s t io n a ir e  t o : -
by
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1. HOSPITALS CHARACTERISTICS VALUED BY CONSUMERS
1.1 Imagine that you have a minor accident at home, for example you cut your hand with a 
knife and need outpatient care for some stitches, how important would each of these 
characteristics be when you chose which hospital to go to. Can you rate the importance of 
different characteristics on a scale of 1 (for very important) to S (not at all important) and 
circle the appropriate number:
1. Ease of access
2. Comfortable surroundings
3. A doctor who clearly 
explains the treatment
4. A competent doctor
5. Sympathetic and polite 
nursing staff
6. Inexpensive care
7. Prompt service
8. Someone you know who works 
there
9. A hospital with modem 
equipment
very quite not not at
imp. imp imp imp imp
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1.3 Now imagine that you need to go to hospital for an operation, for example an appendicitis. 
How important would each of these factors be in your choice of hospital (please circle the 
appropriate response:
very quite not not
imp. imp imp imp imp
1. Ease of access 1 2 3 4 5
2. Comfortable surroundings 1 2 3 4 5
3. A doctor who clearly
explains the treatment 1 2 3 4 5
4. A competent doctor 1 2 3 4 5
5. Sympathetic and polite
nursing staff 1 2 3 4 5
6. Inexpensive care 1 2 3 4 5
7. Prompt service 1 2 3 4 5
8. Someone you know who works 1 2 3 4 5
there
9. A hospital with modem 
equipment
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1.3 This question should only be answered by women
If you were to become pregnant, and wanted to deliver the baby in hospital, how would you 
rate each of the following factors when deciding which hospital to use?
very quite not not
imp. imp imp imp imp
1. Ease of access 1 2 3 4 5
2. Comfortable surroundings 1 2 3 4 5
3. A doctor who clearly
explains the treatment 1 2 3 4 5
4. A competent doctor 1 2 3 4 5
5. Sympathetic and polite
nursing staff 1 2 3 4 5
6. Inexpensive care 1 2 3 4 5
7. Prompt service 1 2 3 4 5
8. Someone you know who works 1 2 3 4 5
there
9. A hospital with modem
equipment 1 2 3 4 5
1.4 Now imagine that you really did cut your hand in a domestic accident and needed to go 
to hospital, which hospital would you go to?
Why? ease enter up to three reasons and prioritize them 1, 2, 3)
1. Ease of access
2. Comfortable surroundings
3. A doctor who clearly 
explains the treatment
4. A competent doctor
5. Sympathetic and polite 
nursing staff
6. Care which is not expensive
7. Prompt service
8. Someone who works there
9. Modem equipment 
lO.Other (please specify)____________
261
1.5 Imagine that you were at home and were experiencing severe abdominal pain for a 
number of hours, and needed an appendicitis operation which hospital would you actually go 
to?
Why? (Please enter up to three reasons and prioritize them 1, 2, 3) 
[ ] 1. Ease of access
[ ] 2. Comfortable surroundings
3. A doctor who clearly 
[ ] explains the treatment
[ ] 4. A competent doctor
[ ] 5. Sympathetic and polite
nursing staff 
[ ] 6. Care which is not expensive
[ ] 7. Prompt service
[ ] 8. Someone who works there
[ ] 9. Modem equipment
[ ] lO.Other (please specify)_____________
1.6 This question should only be answered by women.
If you really were pregnant, which hospital would you choose to have the baby in?
Why? (Please enter up to three reasons and prioritize them 1, 2, 3) 
[ ] 1. Ease of access
[ ] 2. Comfortable surroundings
3. A doctor who clearly 
[ ] explains the treatment
[ ] 4. A competent doctor
[ ] 5. Sympathetic and polite
nursing staff 
[ ] 6. Care which is not expensive
[ ] 7. Prompt service
[ ] 8. Someone who works there
[ ] 9. Modem equipment
[ ] lO.Other (please specify)_____________
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PART 2. KNOWLEDGE OF HOSPITALS IN BANGKOK
2.1 The table below lists 15 hospitals, can you mark *yes' or 'no' according to whether (i) 
you have heard of the hospital before (ii) you personally have used the hospital before 
and (iii) you know of friends or family who have used the hospital.
HOSPITAL HEARD OF USED
PERSONALLY
FAMILY OR
FRIEND
USED
Yes No Yes No Yes No
1. PHYATHAII
2. PHRA MONGKUT
3. CHULALONGKORN
4. BANGKOK 
CHRISTIAN
5. KRUNGHDON
6. CAMILLIAN
7. CENTRAL/KLANG
8. SAMITIVEJ
9. KLUAY NAMTHAI
10. RAMKAMHAENG
11. HUACHIEW
12. RAMATHIBODI
13. BAMGROONGRAD
14. THONBURI
15. RAJAVITHI
Even if you have not had direct experience of many of these hospitals, can you tell us, out 
of the hospitals in the table above:
2.2 Which of these hospitals do you think is the most expensive?
2.3 Which of the private hospitals is the cheapest?_______
2.4 Which has the best doctors?____________________
2.5 Which is the most comfortable?__________________
2.6 Which is the least comfortable?_________________
2.7 Which has the best range of equipment?_____________
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PART 3. CONSUMERIST BEHAVIOUR
3.1 In the past one month can you recall having heard, seen or read any advertisement for a 
private hospital?
[ ] No, please go to part 3.2
[ ] Yes, please answer the following questions
3.1.1 Which hospitals was this for?
and which of these is the most familiar?
3.1.2 What was the content of the advertisement?
3.1.3 Where did you see or hear it, was it>
[ ] on radio
[ ] on television
[ ] in a newspaper or magazine
[ ] on a billboard
3.2 How often have you ever asked someone for advice about which hospital to go to?
[] Frequently
[] A few times
[] Once
[ ] Never (go directly to 3.3)
3.2.1 Who did you ask for advice? {tick more than one box if  necessary)
[ ] Mother [ ] Other relative
[ ] Father [ ] Colleague
[ ] Brother [ ] Friend
[ ] Sister [ ] Doctor
[ ] Son [ ] Other health personnel
[ ] Daughter
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3.3 When seeking care in the public or the private sector, do you ask to see the price list or 
enquire about the price before you seek health care? (please make a tick in the box)
Public Private
Yes, ask for price
No, don’t ask
3.4 When seeking care in the public or private sector, does the hospital inform you of the 
price of care before you use the service?
Public Private
Yes, hospital informs
No, hospitals doesn't inform
3.5 Do you regularly seek care from the same hospital?
[ ] No, got directly to 3.6 
[ ] Yes, please answer the following questions
If yes
3.5.1 Which hospital is i t? __________________
3.5.2 If this hospital was to increase its prices by 50% would you continue to go 
to it?
[] Yes
[] No
[] Depends
3.5.3 If your regular hospital was to change the doctor whom you normally see, 
would you keep using it?
[ ]  Yes
[ ]  No
[ ] Depends
3.5.4 If you were to move away from the locality o f your regular hospital would 
you keep using it?
[ ] Yes
[ ] No
[] Depends
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3.6 Have you ever been very dissatisfied with the service you received from a particular 
hospital?
[ ] No, please proceed to question 3.7
[ ] Yes, please answer the following questions
3.6.1 Which hospital was this?__________________
3.6.2 Why were you so dissatisfied?
3.6.3 What did you do about it? (Tick more than one box if appropriate).
[ ] Accept and do nothing
[ ] Complain
[ ] Resolve not to use again
[ ] Change hospitals immediately
[ ] Other, please specify___________________
3.6.4 Have you ever been back to this hospital again?
[ ]  Yes
[ ]  No
3.7 Have you ever felt that you were charged too much for care received at a hospital?
[ ] No, please go straight to question 3.8
[ ] Yes, please answer the rest of question 3.7
3.7.1 Which hospital over-charged you?
3.7.2 What did you do about it? (Tick more than one box if appropriate). 
[ ] Negotiate
[ ] Accept and pay as required
[ ] Make a complaint
[ ] Refuse to pay
[ ] Decide never to use the hospital again
[ ] Other, please specify_______________
3.7.3 Have you ever used this hospital again?
[ ]  Yes
[ ]  No
3.8 Have you ever sought a second opinion from another doctor?
[ ]  Yes
[ ]  No
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements in 3.9 to 3.14.
3.9 If a relative is diagnosed as having cancer by a general doctor in a public hospital then 
you should advise them to seek a second opinion.
[ ] Strongly agree 
[ ] Agree
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
3.10 If a relative is diagnosed as having cancer by a specialist at a University Teaching 
hospital then you should advise them to get a second opinion.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
3.11 If a relative is diagnosed as having cancer by a specialist in a private hospital then you 
should advise them to get a second opinion.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
3.12 If, some time before her delivery, your sister is told by a general doctor at a public 
hospital that she should have a Caesarian section as the baby is to big to deliver easily, then 
you should advise her to seek a second opinion.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
3.13 If, some time before her delivery, your sister is advised by a specialist in a University 
teaching hospital that she should have a Caesarian section as the baby is to big to deliver 
easily, then you should advise her to seek a second opinion.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
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3.14 If, some time before her delivery, your sister is advised by a specialist in a private 
hospital that she should have a Caesarian Section as the baby is to big to deliver easily, then 
you should advise her to seek a second opinion.
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Agree
[ ] Uncertain
[ ] Disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree
3.15 Please can you tell us how you rate the following elements of health care provided in 
public and private hospitals, according to the time of day at which you seek service.
Mark the services as:
5 - excellent 
4 - good 
3 - average 
2 - not very good 
1 - very poor
Public Private
a. Promptness of service
b. Availability of doctors
c. Politeness of staff
d. Promptness of investigation facilities
a. Promptness of service
b. Availability of doctors
c. Politeness of staff
d. Promptness of investigation facilities
a. Promptness of service
b. Availability of doctors
c. Politeness of staff
d. Promptness of investigation facilities
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PART 4. PERSONAL DATA
4.1 Sex [ ] Male
[ ] Female
4.2 Which district in Bangkok do you currently stay in?
4.3 What is your occupation? ________________
4.4 What is the highest level of formal education which you completed:
[ ] Completed primary
[J Completed secondary
[ ] Completed vocational training
[] Completed under-graduate training
[ ] Completed graduate training
4.5 Is the total monthly income of your household in the region of:
[ ] Less than B3,000
[] B3,000 to B5,999
[] B6,000 to B9,999
[ ] B 10,000 to B 14,999
[ ] B 15,000 to B29,999
[] More than B30,000
4.6 How old are you? [__ ]years
4.7 Are you covered by any health insurance scheme or medical benefit scheme?
[ ] No
[ ] Yes, if so please indicate the type below (mark more than one if necessary) 
[ ] Social security scheme
[ ] Civil servants medical benefit scheme 
[ ] Parastatal medical benefit scheme
[ ] Private health insurance
[ ] Free medical card scheme for low income
[ ] Other (please specify)
[ ] None
4.8 Would you say that you are:
[ ] veiy healthy
[ ] quite healthy
[ ] not very healthy
[ ] not healthy at all
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4.9 For ambulatory care, how many visits have you made during the last year to:
A public hospital [ ___]
A private hospital [ ___ ]
A private clinic [ ___ ]
4.10 During the past year have you ever been admitted to hospital?
[ ]  Yes
[ ]  No
If yes then
4.10.1 Which hospital/s were you admitted to:
n
4.10.2 How many days did you spend in hospital [ __]
****THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP****
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Appendix 6
Price indices by private hospital
Acute
IP Index N* Normal Del N Appendicitis N  Room N
BAMROONGRAJ 290.52 7 25658.50 6 24523.00 1 1345 84
DECHA 220.01 4 490 13
SAMTTTVEJ 210.44 8 58333.00 2 29811.00 1 1400 70
PHYATHAI2 190.30 11 18782.33 12 19095.00 5 1015 170
BANGKOK HOSPITAL 151.85 8 20080.07 27 8277.66 3 900 78
PHYATHAI1 147.90 11 22325.43 23 22158.40 5 993 180
PROMIT 143.08 4 32631.00 1 1000 22
PETCHARAVEJ 141.05 10 30000.00 1 18521.00 1 800 44
SIAM HOSPITAL 133.62 7 15236.00 4 610 54
THONBURI 129.06 11 16940.00 5 18894.80 5 568 245
VIBAWADI 126.93 10 22832.67 3 20068.67 3 587 90
VICHAYUDHT 124.98 6 24457.50 4 22722.00 1 1130 170
BANGPHO HOSPITAL 108.05 5 540 47
KRUNGTHON 107.42 8 22781.33 3 18404.00 3 592 58
KLUAY NAM THAI 106.18 5 12345.36 3 13118.00 1 258 44
MISSION 104.52 8 4610.90 10 525 48
PAOLO MEMORIAL 102.58 11 9991.33 3 17260.00 2 362 156
ST LOUISE 101.41 9 21269.33 6 14044.00 4 630 41
RAMKAMHAENG 94.91 10 15301.60 6 15715.60 5 487 122
MAHESAK 91.66 4 26009.00 1 550 18
SUKHUMVIT 88.70 6 16524.50 4 13349.50 2 550 31
ANANT PATANA 86.07 4 245 21
CAMELLIAN 82.96 8 12713.00 2 481 23
RAMASOOKSAWAT 81.02 3 16710.00 1 300 8
MAYO HOSPITAL 80.66 10 1769925 12 41752.00 1 470 214
CHAOPHRYA 79.48 3 15472.00 1 510 7
BANGPAI HOSPITAL 73.00 8 10778.50 2 400 34
PATPANYA 71.83 2 400 20
BANGKOK CHRISTIAN 69.32 8 1115925 4 8667.00 1 653 46
YANHH 68.96 4 323 28
PASICHAROEN 67.50 3 300 5
BANGNA 64.23 5 6565.00 1 558 8
RATBURANA 58.94 4 300 20
YAOWARAK 58.23 8 17000.00 1 300 31
KASEMRAJ 57.80 9 9335.00 6 10390.00 1 300 126
KARUNA PITAK 56.54 2 12400.00 1 850 5
SRIWICHAI 53.06 9 25410.00 1 300 106
BANGPAKOK POLYCLINIC 52.20 8 8900.00 1 270 28
BANGMOD 50.48 3 6750.00 2 300 11
PETCHKASEM BANGKAE 50.10 5 158 8
NAN-AR 49.08 2 8000.00 1 685 2
HUAACHEW 46.32 6 866623 34 10703.86 7 344 54
SRIWICHAI 2 42.49 4 300 20
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC 30.11 3 300 6
LADKABANG 22.51 2 3064.00 5
SAENAVEJCHAKAN 21.58 4 250 21
HUAYKWANG 20.30 4 350 11
DOWKHANONG 18.87 2 265 6
PATANAVEJ 10.00 2 1767.00 1 210 30
SOOKSAWAT POLYCLINIC 300 1
BAANMAI 300 1
RAMINTRA 300 3
BANGPAKOW 175 4
N* indicates the number of diagnoses for which data was available. 
N denotes the number of cases for which cases were available.
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Appendix 7
Principal components Analysis 1
NAME
- Scores by hospital
PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PCS
KWONG SUI HOSPITAL 0.6851 2.1129 -1.9992 -0.2537 •1.1651 0.6343 0.0213 •0.9069
HUACHEEW HOSPITAL 2.0073 1.4686 -0.4492 0.6287 23904 -2.4878 -13312 -2.4577
suKHUMvrr h o s p i ta l 0.1672 -0.4314 0.8852 -1.6643 0.3991 13841 -03722 •0.9846
PAATBUNYAR HOSPITAL 0.5016 0.0118 0.0210 0.4785 -0.3430 05462 0.7721 41.7054
PATANAVEJ HOSPITAL -0.4567 0.3774 41.4661 0.0349 41.6645 0.9697 0.1784 -13256
S AMTTIVEJ HOSPITAL 1.6192 -0.6421 0.0164 -0.1818 -13677 0.7648 •0.1580 41.0753
TEPTHARIN HOSPITAL •0.1165 -0.9242 41.8947 0.4812 -1.3608 -1.1447 41.7364 0.7834
ST LOUIS HOSPITAL 1.4920 0.4491 41.9116 -1.5596 41.8211 0.2921 05380 0.0742
KARUNA PHTTAK HOSPITAL -0.1340 0.1141 -0.0167 41.9000 0.0821 4)5727 41.2640 -0.9900
BAANMAI POLYCLINIC -0.9849 1.0626 -0.7067 41.2107 0.0673 41.6113 0.9188 413647
RATBURANA HOSPITAL -0.2993 -0.1939 41.7516 0.1943 •1.3014 -0.3279 -1.7042 41.0625
RAMA STJKSAWAT HOSPITAL •0.8592 0.6058 1.2434 0.0685 0.5157 -1.0684 0.7215 41.0608
BANGPAKOW POLYCLINIC -1.4318 1.4806 0.1425 0.3717 1.4580 41.5201 1.4267 1.8618
BANGKUTIEN HOSPITAL 41.7340 -0.7066 -0.0182 -0.3147 41.3241 -1.6083 •1.1013 03609
ROMS AI POLYCLINIC -1.3867 -0.2159 41.9522 -0.5010 0.1728 0.0628 0.7023 •0.4476
BINTONG POLYCLINIC -1.1009 1.3512 41.9819 3.0256 1.8685 0.7479 4)5837 -0.4647
BANGPAI HOSPITAL 0.3625 0.1890 41.2781 41.2964 -15900 41.9571 13213 0.0445
PHETKASEM-BANGKAE HOSP 0.1993 1.0726 41.2774 1.7183 -1.1004 1.4554 -2.0436 0.9087
KASEMRAD HOSPITAL 0.1069 -0.7895 1.0063 0.4605 41.9485 41.4596 0.8201 41.9695
WICHANYUT HOSPITAL -0.7986 0.1904 0.1081 1.2436 41.2207 0.9337 0.0065 -1.4616
PASICHALOEN HOSPITAL -0.4760 0.9500 2.3218 41.5369 2.0251 15226 41.5145 1j6319
CHIT AMARIN HOSPITAL •0.9690 -1.2759 0.0707 0.1766 -0.2364 -1.3058 -1.3095 41.0643
PATANAPAT •0.5596 0.5123 1.8191 0.1024 41.3518 •1.6244 0.0267 05019
RAMKAMHAENG HOSPITAL 1.0374 •0.9420 0.3171 1.8892 41.3091 41.1343 0.4916 41.8594
BANGNA HOSPITAL 0.0617 41.9675 0.6724 1.2829 41.1070 03395 2.5074 41.0465
MISSION HOSPITAL 1.2091 0.3900 41.1421 -1.1006 0.0745 0.0678 41.3756 0.0297
BANGPOO HOSPITAL -0.1272 -1.6503 0.0211 41.6904 0.7327 -0.0458 -1.7751 1.6158
KRUNTHEP HOSPITAL 2.4505 -0.8976 •1.3863 1.2100 0.7215 0.4795 1.4795 2.4740
KLONGTON HOSPITAL 0.0892 41.1291 0.8988 0.6900 -13767 4)5843 0.5172 -0.6798
KANARPAAT POLYCLINIC •1.4036 41.6555 41.8431 41.6601 0.7305 13844 0.0117 0.0420
SAHAVEJ POLYCLINIC -1.4828 -0.3323 -1.5682 -1.0305 0.1239 41.7612 03750 0.1358
CHONGCHIN HOSPITAL 0.1777 1.9892 -1.8055 41.9448 -03130 0.9868 4)3679 15351
DECHA HOSPITAL 0.1429 -0.0265 -0.1616 -1.2684 41.1972 -0.8815 1.0407 0.9728
PHYATHAI2 0.9506 41.8316 -0.5497 41.4161 1.4619 41.1641 -2.0505 0.0855
KRUNGDHON HOSPITAL 0.8722 0.0161 1.1295 -1.5303 41.0210 0.7805 0.1195 41.1304
YAOWARAK HOSPITAL -0.1803 1.3745 1.6272 0.3255 -0.9435 -0.9655 41.0812 0.4668
THONBURI HOSPITAL 1.6194 41.2322 0.0307 41.4399 23176 -1.0969 1.4464 0.0562
V.S. POLYCLINIC 0.1974 1.7993 2.0449 0.4344 -15723 0.1221 -0.8706 13755
PAATSIAM POLYCLINIC •0.6822 0.0737 0.7511 -1.6532 05513 1.3328 03093 -15133
ANANPATANA HOSPITAL •1.1163 41.8016 41.4753 41.9053 41.0710 41.9907 41.5142 0.0577
MAY YO HOSPITAL 0.9557 41.5172 1.0845 0.0321 0.1658 1.7594 41.0772 -0.9474
WIPAWADI HOSPITAL 0.3305 -1.5825 -0.3255 1.0305 0.0895 0.0237 0.1906 1.2196
CENTRAL GENERAL HOSPITA -0.0859 -151088 0.7441 0.6862 0.4123 0.9316 41.8553 4)3313
CENTRAL POLYCLINIC •1.8499 ■0.9371 41.9947 0.4931 0.1456 0.9906 0.9436 4)3844
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Appendix 7 continued
Principal components Analysis 2 - Scores by hospital
NAME PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6
KWONG SUI HOSPITAL 
HUACHIEW HOSPITAL
sukhumvtt hospita l
PAATBUNYAR HOSPITAL 
PATANAVEJ HOSPITAL 
SAMmVEJ HOSPITAL 
TEPIHARIN HOSPITAL 
ST LOUIS HOSPITAL 
KARUNA PHTTAK HOSPITAL 
BAANMAI POLYCLINIC 
RATBURANA HOSPITAL 
RAMA SUKSAWAT HOSPITAL 
BANGPAKOW POLYCLINIC 
BANGKUTIEN HOSPITAL 
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC 
BINTONG POLYCLINIC 
BANGPAI HOSPITAL 
PHETKASEM-BANGKAE HOSP 
KASEMRAD HOSPITAL 
WICHANYUT HOSPITAL 
PASICHALOEN HOSPITAL 
CHIT AMARIN HOSPITAL 
PATANAPAT
RAMKAMHAENG HOSPITAL 
BANGNA HOSPITAL 
MISSION HOSPITAL 
BANGPOO HOSPITAL 
KRUNTHEP HOSPITAL 
KLONGTON HOSPITAL 
KANARPAAT POLYCLINIC 
SAHAVEJ POLYCLINIC 
CHONGCHIN HOSPITAL 
DECHA HOSPITAL 
PHYATHAI2 
KRUNGDHON HOSPITAL 
YAOWARAK HOSPITAL 
THONBURI HOSPITAL 
V.S. POLYCLINIC 
PAATSIAM POLYCLINIC 
ANANPATANA HOSPITAL 
MAY YO HOSPITAL 
WIPAWADI HOSPITAL 
CENTRAL GENERAL HOSPITA 
CENTRAL POLYCLINIC
-0.1887 0.9262 -1.8133
1.6278 1.5666 -1.5643
0.1956 -0.3590 1.8359
0.4780 0.2547 -0.1521
-0.6008 0.0991 -0.3278
1.7089 -0.3157 0.1006
0.0817 -1.1148 -0.8185
1.0009 -0.2632 0.1093
-0.2168 -02034 0.3990
-1.2962 0.3347 -0.6480
-0.2835 -0.4962 -0.6861
-0.8251 0.8976 0.8420
-1.7316 1.1466 -0.2370
-0.5207 -0.8740 0.2633
-1.4119 -0.9487 -0.2981
-1.1921 1.4944 -2.8050
0.1800 -0.0775 0.0303
-0.0121 1.3525 -1.2666
0.4354 -0.0916 0.7867
-0.6915 0.5139 -0.5197
-0.4819 1.6396 1.9612
-0.5369 -1.1741 02044
-0.4604 1.0811 1.2906
1.4484 0.0845 -0.7146
0.4347 •0.1435 0.2323
0.9575 0.1231 0.2346
0.3092 -1.5986 0.5771
2.5063 -0.6422 -1.7747
0.2839 0.4592 0.3367
-1.3160 -12605 0.0042
-1.5657 -1.5290 -0.5551
-0.6848 0.6203 -12004
-0.0106 -0.5190 0.6072
1.1246 -0.8648 -0.4288
0.8285 0.2114 1.6506
-0.3291 1.8631 0.8240
1.5843 -0.0772 0.0674
-0.0464 2.5129 1.0592
-0.6814 -0.1242 1.4648
-0.9514 -1.3531 02746
1.1400 0.2917 1.0116
0.7741 -1.1271 -0.4985
0.5710 -1.0133 0.6328
-1.6351 -1.3028 -0.4919
-0.4481 -1.3508 0.2483
1.7871 1.3025 -3.0738
1.1008 -0.9096 -0.7204
-02540 0.1854 0.3764
-02495 -0.9146 0.6110
-0.8984 -1.4164 1.4005
-1.7089 0.0042 -0.6392
-0.1300 -0.4474 -0.2744
0.1758 -0.0253 -0.6098
0.0338 0.4809 1.0855
-1.2541 -1.2413 -1.1275
0.0633 1.4456 -0.0748
1.0719 1.8897 0.4543
-0.7480 0.5232 -1.8763
0.3093 0.1887 0.6612
1.3624 -0.0478 0.5159
-1.6328 0.9151 0.3007
-0.8761 -1.9843 -1.1524
-12362 0.8425 0.1465
-0.2036 -0.5025 0.5192
22239 -0.4333 0.1163
-0.7387 0.4192 -1.9778
-0.9510 1.3728 -1.0165
-0.8077 0.5791 0.7522
•0.5362 1.9262 1.5720
0.4301 -0.7506 0.1034
0.6427 -0.7272 -0.9983
0.5003 0.7760 2.1450
-1.5862 03171 0.8723
1.1540 -0.7161 0.4917
0.1794 02926 0.3362
0.5735 -1.3184 0.0513
-0.1761 0.9468 0.2417
1.4539 -1.0286 -1.0500
0.4864 -0.8862 0.9023
-12530 0.4066 -0.1835
1.8424 2.1974 -0.0597
-1.5531 -0.8796 -0.1322
12182 -1.3011 1.8175
-0.1862 0.1521 -0.6722
0.5827 -0.8724 0.0940
-0.3054 0.6057 0.1753
02904 -0.4045 -0.6424
0.2514 0.3890 0.2901
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Appendix 8
Cluster analysis - Hospitals by duster number
NAME BAV6
Type of Cluster Analysis 
Including Distance and Age variables 
BAV7 WAV6 WAV7 : BAV6
Excluding Distance and Age variables 
BAA/7 WAV6 WAV7
KWONG SUI HOSPITAL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HUACHIEW HOSPITAL 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
sukhumvtt h o spita l 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PAATBUNYAR HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PATANAVEJ HOSPITAL 3 3 4 4 1 1 1
SAMITIVEJ HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TEPTHARIN HOSPITAL 3 3 4 4 1 I 3
ST LOUIS HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
KARUNA PHITAK HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BAANMAI POLYCLINIC 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
RATBURANA HOSPITAL 3 3 4 4 1 1 3
RAMA SUKSAWAT HOSPITAL 5 5 6 6 5 5 5
BANGPAKOW POLYCLINIC 4 4 5 5 4 6 4
BANGKUTIEN HOSPITAL 0 3 4 4 1 1 3
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
BINTONG POLYCLINIC 4 4 4 4 4 6 1
BANGPAI HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PHETKASEM-BANGKAE HOSP 5 6 4 4 1 1 3
KASEMRAD HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
WICHANYUT HOSPITAL 5 6 4 4 1 1 1
PASICHALOEN HOSPITAL 5 5 6 6 5 5 5
CHIT AMARIN HOSPITAL 5 6 4 4 1 1 1
PATANAPAT 5 3 6 6 5 5 5
RAMKAMHAENG HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BANGNA HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
MISSION HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
BANGPOO HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
KRUNTHEP HOSPITAL 6 7 3 7 6 7 6
KLONGTON HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
KANARPAAT POLYCLINIC 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
SAHAVEJ POLYCLINIC 5 6 4 4 1 1 1
CHONGCHIN HOSPITAL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DECHA HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PHYATHAI2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
KRUNGDHON HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
YAOWARAK HOSPITAL 5 5 6 6 5 5 5
THONBURI HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
V.S. POLYCLINIC 5 5 6 6 5 5 5
PAATSIAM POLYCLINIC 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
ANANPATANA HOSPITAL 4 4 5 5 3 3 3
MAY YO HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 , 3
WIPAWADI HOSPITAL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
CENTRAL GENERAL HOSPITA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
CENTRAL POLYCLINIC 4 4 5 5 4 4 4
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Appendix 9
Sample and Response rate for consumer survey
No. no. Response 
ORGANIZATION District Distribute) Returned Rate 
GOVT
Min. of Foreign Affairs PH 30 24 80%
Min of Justice PH 20 19 95%
The National Museum PH 30 28 93%
Min of Transport PR 30 28 93%
Dept of Social Welfare PR 20 17 85%
Nat Statistics Office PR 30 30 100%
Customs Dept KT 25 21 84%
Srinakarinvirote Uni. KT 30 26 87%
Demonstration School S KT 30 30 100%
Town A Country PlanntHK 30 24 80%
BMA Cleansing Dept HK 25 18 72%
BMA Social Welfare DiHK 25 24 96%
Mineral Resource Dept R 30 20 67%
Highway Dept R 20 19 95%
Rajavithee Orphans HonR 30 28 93%
TOTAL GOVT 405 356 88%
PARASTATAL
Govt lottery PH 40 39 98%
Public Warehouse Org PH 35 0 0%
Govt Stationery Office PH 45 42 93%
Tourist Authority PR IS 13 87%
Forest Industry Org PR 25 18 72%
Tobacco Monopoly KT 30 27 90%
Pott Authority KT 25 16 64%
Tanning Organization KT 25 25 100%
Mass Communication OHK 25 25 100%
Govt Housing Bank HK 25 22 88%
Bangkok Mass Transit /HK 25 9 36%
Veterans Assoc. R 10 8 80%
Industrial Estate Auth. R 30 27 90%
Express Transport Org R 25 24 96%
TOTAL PARASTATAL 380 295 78%
No. no. Response 
ORGANIZATION District Distribute Returned Rate 
PRIVATE FOR-PROFIT
Minuna Hotel PH 25 21 84%
Kamonsukoson InsurancPH 25 21 84%
Lawyers' Council PH 25 16 64%
Sahamalayan Bank PR 25 25 100%
Bctaco Fanning PR 25 18 72%
Palitapan mansampalanf PR 25 25 100%
Ital Thai Engineeering HK 25 21 84%
Phisanu Kamchang HK 25 24 96%
STC Corporation HK 25 24 96%
B.Grim and Co. R 25 15 60%
Auto Technique R 25 25 100%
Era wan Hotel R 25 22 88%
Asoke Motors KT 25 18 72%
Group 4 Securities KT 25 14 56%
Saha Utsahakan Palm O KT 25 13 52%
TOTAL PRIVATE COMPANIES 375 302 81%
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Assoc for Mental Illness 25 24 %%
Klong Tooey Slum Found. 25 17 68%
Pawtectung Society 25 23 92%
World Vision 25 24 96%
Found, for Children in Need 20 16 80%
Catholic Council for Dev. 20 7 35%
Anti-TB Society 25 0 0%
Thai Volunteers Assoc. 25 12 48%
Pop and Community Dev Fund 25 24 96%
YMCA 25 25 100%
Thai-Japan Tech. Exchange 25 24 96%
People's Rights A Freedoms 20 14 70%
Youth A Children Found. 20 20 100%
Pearl S. Buck Found. 25 24 96%
Catholic Relief Services 25 6 24%
TOTAL NGOs 355 260 73%
GRAND TOTAL 
No. distributed ISIS
No returned A correct 1213
Response rate 80%
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Appendix 10
Pearson correlation coefficients between personal characteristics 
of sample
Sex Income Education Age
Sex 1
Income -0.1266** 1
Education 0.0151 0.2753** 1
Age -0.1117** 0.6027 0.03092 1
Key
** denotes significant at 0.001 level
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Appendix 11
Significance of difference in reasons for seeking care at a particular hospital across scenarios using t-test for two related samples
FINGER AND APPENDIX FINGER AND DELIVERY
Mean finger Mean append t Mean finger Mean delivery t Mean append Mean delivery t
Access 1.41 1.23 8.44* 1.36 1.28 2.84* 1.21 1.28 3.29*
Comfortable 2.45 2.11 13.74* 2.42 1.76 19.85* 2.04 1.76 10.50*
Dr who explains 2.08 1.66 16.84* 1.99 1.45 16.29* 1.57 1.45 5.26*
Skilled doctors 2 1.3 24.56* 1.91 1.19 22.16* 1.25 1.19 3.61*
Sympathetic nurses 2.05 1.96 4.46* 1.99 1.79 7.41* 1.89 1.78 5.31*
Reasonable price 2.16 2.16 0.16 2.19 2.17 0.76 2.19 2.17 0.81
Prompt service 1.65 1.51 7.10* 1.61 1.51 3.49* 1.45 1.51 2.64*
Contact at the hospital 3.55 3.19 12.51 3.51 3.05 12.12* 3.12 3.04 2.46*
Modem equipment 1.83 1.34 20.36 1.73 1.22 18.25* 1.29 1.22 4.12*
APPENDIX AND DELIVERY
Notes:
* indicates significance at 2% level
Explanation of scoring system is given in the text, lower scores suggest the variable is of greater importance
Appendix 12
Number of complaints by hospital compared with proposed utilization by hospital
Proposed utilization Respondents Ratio
Number % of all N. finghos N.apphos N.delhos Total use saying will use Complaint:
HOSPNAME complaints complaints as % of all. Predicted use
Bamroongrad 7 1.4 17 24 19 60 2.12% 0.66
Bangpoo 1 02 25 18 6 49 1.73% 0.12
Huachiew 10 2 22 23 45 90 3.18% 0.63
Kluay Namthai 14 2.8 14 17 3 34 1.20% 2.33
Krunghdon 5 1 12 16 4 32 1.13% 0.89
Knmgthep Chris 4 0.8 8 13 18 39 1.38% 0.58
Krunghtp 11 2.2 18 32 15 65 2.29% 0.96
Mayo 4 0.8 29 27 7 63 222% 0.36
Paolo Memorial 12 2.4 19 22 9 50 1.76% 1.36
Phathai 2 2 0.4 19 29 22 70 2.47% 0.16
Ramkamhaeng 18 3.5 79 66 20 165 5.82% 0.60
Samitivej 5 1 7 8 8 23 0.81% 1.23
Siam 2 0.4 22 14 1 37 1.31% 0.31
St Louis 0 0 20 20 13 53 1.87% 0.00
Sukhum vit 2 0.4 19 10 3 32 1.13% 0.35
Thonburi 10 2 46 59 21 126 4.45% 0.45
Wichaiyudht 1 0.2 20 19 10 49 1.73% 0.12
Wipawadi 6 12 27 26 14 67 2.36% 0.51
Phyathai 13 2.6 36 51 55 142 5.01% 0.52
Central/Klang 15 3 12 6 2 20 0.71% 4.25
Chula 44 8.7 22 41 45 108 3.81% 2.28
Lerdsin 5 1 8 8 3 19 0.67% 1.49
Nopparat 5 1 18 14 5 37 1.31% 0.77
Phumipol 6 1.2 19 29 13 61 2.15% 0.56
Police 10 2 8 12 6 26 0.92% 2.18
Pra Mongkut 13 2.6 15 26 17 58 2.05% 1.27
Pra Pin Klao 9 1.8 7 12 5 24 0.85% 2.13
Rajavithi 45 8.9 22 28 56 106 3.74% 2.38
Ramathibodi 67 13.2 26 67 78 171 6.03% 2.19
Siriraj 51 10 53 90 52 195 6.88% 1.45
Taksin 6 1.2 8 4 2 14 0.49% 2.43
Wachira 22 4.3 24 20 12 56 1.98% 2.18
total 1077 1071 686 2834
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Appendix 13
Reasons given for choosing public and private hospitals, by condition
PRIVATE HOSPITALS 
PRIVATE-FINGER TOTAL MEAN
R1 R2 R3 SCORE SCORE
Access 521 38 19 1658 2.61
Comfort 8 57 57 195 0.31
Dr explains well 7 45 71 182 029
Skilled doctors 52 161 72 550 0.87
Sympathetic nursing 7 65 67 218 0.34
Moderate price 4 51 73 187 0.29
Prompt service 23 149 136 503 0.79
Contact at hospital 2 6 8 26 0.04
Modem equipment 6 46 104 214 0.34
Registered hospital 4 3 3 21 0.03
Regular hospital 
TOTAL
PRIVATE APPEND
1
635
2 0 7
3761
TOTAL
0.01
MEAN
R1 R2 R3 SCORE SCORE
Access 379 60 38 1295 2.08
Comfort 5 45 45 150 024
Dr explains well 6 42 40 142 0.23
Skilled doctors 151 236 76 1001 1.61
Sympathetic nursing 3 25 42 101 0.16
Moderate price 16 35 65 183 0.29
Prompt service 11 72 125 302 0.49
Contact at hospital 15 15 18 93 0.15
Modem equipment 25 85 158 403 0.65
Registered hospital 10 4 7 45 0.07
Regular hospital 
TOTAL
1
622
0 1 4
3719
0.01
PRIVATE DELIVERY TOTAL MEAN
R1 R2 R3 SCORE SCORE
Access 163 38 41 606 1.41
Comfort 7 41 48 151 0.35
Dr explains well 15 35 38 153 0.36
Skilled doctors 183 128 34 839 1.96
Sympathetic nursing 3 18 33 78 0.18
Moderate price 8 38 57 157 0.37
Prompt service 6 38 40 134 0.31
Contact at hospital 14 20 20 102 024
Modem equipment 23 70 106 315 0.73
Registered hospital 6 2 7 29 0.07
Regular hospital 1 1 1 6 0.01
TOTAL 429 2570
Notes:
R1 denotes die number of people giving this as their primary reason, R2 as their secondary reason and 
R3 as their third reason. As described in the text three marks were given if the variable was a primary reason, 
two if it was a secondary reason and one if it was the third reason. The sum of these points is the SCORE and 
the mean score is simply the total score divided by the number of respondents.
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Appendix 13 - continued
Reasons given for choosing public and private hospitals, by condition
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
PUBLIC FINGER TOTAL MEAN
R1 R2 R3 SCORE SCORE
Access 172 14 9 553 2.43
Comfort 0 17 8 42 0.18
Dr explains well 6 13 27 71 0.31
Skilled doctors 18 50 23 177 0.78
Sympathetic nursing 5 16 8 55 0.24
Moderate price 12 53 53 195 0.86
Prompt service 7 22 35 100 0.44
Contact at hospital 5 10 12 47 0.21
Modem equipment 3 21 29 80 0.35
Registered hospital 0 0 2 2 0.01
Regular hospital 0 1 0 2 0.01
TOTAL 228 1324
PUBLIC APPEND TOTAL MEAN
R1 R2 R3 SCORE SCORE
Access 149 18 15 498 2.23
Comfort 0 7 8 22 0.10
Dr explains well 2 14 17 51 0.23
Skilled doctors 51 81 23 338 1.52
Sympathetic nursing 3 8 10 35 0.16
Moderate price 7 20 45 106 0.48
Prompt service 4 23 21 79 0.35
Contact at hospital 2 9 19 43 0.19
Modem equipment 4 36 52 136 0.61
Registered hospital 0 1 1 3 0.01
Regular hospital 1 0 1 4 0.02
TOTAL 223 1315
PUBLIC DELIVERY
R1 R2 R3
TOTAL MEAN 
SCORE SCORE
Access 69 7 13 234 1.63
Comfort 4 9 13 43 0.30
Dr explains well 7 14 10 59 0.41
Skilled doctors 44 49 16 246 1.71
Sympathetic nursing 2 3 19 31 0.22
Moderate price 5 17 12 61 0.42
Prompt service 2 8 12 34 0.24
Contact at hospital 4 8 10 38 0.26
Modem equipment 7 27 32 107 0.74
Registered hospital 0 1 1 3 0.02
Regular hospital 0 0 2 2 0.01
TOTAL 144 858
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APPENDIX 14
SCORES FOR CHARACTERISTICS BY HOSPITAL AND CONDITION
1. FINGER
BMG PHYATHAI RKH MAYO CHULA RAMA RAJAVTFHI WACHIF
ACCESS 1.9 1.79 2.73 2.71 1.75 2.30 2.37 2.47
COMFORT 0.8 0.34 0.40 0.38 0.00 0.13 0.32 0.24
DREXPLAD 0.4 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.52 0.68 0.47
SKILL DR 1.5 1.28 0.84 1.00 1.63 0.91 0.58 0.94
SYMPNURI 0.6 0.43 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.26 0.21 0.00
CHEAP 0 0.18 0.17 0.38 1.06 0.65 0.58 0.82
PROMPT 0.5 0.87 0.66 0.90 0.38 0.57 0.37 0.47
CONTACT 0 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.38 0.04 0.11 0.53
EQUIPMENT 0.6 0.57 0.47 0.14 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.18
REGIST 0 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
REGULAR 0 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
2. APPENDICITIS 
BMG PHYATHAI RKH MAYO CHULA RAMA R A JA vm n WACHIRA
ACCESS 1.58 1.61 2.59 2.55 1.38 1.24 1.52 2.35
COMFORT 0.74 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.12
DREXPLAD 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.18 0.46 0.30 0.35
SKILL DR 1.42 1.95 1.45 1.45 2.09 1.98 1.61 1.47
SYMPNURI 0.37 0.28 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.00
CHEAP 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.88 0.74 0.78 0.59
PROMPT 0.42 0.53 0.40 0.70 0.06 0.15 0.39 0.18
CONTACT 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.53 0.26 0.26 0.53
EQUIPMENT 1.21 0.87 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.89 0.87 0.41
REGIST 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00
REGULAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00
3. DELIVERY
BMG PHYATHAI RKH MAYO CHULA RAMA RAJAVmH WACHIRA
ACCESS 0.88 1.01 2.33 2.50 0.68 1.03 1.43 3.00
COMFORT 0.69 0.57 0.28 0.50 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.00
DREXPLAD 0.44 0.26 0.39 0.50 0.78 0.38 0.45 0.44
SKILL DR 2.06 2.10 1.39 1.00 2.16 2.12 1.85 , 1.00
SYMPNURI 0.25 0.35 0.28 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.00
CHEAP 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.65 0.62 0.79 0.78
PROMPT 0.75 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.11
CONTACT 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.25 0.49 0.26 0.53 0.33
EQUIPMENT 0.94 0.90 0.67 0.75 0.78 1.03 0.34 0.33
REGIST 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00
REGULAR 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
4. MEAN ALL CONDITIONS
BMG PHYATHAI RKH MAYO CHULA RAMA RAJAVITHI WACHIRA
ACCESS 1.45 1.47 2.55 2.59 1.27 1.53 1.77 2.61
COMFORT 0.74 0.40 0.34 0.43 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.12
DREXPLAD 0.38 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.48 0.42
SKILL DR 1.66 1.78 1.23 1.15 1.96 1.67 1.35 1.14
SYMPNURI 0.41 0.35 0.22 0.10 0.07 0.21 0.16 0.00
CHEAP 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.86 0.67 0.72 0.73
PROMPT 0.56 0.62 0.50 0.70 0.17 0.28 0.32 0.25
CONTACT 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.46 0.19 0.30 0.46
EQUIPMENT 0.92 0.78 0.61 0.45 0.62 0.80 0.53 0.31
REGIST 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
REGULAR 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00
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Appendix 15
Frequency of complaints by hospital ownership
No. of As % of all No. of As % of all No. of As % of all
complaints about public hospital complaints about private hospital complaints about complaints
COMPLAINT public hospitals complaints private hospitals complaints all hospitals
Slow 79 15.83% 18 9.84% 109 14.44%
Long Queue 58 11.62% 31 16.94% 103 13.64%
Poor service 47 9.42% 18 9.84% 76 10.07%
Rude 58 11.62% 12 6.56% 74 9.80%
Apathy 39 7.82% 13 7.10% 57 7.55%
Impolite 42 8.42% 7 3.83% 55 7.28%
Manner 25 5.01% 9 4.92% 38 5.03%
Careless 24 4.81% 7 3.83% 32 4.24%
Expensive 5 1.00% 21 11.48% 31 4.11%
Reception 21 4.21% 5 2.73% 28 3.71%
Poor advice 19 3.81% 3 1.64% 23 3.05%
Crowded 14 2.81% 5 2.73% 22 2.91%
Cleanliness 15 3.01% 4 2.19% 19 2.52%
Wrong diagnosis 6 1.20% 8 4.37% 15 1.99%
Discriminate 11 2.20% 0 0.00% 13 1.72%
Queue jumping 11 2.20% 1 0.55% 12 1.59%
Poor exam 5 1.00% 6 3.28% 12 1.59%
Long process 11 2.20% 1 0.55% 12 1.59%
Over-charge 1 0.20% 8 4.37% 9 1.19%
Limited 5 1.00% 2 1.09% 8 1.06%
Incompetent 3 0.60% 4 2.19% 7 0.93%
Total no. complaints 499 100.00% 183 100.00% 755 100.00%
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Appendix 16
Scatter plots for correlation analyses in Chapter 8
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Appendix 16 - continued
Scatter plots for correlation analyses in Chapter 8
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Appendix 17
Competition measures by hospital
NAME COMP2 COMP5 BEDCOMP2 BEDCOMP5 HHI2 HHI5
PHYATHAI 1 21 57 5.1 2.4 0.100 0.045
PHYATHAI 2 17 45 5.6 2.9 0.107 0.057
DECHA HOSPITAL 19 55 1.6 0.7 0.108 0.045
MISSION HOSPITAL 13 60 5.0 1.2 0.132 0.047
KWONG SUI HOSPITAL 14 52 1.3 0.3 0.147 0.054
CHONGCHIN HOSPITAL 13 57 1.7 0.4 0.180 0.054
RATBURANA HOSPITAL 5 18 28.1 4.9 0.193 0.153
HUACHEW HOSPITAL 11 62 33.0 4.5 0.199 0.046
BANGKUTIEN HOSPITAL 5 26 24.5 2.1 0.204 0.107
SAHAVEJ POLYCLINIC 11 51 0.6 0.1 0.231 0.054
KRUNTHEP HOSPITAL 6 27 42.7 11.8 0.260 0.113
ST LOUIS HOSPITAL 11 44 11.8 3.9 0.271 0.069
SAMmVEJ HOSPITAL 6 31 21.8 3.9 0.272 0.110
PROMMTT 6 35 8.7 1.5 0.272 0.102
BAMROONGRAD 11 61 13.4 2.0 0.273 0.046
YAOWARAK HOSPITAL 4 31 12.4 0.7 0.293 0.147
KRUNGDHON HOSPITAL 5 40 36.7 1.7 0.297 0.102
KLONGTON HOSPITAL 5 21 6.2 1.8 0.312 0.112
PETHAVEJ 4 22 12.9 4.1 0.331 0.123
PATANAVEJ HOSPITAL 4 15 7.4 1.5 0.332 0.128
PAATBUNYAR HOSPITAL 2 15 45.5 7.3 0.372 0.131
PASICHALOEN HOSPITAL 2 19 45.5 3.7 0.385 0.089
PATANAPAT 3 22 5.6 0.8 0.389 0.154
su k h u m v t t  h o s p it a l 4 14 37.3 7.4 0.406 0.132
ROMSAI POLYCLINIC 2 19 21.7 0.9 0.414 0.153
KASEMRAD HOSPITAL 3 8 59.5 26.6 0.420 0.175
PHETKASEM-BANGKAE HOSP 3 9 18.3 10.1 0.433 0.171
MAY YO HOSPITAL 2 7 49.8 24.5 0.442 0.230
RAMA SUKSAWAT HOSPITAL 5 18 6.0 3.2 0.467 0.173
V.S. POLYCLINIC 6 17 0.4 0.2 0.475 0.190
BANGBORN HOSPITAL 1 8 50.0 7.3 0.500 0.189
BINTONG POLYCLINIC 1 8 50.0 8.0 0.500 0.217
WIPAWADI HOSPITAL 1 6 46.7 23.6 0.502 0.223
BANGPAI HOSPITAL 2 25 66.7 2.2 0.520 0.214
SUKSAWAT POLYCLINIC 5 28 1.9 0.3 0.616 0.179
THONBURI HOSPITAL 5 30 18.5 5.5 0.619 0.108
BAANMAI POLYCLINIC 4 37 1.9 0.2 0.633 0.086
WICHANYUT HOSPITAL 1 6 23.1 9.3 0.645 0.223
B ANGPAKOW POLYCLINIC 5 20 6.3 1.8 0.661 0.133
KLUAY NAMTHAI 3 5 59.5 26.6 0.680 0.099
PAOLO MEMORIAL 3 34 81.5 3.7 0.684 0.080
BANGPOO HOSPITAL 2 20 83.3 1.6 0.708 0.116
SAENAVEJCHAKARN 1 7 11.9 2.8 0.790 0.192
CENTRAL GENERAL HOSPITAI 5 32 93.8 14.2 0.883 0.584
ANANPATANA HOSPITAL 1 12 6.1 0.5 0.885 0.227
YANHII POLYCLINIC 2 26 2.9 0.3 0.888 0.102
KANARPAAT POLYCLINIC 1 4 3.6 1.3 0.930 0.325
SIAM HOSPITAL 1 4 96.4 51.9 0.930 0.424
RAMKAMHAENG HOSPITAL 1 5 96.9 57.7 0.940 0.398
LADKABUNG 0 1 100.0 45.5 1.000 0.504
BANGMOD 0 20 100.0 11.2 1.000 0.170
BANGNA HOSPITAL 0 1 100.0 100.0 1.000 1.000
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